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This dissertation focuses on the economic inequality problem in Nepal, in particular, to 
integrate insights from other social aspects into the distribution problems of economic 
resources. It consists of five chapters on income and wealth distribution in Nepal. The first 
Chapter presents an overview of Nepal’s history, geography, economic development, 
policies and problems. The aim of Chapter Two is to provide an understanding of the 
inequality of income for 1984 and 1996 in Nepal and to describe how income/expenditure 
inequality in Nepal has changed during the period 1984 and 1996. In Chapter Three we 
examine the inequality of wealth distribution for 1995 and 1996 in Nepal. The Chapter four 
continues to investigate income and wealth inequalities using decomposition methods 
because they provide rigorous and powerful tools for identifying the underlying structure of 
income or wealth, which allow for direct interpretation of the estimated contribution in terms 
of the inequality index – the relative contribution of a set of population characteristics and of 
each income factor source that may be found within household income, expenditure and 
wealth. Chapter Five investigates the inequality of income in the process of development in 
Nepal. We first examine the Kuznets’ proposition according to which ‘the degree of 
inequality varies systematically with the level of income per head – initially increasing as 
incomes rise and then, beyond some point, decreasing, with further increases in income per 
head’. By considering historical, structural, institutional, political and socioeconomic issues, 
we offer an alternative explanation of reducing economic inequality in Nepal, with an 
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I The Background and Objective of the Study 
This dissertation is a study on the inequality of income, expenditure and wealth 
distribution in Nepal. A number of recent economic theories postulate that inequality might be 
necessary to generate extra savings required for fast growth. A number of new studies published 
in the 1990s have found a negative relationship between inequality and growth (see Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1994, Persson and Tabellini, 1994, Clarke 1995 etc). Deninger and Squire (1996) found 
a negative relationship between the unequal distribution of assets and growth. Aghion and 
Bolton (1991) have examined the effect of wealth inequality on growth in the presence of 
imperfect capital markets. In this latter context, poor people are liquidity constrained; which 
leads to a more unequal wealth distribution. The result of this liquidity constraint is that it will 
be difficult for poor societies to invest in human and physical capital; and this will lead to lower 
productivity. Barrow (1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) have argued that higher levels of 
inequality stimulate political instability. 
Opinions on the desirable level of inequality and standard of living of countries vary 
between different schools of economic thought. For example in Nepal, more than 40 percent of 
the population lives below the poverty line.1 The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP, 1998) reported that poverty was greater in rural areas, especially at higher altitudes and 
less accessible regions. Poverty among the lower castes and ethnic minorities has been found to 
be higher than elsewhere. This suggests an unfair distribution of economic resources among the 
socio-economic classes. Therefore, a higher level of income inequality tends to be bad for the 
                                                 
1 The estimates come from the official statistics 1996 and based on a poverty line of $1 per day per 
person. 
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economy because it increases the number of poor or it further deteriorates the condition of poor 
cohorts of population. In such a situation, there is always the increased risk of social and 
political conflicts. 
The link between political risk and poverty has been often illustrated in Nepal. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, Nepal saw an extreme change in its political climate from absolute 
monarchy (which lasted until the late 1980s) to a democracy with a constitutional monarchy. 
The movement of the 1980s yielded a functional democracy and allowed many political parties 
to emerge in Nepal; among which the Nepal Congress Party (NCP) and the Communist Party of 
Nepal (CPN) featured prominently, alongside many other small parties. The first democratic 
election was held in 1991, which brought NCP to power with a majority to serve a five-year 
term. In the 1991 election, the Nepal Communist Party, United People’s Front (SJM) became the 
third largest party in the House of Representatives. In 1994, the SJM split in order to participate 
in the second interim election. In 1995, former Parliamentarian Pushpa Kamal Dahal, left the 
SJM to form the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN, Maoist) and began guerrilla fighting against 
the elected government. In early 1996, the Maoists declared the so-called people’s war. More 
than 10,000 people have lost their lives in the last nine years of civil war that have resulted since 
then. Between 1984 and 1996 Nepal experienced a rapidly worsening distribution of income and 
of wealth. The social conflict in Nepal has part of its roots in the increasing income and wealth 
inequality. Hence, to some extent, the last two decades were very important in modern Nepalese 
history; and show clearly the link between political risk and poverty – the available household 
surveys drew my attention to the issue of Nepal’s income, expenditure and wealth inequality. 
Economists have recently been interested in the studies of inequality of income and 
wealth. Most of these early studies focused on developed countries. Despite the bulk of literature 
in this field, however, Nepal lacks specific research because household data regarding income 
and wealth have not been previously available. Recently, however, the Central Bureau Statistic 
(CBS) of Nepal has initiated some surveys on living standards of Nepalese households and has 
collected the household income, expenditure, wealth and so on. The Central Bank of Nepal 
(NRB) has, probably for the first time, carried out a survey of household budgets that yielded 
specific data on income and consumption at the household level. Relying on the data from NRB 
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and CBS we analyse inequality for 1984 (income and expenditure only), 1996 (income, 
expenditure and wealth) and 2001 (rural income and expenditure). 
In developed societies, opportunities for advancement are generally based on merit and 
open to everyone regardless of class, race, creed, sex or other discriminatory criteria. Inequality, 
therefore, is not a large concern in those societies. In Nepal, however, opportunities are not 
equally open to all. This leads us to argue that the unbiased socio-economic class system of 
Nepal (caste, ethnicity and so on) has highly affected its distribution of income and wealth. For 
example, the higher caste and ethnic groups are generally wealthy and retain the highest ranks of 
public and private jobs, granting them strong political influence. Additionally, they may be 
better able to afford high investment in human and physical capital, which directly improves 
their productivity. Therefore, the high earning jobs are concentrated in these groups, has led to a 
big gap between the higher and lower social classes of Nepal in terms of income, expenditure 
and wealth distribution. Hence, social stratification has become a foundation for economic 
inequality in Nepal. It seems, from our analysis, that the social classification of Nepalese people 
has become a tool for reinforcing economic gaps, as much as social values. The main objectives 
of our study are: 
 
• to understand the inequality of income for 1984, 1996 and 2001 (only rural Nepal) and 
of wealth for 1995 and 1996. We are fully aware that having data for 1995 and 1996 
only we cannot draw conclusions as to the dynamics of wealth. But these data are 




                                                 
2 We have just received the data for Nepal Living Standard Survey for the year 2003/4 but due to lack of 
time we cannot include them in this thesis. We shall do so in a forthcoming research. 
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• to construct some useful explanations of the evolution of income/expenditure inequality 
from 1984 to 2001 and to analyse the inequality of wealth for 1995 and 1996. This will 
be assessed against an historical background. At the same time it is also important to 
compare the distribution of income inequality in the South Asian Nations in order to 
capture the impact of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
revolution.3 
• This thesis will also provide broad information on the situation of household wealth 
inequality in the mid 1990s and will give some attention to the varying experience of 
different groups of the society. We will additionally supply information on regional 
dimensions of inequality of income, expenditure and wealth distribution in Nepal. To the 
best of our knowledge, an exhaustive study on wealth inequality does not exist yet in the 
case of Nepal; it is our intension to dedicate further effort to future studies in this field. 
• to investigate the contributions of factor income components on inequality and the role 
of population subgroups (by social, geographical, economic etc. criteria) in forming the 
level of inequality of income, expenditure and wealth in Nepal. 
• to explore some of the implications of inequality of income, expenditure and wealth in 
the process of development as discussed by Kuznets (1955). 
                                                 
3 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established on 8 December 1985 
by the Heads of State or Government of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka. The Association provides a platform for the peoples of South Asia to work together in a spirit of 
friendship, trust and understanding. It aims to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to 
improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region. Cooperation in the SAARC is based on respect for the principles of sovereign 
equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in internal affairs of the Member 
States and mutual benefit. 
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II Summary of the Thesis 
This study is organised into five chapters. The first Chapter presents an overview of 
Nepal’s history, geography, economic development, policies and problems. It covers the social, 
demographic as well as the administrative characteristics of the country. Additionally, we 
provide the first glimpse of the macroeconomic trends, distribution of resources and poverty in 
Nepal. We end this chapter by trying to identify the most relevant causes of poverty in Nepal. 
The remaining the chapters are summarised below. 
The aim of Chapter Two is to provide an understanding of the inequality of income for 
1984 and 1996 in Nepal and to describe how income/expenditure inequality in Nepal has 
changed during the period 1984 and 1996. These two dates represent two important decades 
during which Nepal experienced an absolute monarchy (in the 1980s) and democracy (since the 
beginning of the 1990s). At the same time it is also important to compare the distribution of 
income inequality with other South Asian Nations in order to capture the impact of the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) revolution. We also try to provide the 
reasons for the inequality trend in South Asian Nations over the last two decades. Nepal appears 
to have had one of the highest levels of inequality in the SAARC nations in the 1990s. These 
international comparisons tend to be difficult because of differences in data sources and in 
measurement methods between countries. However, it may be said with certainty that Nepal’s 
level of inequality has risen substantially in the 1990s relative to the levels observed in other 
SAARC countries. 
This chapter also evaluates the analytical tools that are to be used in this study. 
Inequality of income may yield different results based on the same data due to the varying 
sensitivity of inequality measures. Some inequality measures may be sensitive in lower tails of 
the distribution and others in the upper tail. Therefore, judging income inequality by using only 
one index may be erroneous. In this chapter we have collected nine inequality indexes4 such that 
some are lower tail sensitive, some are middle class sensitive and others are upper tail sensitive. 
                                                 
4 We adopted these indicators from Sawyer (1976) and have refined them for our analysis. 
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It is especially useful in order to compare the two distributions – whether one is more unequal 
than another. If all measures show that the first is greater than the latter, then we may 
indisputably claim it to be true. One cannot go beyond the limitations of the data set at hand, but 
appropriate applications of research tools should provide more reliable results. In general, all 
inequality measures, regardless of magnitude, produce a similar interpretation in the trend 
analysis. These indexes are found to be valuable when we analysed the inequality trend of 
income for each country of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
nations, and the comparison of inequality between these countries – particularly when the 
difference is very small, some measures may produce positive difference while others may 
produce negative difference for the same distributions of income. 
To measure the impact of income inequality we used income data per quintile group, 
since more detailed data are not available. Additionally, we compare the results from Nepal with 
those of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. We shall focus on the following points 
 
• Measuring the Trend of Income Inequality in Nepal: The quintile shares for 1984 and 
1996 reveals the amount lost by the entire lower four quintiles between these two 
periods. The gain of the top quintile was 5.3 percent of total income. In 1996 the 20 
percent of households with the highest incomes earned nearly half — 44.8 percent — of 
national income, while the remaining 80 percent of the population divided the other half 
(56.2 percent) of national income. Thus, the distribution of income worsened between 
1984 and 1996 and the losers were the lower quintiles. This result was confirmed by all 
inequality measures implemented in this study. 
• Measuring Inequality Trends in Bangladesh 1981-96: Bangladesh experienced a 
decreasing income dispersion during the last two decades. The aggregate share of the 
richest quintile decreased from 1981 to 1996, though in the mid 1980s and from 1992-96 
it showed a tendency to increase its share. On the contrary, the poorest quintile share has 
consistently increased throughout this period; while the middle three quintiles 
experienced a mixed pattern with a rise and fall of their income share in the national 
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income. Bangladesh has succeeded to reduce the inequality of income distribution in the 
1990s compared with the 1980s. 
• Measuring Inequality Trends in India 1981-96: Between 1983 and 1986 inequality 
slightly increased in India; the Gini’s index increased by 0.56 percent point. India 
experienced a decline in inequality for the next four years. It reached the lowest 
inequality level of the last two decades in 1990, with a Gini index equal to 27.28 
percentage points. Then, in the nineties the inequality rose drastically in India. 
• Measuring Inequality Trends in Pakistan 1985-97: In the last two decades 6 household 
surveys were carried out to estimate the income distribution of the country. The initial 
inequality registered 0.30 for the Gini index. From 1986 to 1997, Pakistan experienced a 
decline of income inequality. Some exceptions are found – the inequality registered an 
increase between 1988 and 1991 for Log Variance and Atkinson’s index (ε=2) and 
between 1991 and 1997 for Theil index; but for the rest of the measures we found a 
decline of inequality. 
• Measuring Inequality Trends in Sri Lanka 1980-95: Four household surveys were used 
to estimate the income distribution of the country. The initial inequality is measured at 
0.41 for the Gini index. Inequality of income increased between 1981 and 1987. During 
this period, inequality marked the highest point for the South Asian Nations – the Gini 
coefficient was 0.42. Between 1987 and 1990 the Gini index declined dramatically by 
more than 14 percentage points. This is due to the data for expenditure used for 1990; 





There was a considerable change in income inequality in the selected South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries. Among the SAARC countries, Nepal 
had the most equal distribution in the 1980s; while in the 1990s, Nepal had the worst distribution 
of income. 
In Chapter Three we examine the inequality of wealth distribution for 1995 and 1996 
in Nepal. The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) of Nepal collected in 1996 a comprehensive set 
of data on different aspects of household welfare, such as consumption, income, housing, labour 
markets, education, health, wealth, migrations etc. These data are used in Chapter Three for 
calculating the distribution of wealth between urban and rural areas, among various levels of 
development (Far-western, Mid-western, Western, Central and Eastern), ecological (Mountains, 
Hills, Terai) regions, and among various religious as well as ethnic groups of Nepal. To our 
knowledge this type of study has not previously been undertaken in the Nepalese context. This 
chapter, therefore, aims at providing a reference for future study in this field. 
 
• Wealth distribution between the rural and urban families: 
One of the major components of wealth is the family dwelling. The majority of 
families own their dwelling; rented houses being found only in the urban areas and in the central 
regions. Other important components of wealth in Nepal are land, livestock and farming assets. 
Around 83 percent of the total households have some farming land, but its distribution is very 
unequal. These three elements are the most valuable assets in an agrarian society, because they 
represent the core of production. The non-farm enterprises, around 24 percent of the households, 
are found to be operating such activities. Finally durable goods – i.e. the materials and supplies 
held by a family – and borrowings and lending are other important components of wealth. 
First of all it is important to mention that the level of inequality of overall wealth 
distribution in Nepal is much higher compared to most industrialized countries. Our study on 
wealth distribution reveals a large variation between urban and rural families. We find that 
wealth is more concentrated in the upper class households of urban areas; however inequality of 
wealth remained higher in rural areas. Taken overall, Nepal’s wealth distribution has slightly 
improved between 1995 and 1996. Urban families are far wealthier than rural ones, though. The 
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lower 40 percent of the families owned only 9 percent of the total agriculture land; while the top 
6 percent occupied more than 33 percent. Hence, few rich households own the higher part of 
land, while most of the farmers are landless or marginal farm holders. It is worth noting that in 
rural areas the informal financial market is the sole source of credit; the so-called educated 
feudalists taking advantage of the illiteracy of rural people by lending money at high interest 
rates. 
 
• Wealth distribution among the households of development regions: 
Our measures show the least inequality of wealth in the far-western, followed by mid-
western, eastern, western and central development regions, for both years, 1995 and 1996. 
Wealth distribution has improved in all regions except in the mid-western region; and average 
net wealth has increased. The households of the central region are wealthier by more than four-
fold compared with the households of the far-western region and by more than three-fold 
compared with the mid-western and eastern development regions. The western development 
region is the second richest region in terms of wealth, where the households are wealthier by two 
times compared with the eastern and mid-western regions. The value of enterprises for 
households in the central and western development regions is higher, suggesting that they have 
alternative income resources apart from agriculture. It seems that the wealthier development 
regions are characterised by a higher inequality, while the poor development regions have better 
distribution of wealth. In this chapter we try to draw some conclusions on the reasons for this 
state of things. 
 
• Wealth distribution among the households of geographical regions: 
The lower 60 percent of households have a higher proportion of wealth in the 
Mountain region compared with other regions. Not only the relative value but even in terms of 
absolute value, the wealth of the Hill region is around three times higher than that of the Terai 
region; and five times higher than that of the Mountain region. The inequality of wealth 
distribution has decreased between 1995 and 1996, but it is still large for the Hill region. The 
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household wealth of all regions is composed mainly of the value of dwellings and landholding. 
Moreover, the livestock is essential in the formation of wealth because families heavily depend 
on herding and trading in the Mountain region, while in the Hill region the other assets and 
enterprises are important components of wealth. The density of the population is very high in the 
Hill and Terai regions. Agriculture is the predominant economic activity, supplemented by 
livestock. The vast majority of the households are land-hungry, hence the poor economic 
situation is due to land scarcity, and the acute inequality of its distribution and some forms of 
bonded labour are at the basis of high inequality of wealth distribution in these areas. 
 
• Wealth distribution classified by household religion5: 
The dominance of the higher classes of the Hindu society over the lower classes is 
evident in the socio-economic and religious values predominant in today’s Nepal. It has certainly 
reflected on the distribution of wealth. Wealth distribution among Buddhist families tends to be 
more unequal, followed by Hindu households. The top percentiles of the Hindu and Buddhist 
households have experienced a decrease in their share of wealth between 1995 and 1996. The 
household wealth share of the lower 60 percent has increased for these groups, and, as a result, 
the distribution of wealth has slightly improved. The Buddhists were the wealthiest families of 
Nepal in 1996, and their value of entrepreneurship is relatively high compared with others. 
Wealth for the Muslim households is more equally distributed - this is not surprising since the 
concept of equality is stronger for them- and their range of profession is rather limited. 
 
• Wealth distribution among the ethnic/caste families: 
The Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS 1996) has considered fifteen ethnic groups 
in Nepal – Bramin, Chetry, Newar, Gurung, Rai, Magar, Limbu, Tamang, Tharu, Yadav/Ahir, 
Muslim, Sarki, Kami, Damai. The Newar, one of the oldest ethnic groups in Nepal, are the 
                                                 
5 The Nepalese households are segregated into four groups according to the religion that the household 
believe in. 
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country’s earliest inhabitants. Because of their identity business oriented, Newar have managed 
to remain lesser dominated by the ruling elite; and they are the wealthiest groups, followed by 
Bramin, Gurung, Chetri. The average net wealth has increased for all ethnic households between 
1995 and 1996. Gurung households face the strongest wealth inequality, followed by Chetri, 
Bramin, Tamang, Magar and Newar. The Mongoloid groups (Gurung, Rai, Magar etc.) live in 
the remote hills and mountains of Nepal, where development has been very slow and the 
illiteracy rate is very high, while some families are in important positions in the Gorkha 
regiment in England or India. This has led them to have high earnings and savings; causing high 
inequality in the wealth distribution. Limbu, Muslim, Yadav/Ahir, Taru and the lower castes 
households, i.e. Kami, Damai and Sarki, are generally classified as poor households. Due to low 
education and skills, they have little chance of improving their situation; indeed other sectors 
(than agriculture) of the economy offer them fewer opportunities. They have relatively low 
inequality of wealth distribution, though, compared with other ethnic groups. 
The inequality measure decomposition methods provide rigorous and powerful tools 
for identifying the underlying structure of income or wealth, which allow for direct interpretation 
of the estimated contribution in terms of the inequality index. Chapter Four analyses two types 
of decomposition of inequality – the relative contribution of a set of population characteristics 
and of each income factor source that may be found within household income, expenditure and 
wealth. 
The first one deals with the influence of population subgroups, those identified by the 
Nepal Living Standard Survey and Household Consumption Survey of Rural Nepal6, upon total 
inequality. This method divides the level of inequality ‘between groups’ and ‘within groups’. 
This type of analysis provides the answers to the following question. How much inequality of 
Nepalese income, expenditure and wealth may be explained by the differences of between urban 
and rural areas and within each area, between development regions and within each development 
region, between various religion people/families and within each religion people/families, and 
                                                 
6 Nepalese people are subdivided by geographical regions, development regions, rural and urban 
families/individuals, religions and ethnicity or castes. 
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between ethnic/caste groups and within each ethnic/caste group? Dynamic decomposition by the 
population subgroups identifies the changes in inequality due to the changing demographic 
composition by each subgroup, changes in the mean income/wealth of each group, and the 
inequality changes within each group. For our analysis we use three indexes, i.e., the Gini index 
and two Theil indexes. We have developed the decomposition methodology for the Gini index 
proposed by Yao (1999) and the two Theil indexes by Shorrocks (1980). 
This latter is the decomposition of inequality by factor sources, which allows for the 
estimations of the factor contribution of each income and wealth source to the overall inequality. 
The impact of these sources on total income or wealth is examined in this study. We 
disaggregate the total income of Nepalese households and individuals into seven sources. 
Similarly we disaggregate the total wealth into nine sources. Following Shorrocks (1982) we 
have developed three methods of inequality decomposition by income and wealth sources, they 
are: (a) the Theil Decomposition (T/D) rule, (b) the Variance Decomposition (V/D) rule and (c) 
the Factor Share (F/S) rule. We examine which factor of income and wealth contributes more to 
the level of inequality and by how much. T/D and V/D measures further identify which factor 
leads to an increasing or decreasing inequality. 
In this chapter, we analysed the decomposition by population subgroups for income 
and consumption inequality (1996 and 2001) and for wealth inequality (1996). 
• The decomposition of inequality for expenditure: 
The within groups index dominates the between group on whichever partition criteria 
is used. The ‘between inequality’ term ranges from 3 percent to 32 percent of total expenditure 
inequality relative to undertaken partitions in this study. It ranges from 5 percent to 38 percent of 
total inequality when we use the per capita expenditure. The ‘between inequality’ term accounts 
for 11 percent and 12 percent in the aggregate inequality for development regions and ecological 
belts respectively in the household expenditure. It is even higher for individual expenditure. The 
urban rural decomposition registered around two fifth; while the ethnic/caste decomposition 
registered around one fifth of total inequality for the between terms. Little of expenditure 
inequality is explained by the between group for the decomposition of population by religion. 
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Though the disparity in household mean income among the religion groups is high, the higher 
proportion of population weight (above 80 percent) dictated low ‘between inequality’ term. 
• The decomposition of inequality for income: 
The results of income inequality decomposition show that the bulk of inequality is due 
to the differences within the population groups rather than to disparities among groups. The 
exceptions to this pattern emerged when population is grouped according to ethnicity as well as 
rural and urban residences. Around 10 percent of the aggregate inequality is accounted by the 
between term when the population is disaggregated by the ethnicity of the country. Similarly 
around 15 percent of the aggregate inequality is accounted by this term for urban and rural 
population decomposition. 
• The decomposition analysis of the inequality of wealth: 
The analysis of inequality decomposition by population subgroups for wealth reveals 
that the ‘between inequality’ term contributes to a small extent to total inequality compared with 
the ‘within’ term. We found that the between term is higher for the ethnic decomposition as well 
as for the urban/rural decomposition. The ‘between inequality’ term for the development and 
ecological regions is relatively high; but for the religion classification, it is very low as in the 
income and expenditure distributions. This suggests that wealth inequality can be reduced 
among the religious groups only by reducing inequality in each group. 
• The decomposition analysis of the inequality for rural Nepal 1996 and 2001: 
In this research we shall conclude that overall inequality has decreased between 1996 
and 2001 for the decomposition of population by geographical regions in rural Nepal. In 
absolute terms the large part of the decrease is due to the within components, but it has 
decreased only by 6 percent; while the between term has decreased by 34 percent. Thus the 
improvement in expenditure distribution in rural Nepal between 1996 and 2001 is primarily due 
to the improvements of between development region inequalities. Similarly, when we 
decompose the rural household by ecological belt, the between inequality term seems to be 
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almost eliminated. The reduction of inequality is completely due to the within components of 
regional inequality. 
• Decomposition of wealth inequality by its sources: 
Dwelling, landholding and other assets represent a higher proportion of the aggregate 
household wealth; and the dominant positive influences on inequality relate to the same 
components. We shall find that all the components of wealth (except for the value of livestock) 
have a positive impact on total inequality. On the contrary, livestock negatively contributes to 
total inequality for both T/D and V/D rules. 
More than 60 percent of total rural wealth comes from land holding, probably because 
of the agrarian-based rural economy. More than 65 percent of total inequality is caused by this 
component of wealth. Dwelling and other assets are a relatively high component of total wealth; 
they also contribute to the higher inequality level in rural Nepal. Only the livestock represents 
the negative factor in total inequality for the T/D rule, suggesting that it is negatively correlated. 
The urban wealth distribution is dominated by dwellings, and then by landholdings and 
other assets. Farm assets and livestock have a negative value for the T/D rule; while for the V/D 
rule they are almost irrelevant. The remaining components of wealth in urban Nepal have a 
positive effect in the determination of total inequality. 
• Decomposition of income inequality by its sources: 
Farm income has the highest share in income of Nepal and more than 80 percent of the 
aggregate inequality measure is explained by this component for 1996. Wage income, rent of 
owner occupied house, and income from enterprises contribute to more than 10 percent of total 
income. Wage income has a negative impact on rural inequality of income distribution; while the 
remaining part of the components has a positive value. In urban income distribution, the share of 
farm income accounts for only around 10 percent. Enterprise income, wage income and owner 
occupied house rent, have a share above 20 percent each in total income. The highest share of 
total inequality comes from the earnings from enterprises. Similarly to rural income distribution, 
only wage income has a negative impact in the total inequality of income. This is why in most 
societies wage-income is the least concentrated of all other kinds of income. 
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Chapter Five investigates the inequality of income in the process of development as 
discussed by Kuznets (1955). We first examine the Kuznets’ proposition according to which ‘the 
degree of inequality varies systematically with the level of income per head – initially increasing 
as incomes rise and then, beyond some point, decreasing, with further increases in income per 
head’. This proposition has been tested using the quadratic equation of income inequality against 
per capita income. The first sample was tested for Nepal across 72 districts out of 75 in 1996. 
The results confirm the inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality of income and per 
capita income. We also examine the same hypothesis using the cross-country data for the sample 
of the SAARC nations. The test has further been extended by the Milanovic database of the 
world for two periods (circa 1988 and 1993). The empirical analysis continued to support the 
inverted U-hypothesis.7 
Explanations of the Kuznets process relate to the nature of structural change. Early 
growth of income inequality may be concentrated in the modern industrial sector because 
employment in the urban modern sector is limited; but wages and productivity are high - as in 
the Lewis two sector theory of development. In this regard, Kuznets (1955) has discussed some 
mechanisms in which economic development often focuses on the rapid evolution of 
industrialisation. The economic measures of development have been often supplemented by 
literacy, schooling, health, urbanization, etc. We also examine the Kuznets curve further by 
incorporating these mechanisms into the simple quadratic equation in order to capture 
(1) a trade-off between income inequality and growth, 
(2) a trade-off between income inequality and the demographic transition, 
(3) a trade off between income inequality and education, and 
(4) a trade-off between income inequality and labour force shift. 
                                                 
7 The Milanovic database consists of the data for income and expenditure distributions. We have also 
tested the above cited hypothesis including a dummy for the data sources in order to capture the effect of 
income and expenditure because inequality of income is rather higher than inequality of expenditure. The 
dummy variable is statistically significant in the model. 
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We examine these hypotheses empirically with the data of Nepal across 72 districts for 
1996. We find that urbanisation has a negative impact on income inequality; while population 
growth and an initial increase in schooling have positive effect on income inequality. 
The statistical test is further extended with South Asian Nations data (for last two 
decades) and the World data (for circa 1988 and 1993). Agriculture value added, population 
growth and growth rate of economy8 have positive effects on income inequality. The higher 
level of education and urbanisation tends to improve the distribution of income. 
III The significance of the thesis 
This thesis represents a painstaking inquiry into the genesis, causes, dynamics and 
implications of inequality in the distribution of economic welfare in Nepal, one of the most 
ancient and distinguished countries of the Indian Sub-Continent. We attempt to combine 
historical, institutional, social, and economic arguments to explain why Nepal is still one of the 
least economically developed countries of the world, where economic inequalities are still at an 
acceptable level. However, at the end of our journey, we are not convinced that the performance 
of our native nation must be judged only through variable like income and wealth per capita or 
inequality indexes. In fact we are convinces that history, tradition, and social institutions are 
sometimes more important that any Gini coefficient or other inequality indexes for providing a 
judgement of the progress of our country. For these reasons we have provided a comprehensive 
historical, social and institutional background of our Nation. 
                                                 
8 The growth rate of economy however is statistically insignificant in our analysis. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to Nepal 
1.1 Introduction 
Nepal is a sovereign nation situated in the South Asian region. This Himalayan Hindu 
Kingdom has always existed as an independent nation despite some historic movement of its 
borders. The geographical landscape is widely varied. The altitude of Nepal varies to extremes 
within short distances; and ranges in altitude from just above the sea level to the summit of the 
Everest within the distance of just 193 kilometres. 
In the Medieval times, Nepal was divided into many tiny states ruled by kings: Khas 
states in the west, Malla states in the Kathmandu valley, Doy state in the Terai, Sen states, and 
Baisi-Chaubisi states. The demarcation specified by the Sugauli Treaty between Nepal and the 
British East India Company in 1816 is generally taken as the starting point for the era of modern 
Nepal. The boarders in the east and the west are the Mechi and Mahakali River respectively. In 
the north, peaks and gorges divide Nepal and China. In the south, pillars fixed at one kilometre 
intervals mark the border between Nepal and India. The total land area of present Nepal is 
147,181 square kilometres, stretching 885 km lengthwise and a width varying from 144 
kilometres to 240 kilometres. Irrespective of its small size, especially taken in comparison to the 
political giants of the region, Nepal has been able to maintain its identity in international affairs. 
Geographically, Nepal lies on 26° 2’ to 30° 27’ north latitude and 80° 4’ to 88° 12’ east 
longitude. 
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For local governance, municipality and village development committees have been 
constituted. Presently there are 58 municipalities, some of which have been classified as 
metropolitan municipality, others as sub metropolitan municipality or municipality. A 
municipality may comprise 9 to 35 wards. Likewise, there are 3,912 village development 
committees (VDC) as local self-governance units. A VDC has nine wards. The concept of a 
model VDC has been put forward and experimentally implemented. A chairperson, vice 
chairperson, and various ward members are in charge of initiating development works in each 
village. There is a secretary for the administrative function of the VDC. 
The period of Nepalese history from 995 to 1883 is known as the medieval period. 
During this epoch, Nepal was divided into subjects and districts ruled locally by a samantas - a 
type of dual rule. When central rule weakened and tension grew between the centre and the 
districts, political stability was endangered. After a few years, the subjects disobeyed the central 
command and Nepal was divided into three states, which lasted for two hundred years. These 
states had a constant power struggle for supremacy over each other. This struggle ended when 
these states broke into tiny local states like Baisis, Chaubisis and many others until  Nepal 
regained its identity as one nation only in 1883. 
1.1.1 Unification and the Background of the Shah Dynasty 
The fame of Prithvi Narayan shah stands out indelibly in the Nepalese history. He had 
made a solid contribution to Nepal and Nepalese politics. In fact, he made possible Nepal as a 
nation so he is called the Maker of the Nation. He is remembered as a great politician, and a just, 
brave, and excellent commander. He not only reunified Nepal, but also developed the concept of 
a non-aligned foreign policy and the idea of economic independence. 
1.1.2 Post Unification Political scenario and the Rana Regime 
The reunification went well; but political troubles followed one after the other. The 
political state of the newly formed Nepal began deteriorating as a consequence of conspiracies 
for power among the royal families. In post reunification Nepal, the political instability and 
 19
uncertainty became a catharsis for bloodshed and assassination in the royal palace, which 
brought autocratic Rana rule and lasted for 104 dark years. During this regime, developments 
were nominal. The rulers spent most of their time and energy exploiting and suppressing the 
people.  
The Ranas always ignored the role of the King and the people. The Nepalese people 
were denied a voice in the political process. The Prime Minister became the sole and supreme 
ruler, having the authority to promulgate, implement, and repeal laws. The Rana rule created a 
wide economic gap in the society. The national treasury was spent to decorate Rana palaces, 
while the common people went without food and shelter. The Rana rulers believed that if people 
were educated their despotic rule would be dismantled, so they did not allow schools and 
colleges to be opened. The Ranas indirectly followed the British in India. When the British fled 
from India, it had a great impact on the Ranas. Many colonies across the world were fighting 
against the British to free themselves. The Ranas, whose grip on power was reliant upon British 
rule in India, felt helpless when India gained independence. 
1.1.3 Modern history and politics 
The end of the Rana Regime in 1951 occurred when an armed revolt led by the Nepali 
Congress Party, armed partly with the moral support of King Tribhuwan, paved the way for a 
joint government of the Nepali Congress and the Ranas. The period 1951-59 was marked by a 
rapid succession of governments and political instability. An election was held under a 
parliamentary constitution in 1959, which brought the Nepali Congress Party to power. King 
Mahendra, father of the present King Gyanendra, dissolved the first popularly elected 
government of the country and replaced the democratic regime by the party- less Panchayat 
system. This system lasted for thirty years, until April 1990, when a pro-democracy movement, 
led jointly by the then banned political parties - the Nepali Congress and the United Left Front (a 





The new coalition prepared and promulgated a new Constitution incorporating 
elements of constitutional monarchy, multiparty democracy, and fundamental freedoms; and it 
held the first multi-party elections in thirty years. The new Constitution that came into effect in 
November 1990 underwrote a two-tiered legislature, the National Council (Upper House) 
consisting of 60 members and the House of Representatives (Lower House) consisting of 205 
members. Members of the House of Representatives are to be elected every five years through 
national elections. The National Council consists of members selected by the Lower House, the 
King, and an Electoral College consisting of members from local level committees. The King, as 
Head of State, appoints the majority leader of the House of Representatives as the Prime 
Minister, who leads the affairs of the country with the help of council of ministers that s/he 
forms. 
Administratively, the country is divided into five development regions, fourteen zones 
and seventy-five districts. The districts are the main units of local governance, with the structure 
comprising the Village Development Committees (VDCs) with a Chairperson and Vice-
Chairperson and members consisting of representatives elected from various wards, and the 
District Development Committees (DDCs) elected indirectly by them. The urban areas elect 
their own Mayors who lead municipalities (that have similar structures). Efforts directed at 
greater decentralisation have primarily sought to strengthen the government machinery at the 
district level. The Regulations of the Local Self-Governance Act of 1999 have now been signed 
into effect, making it possible for elected local bodies to raise revenue, enter into collaborative 
ventures with the private sector, adjudicate and, generally, promote development in a 








1.2 Geographical Division of Nepal 
Some distinct physical features divide Nepal into different geographical regions. The 
division categorised according to landscape, water bodies, and climate is very distinct as each 
exhibit observably different characteristics in particular regions. The following is a brief 
description of different geographical regions of Nepal. 
Differences in the topography influence the lifestyle of the local inhabitants. The 
cultural traits of the mountain dwellers have direct relation to the geographical characteristics, 
and the same goes with the Terai region. We can divide Nepal based on its landscape as follows. 
1.2.1 The Himalayan region 
The region in the north with altitude above 3,000 metres is known as the Himalayan 
region. It occupies 15% of the total area. Gurung, Sherpa, Thakali, Manangi, Bhote are the 
indigenous people living here. Rai, Limbu, Brahmins and Newars are also found sporadically 
living in this area. The lifestyle of these people is similar to that of Tibetans. In order to keep out 
the cold, houses are made of mud, have thick walls, and are cave-like in structure. Due to 
excessive cold in winter, people tend to migrate to warmer lowlands during the winter months. 
Because of the difficult climatic condition and poor fertility of the soil, the main occupations 
here are trade and animal husbandry, not particularly farming. Major crops are oat and barley 
though. There are wide pastoral areas for the cattle to graze. 
1.2.2 The Hills 
The region with the altitude from 300 metres to 3,000 metres is known as ‘the hills’. It 
spreads from east to west in the middle of Nepal, the Terai in the south and the Himalayas in the 
north. There are two ranges in the hills: the Mahabharat range and the Churia range. The hill 
area is 75 km to 125 km wide and covers 68% of the total land area. All four varnas i.e. 
Brahmins, Chetris, Vaishayas, Shudras, and 36 castes are found living indigenously here. 
Diversity, mutual co-operation, and togetherness are typical characteristics of these inhabitants. 
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The main occupations of the hard-working hill people are agriculture, animal husbandry, trade, 
industry and public and private services. 
1.2.3 The Terai region 
The plain area has a width of 15 km to 21 km and lies in the south of Nepal. It is 
known as the Terai region. It runs all the way from east to west of Nepal and covers 17% of the 
total land area of the Kingdom. In some parts, it penetrates into the hills, forming the ‘inner 
Terai’. Because of good transportation, communication, and high agro-yield, there is a high rate 
of inflow of population from the hills; and new communities are forming throughout the Terai. 
The indigenous communities living here include Danuwar, Tharu, Yadav, Rajput, Dhimal, 
Mandal, and immigrants include Brahmins, Chhetris, Magars, and others. Popularly known as 
the granary of the country, this region has incorporated trade and industry on a high scale, 
providing employment for the growing population. With typical traditions and rituals, which 
have many things in common with Indian culture, this region holds an important place in 




1.2.4 The river system 
Nepal can be divided into three major river systems from east to west: the Kosi 
River, the Narayani River (India's Gandak River), and the Karnali River. All ultimately 
become major tributaries of the Ganges River in northern India. After plunging through 
deep gorges, these rivers deposit their heavy sediments and debris on the plains, thereby 
nurturing them and renewing their alluvial soil fertility. Once they reach the Terai 
Region, they often overflow their banks onto wide floodplains during the summer 
monsoon season, periodically shifting their courses. Besides providing fertile alluvial 
soil, the backbone of the agrarian economy, these rivers present great possibilities for 
hydroelectric and irrigation development. The deep gorges formed by the rivers 
represent immense obstacles to establishing the broad transport and communication 
networks needed to develop an integrated national economy rather than to support any 
significant commercial facility by these rivers; for instance production of hydro-power. 
As a result, the economy in Nepal has remained fragmented. Because Nepal's rivers have 
not been exploited for transportation, most settlements in the Hill and Mountain regions 
remain isolated from each other. The eastern part of the country is drained by the Kosi 
River, which has seven tributaries. It is locally known as the Sapta Kosi, which means 
seven Kosi rivers (Tamur, Likhu Khola, Dudhkoshi, Sunkoshi, Indrawati, Tama, and 
Arun). The principal tributary is the Arun, which rises about 150 kilometres inside the 
Tibetan Plateau. The Narayani River drains the central part of Nepal and has seven 
major tributaries (Daraudi, Seti, Madi, Kali, Marsyandi, Budhi, and Trisuli). The Kali, 
which flows between the Dhaulagiri Himal and the Annapurna Himal, is the main river 
of this drainage system. The river system draining the western part of Nepal is the 
Karnali. Its three immediate tributaries are the Bheri, Seti, and Karnali rivers, the latter 
being the major one. The Mahakali, which flows along the Nepal-India border on the 
West Side, and the Rapti River also are considered tributaries of the Karnali. 
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1.3 The Population 
Though Nepal had a population of 23 million in 2001, it might seem that the 
size of the Nepalese population is very small compared to its neighbours (India and 
China), each with more than one billion people. The first census of Nepal (1911) yielded 
a population size of 5.6 million. Since then, the census count has been conducted more 
or less at ten-year intervals. The annual average growth rate of population during the last 
decade, i.e. 1991-2001, was 2.25 percent. One of the major consequences of rapid 
population growth was the progressive deterioration of the ratio of people to exploitable 
land, which has affected both social as well as economic aspects of Nepal.9 The 
following figure shows the demographic trend and the growth of population over the last 
fifty years. 
                                                 
9 The population pressure on productive land has increased. The agricultural production has not 
sufficiently increased in order to meet the demand of the growing population; this has specially 
aggravated the living situation of the peasants in Nepal. The lack of employment in other sectors than 
agriculture has created the need to farm marginal land for food production. Forests are being depleted in 
order to expand the agricultural land, which have resulted in frequent landslides, floods, as well as soil 
erosion. 
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Data source: Nepal Population Report (2002) 
Until 1961, the population census in Nepal did not disaggregate the Hill and Mountain 
regions. The proportion of population living in the Terai is increasing, while the proportion of 
people living in the hills and mountains is declining over the years. 
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Data source: Nepal Population Report (2002) 
Population density varies from region to region. The Terai is the most densely 
populated, while the mountains are sparsely populated. The Terai population has increased by 
four folds in the last half century as a result of the north-south movement of the population and 
immigration. The population report (2002) has recognized some reasons of these migrations into 
the Terai regions. They are: (1) unequal distribution of resources, (2) availability of productive 
land in Terai, (3) difficult topography of Hills and Mountains (4) disparity in socio-economic 
development and (5) the lack of basic facilities and infrastructure in these latter regions. These 
factors have led to an increased migration to the Terai area from hills and mountains and at the 
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same time the flow of immigrants from the bordering country have played a crucial role in the 
growing population living in the Terai region. 
Nepal is one of the least urbanized countries in the world. Urban population of Nepal 
increased from 3.6 percent in 1952 to 14.2 percent in 2001. Although urban population has 
increased substantially, it is still low compared to the South Asian nations. The urban population 
growth over the last half century is depicted in the following figure. 
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Data source: Nepal population report (2002) 
Nepal is as ethnically diverse as it is geographically. It is home to several races and 
tribes, languages and religions. There are some 75 different ethnic groups that speak about 50 
different languages (dialects). Most agree that the original inhabitants were Tibetan-Mongoloids 
from the north who migrated south and Indo-Aryans from the south who migrated north. 
Nepalese of Indo-Aryan ancestry constitute the great majority of the total population. Tibeto-
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Nepalese form a significant minority of the country's population. The majority of the Nepali 
people are Hindus and the second largest group is Buddhists. Other religions represented are 
Islam, Christianity, and Animism. The share of the Hindu population has consistently remained 
over eighty percent since 1950s. The second largest religion in Nepal is Buddhism; practiced by 
about 11 percent, while Islam constitutes about 4.2 percent of the population.  
 
Table 1.1  Population by religions in Nepal (1961-2001) 
 No of population 
 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 
Hindu 8,254,256  10,329,893  13,445,441  15,996,648  18,330,533  
Buddhist 870,702  866,699  799,215  1,438,607  2,441,949  
Muslim 280,507  351,302  399,608  652,736  954,952  
Others and Unspecified 7,530  8,089  378,576  403,106  1,009,521  
Total 9,412,996  11,555,983  15,022,839  18,491,097  22,736,955  
Data source: Nepal Population Report (2002) 
There are also many tribal groups in Nepal. The co-existence of these ethnic groups 
and their cultures has been marked by tolerance and openness for centuries, building both unity 
and diversity into the rightful heritage of the Nepalese people. The official language is Nepali, a 
derivative of Sanskrit, and the lingua franca of around 50 percent of the population. Nepali is 
spoken and understood, at least to a limited extent, by most of the population. A summary of the 
major linguistic populations is provided in Table 1.2. The 1952/54 census collected information 
on 36 languages and the 1961 census collected information on 52 languages. According to the 
1991 and 2001 censuses, more than 50 percent of the total population has Nepali as their mother 
tongue; followed by Maithili, Bhojpuri, Tharu, Tamang, Newari, Magar etc. The distribution of 
population of Nepal by mother tongue from 1961 to 2001 is shown in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2 The distribution of population by languages in Nepal (1961-2001) 
Mother Tongue 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 
Nepali 4,796,863 6,061,113 8,767,329 9,302,871 11,053,255 
Maithali 1,132,383 1,327,782 1,669,037 2,191,195 2,797,582 
Bhojpuri 577,017 806,608 1,143,238 1,379,436 1,712,536 
Tharu(Dagaura/Rana) 406,641 495,752 545,329 992,972 1,331,546 
Tamang 529,010 554,687 522,795 904,215 1,179,145 
Newar 377,461 455,306 449,183 689,718 825,458 
Magar 255,092 288,900 213,324 430,843 770,116 
Awadhi 477,239 316,634 234,356 375,369 560,744 
Gurung 158,138 172,184 174,265 227,440 338,925 
Limbu 138,371 171,029 129,196 253,328 333,633 
Urdu 2,824 na na 201,553 174,840 
Rajbanshi 55,537 55,469 60,091 85,059 129,883 
Sherpa 83,776 79,736 73,612 122,041 129,771 
Hindi 2,824 na na 170,118 105,765 
Danuwar 11,296 10,400 13,521 24,038 31,849 
Sunuwar 13,178 20,801 10,516 na 26,611 
Thakali 6,589 na 6,009 7,396 6,441 
Others 388,757 739,583 1,011,037 1,133,504 1,228,855 
Total 9,412,996 11,555,983 15,022,839 18,491,097 22,736,955 
Author’s calculation from the Nepal Population Report (2002) data 
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1.4 Caste and Ethnicity 
One integral aspect of Nepalese society is the existence of the Hindu caste system, 
modelled after the ancient and orthodox Brahmanic system of the Indian plains. The caste 
system did not exist prior to the arrival of Indo-Aryans. Its establishment became the basis of the 
emergence of the feudalistic economic structure of Nepal. The high-caste Hindus began to 
appropriate lands, particularly lowlands, that were more easily accessible, more cultivatable, and 
more productive including those belonging to the existing tribal people, and introduced the 
system of individual ownership. Even though the cultural and religious rigidity of the caste 
system has slowly been eroded, its introduction into Nepal was one of the most significant 
influences stemming from the migration of the Indo-Aryan people into the hills. The migrants 
from the north were later incorporated into the Hindu caste system, as defined by Indo-Aryan 
migrants, who quickly gained control of the positions of power and authority. Tibetan migrants 
did not practice private ownership; their system of law was based on communal ownership. No 
single, widely acceptable definition has yet been found to analyse the caste system. The fourfold 
caste divisions are: 
• Brahmins (priests and scholars), primitively the caste of the priests, whose main duties 
are to study and teach, and also to preside over and perform all-important rituals. 
• Kshatriya or Chhetri (rulers and warriors), originally the caste of kings, princes, rulers, 
warriors, in other words all those whose duty is to give protection to the Brahmins as 
well as to the whole population. Nevertheless, they too, should be able to study- but not 
to teach. 
• Vaisya (or Vaisaya, merchants and traders), are those of the third highest caste: they are 
the traders, peasants, artisans, cattle breeders etc. They too, should know how to read the 
texts. 
• Sudra (farmers, artisans, and labourers), those who should be the servants of the three 
upper groups. They are not supposed to read the texts. 
Now, outside this caste structure are the ‘untouchables’ or outcastes a notion that is 
linked with that of purity, which in turn, rests on the natures of their profession. It is important to 
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note that one of the most ‘polluting’ professions - almost on the same level as sweepers and 
refuse collectors - are the four following professions: sweepers, blacksmiths (called kami), 
shoemakers or tanners (called sarki) and tailors (called damai). 
These Pahari caste divisions based on the Hindu system, and thus not strictly upheld 
by the Newars. The Newars have their own caste hierarchy, which they claim is parallel in caste 
divisions to the Pahari Hindu system. In each system, each caste is ideally an endogamous 
group in which membership is both hereditary and permanent. Furthermore, caste determines an 
individual's behaviour, obligations, and expectations. All social, economic, religious, legal, and 
political activities of a caste society are prescribed by sanctions that determine and limit access 
to land, position of political power, and command of human labour. Within this constrictive 
system, wealth, political power, high rank, and privilege converge and are transmitted inter-
generationally; hereditary occupational specialisation is a common feature. Nevertheless, caste is 
functionally significant only when viewed in a regional or local context and at a particular time. 
The assumed correlation between the caste hierarchy and the socio-economic class hierarchy 
does not always hold. Because of numerous institutional changes over the years and increased 
dilution (or expansion) of the caste hierarchy stemming from inter-caste marriages, many poor 
high-caste and rich low-caste households can be found. 
Although the caste system has lost its legal support, the higher castes still control 
almost all the region’s wealth and carry considerable political power. Movement back and forth 
across the India-Nepal border is unrestricted, especially for marriages and socio-economic 
relations, thus cementing caste ties. In Nepal, the Hindu caste system socially and ritually 
defines all people by the group into which they have been born. It is further elaborated into a 
number of rules for eating, marrying, working, and touching. However, as strong and persuasive 
as this system is, Nepal has been unique in the Hindu world for the degree to which economic, 
political and romantic deviations from the caste norms are accepted and incorporated into 
society. 
The 2001 census identified around 100 caste or ethnic groups and subgroups in the 
population. The major ethnic/caste groups are presented in Table 1.3 below. 
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Table 1.3 The distribution of population by caste/ethnic groups in 2001 
Caste /Ethnic Groups Number of Population Population Ratio (%) 
Chhettri 3,593,496 15.80   
Brahman 3,030,973 13.33   
Magar 1,622,421 7.14   
Tharu 1,533,879 6.75   
Tamang 1,282,304 5.64   
Newar 1,245,232 5.48   
Muslim 971,056 4.27   
Kami 895,954 3.94   
Yadav 895,423 3.94   
Rai 635,151 2.79   
Gurung 543,571 2.39   
Damai/Dholi 390,305 1.72   
Limbu 359,379 1.58   
ThakurI 334,120 1.47   
Sarki 318,989 1.40   
Teli 304,536 1.34   
Chamar, Harijan, Ram 269,661 1.19   
Koiri 251,274 1.11   
Kurmi 212,842 0.94   
Sanyasi 199,127 0.88   
Dhanuk 188,150 0.83   
Musahar 172,434 0.76   
Dusad/Paswan/Pasi 158,525 0.70   
Sherpa 154,622 0.68   
Sonar 145,088 0.64   
Kewat 136,953 0.60   
Baniya 126,971 0.56   
Gharti/Bhujel 117,568 0.52   
Mallah 115,986 0.50   
Kalwar 115,606 0.51   
Others 2,415,338 10.60   
Total 22,736,934.00  100.00   
Author’s own estimates from the Nepal Population Report (2002) data 
 34
1.5 The Inheritance System and Women's Command over Resources 
The inheritance system of Nepal, as codified in the National Code of Nepal (Mulki 
Ain) of 1963, is matrilineal in character and derives from the Hindu system of beliefs 
emphasising matrilineal descent and patriarchal residence. The family laws, which govern 
marriage, divorce, property rights, and inheritance, reinforce the patriarchy and put severe limits 
on women's command over economic resources. According to the National Code, amended in 
1975, a woman shares equal rights of inheritance with her husband and her sons in her husband's 
property. She is also an equal co-partner (one who may claim a share) in the ancestral property 
(if her husband is not alive) provided she is at least 30 years old and/or has been married for at 
least 15 years. She is entitled to equal inheritance rights with her brothers in her parental 
household only if she is unmarried and is at least 35 years of age at the time of partition of the 
property. The property she gets in the marital household is conditional on her remaining faithful 
to the husband and his clan even if he is dead. She looses all rights to his property on marriage to 
another person or divorce. She has no claims on maintenance after five years of divorce. 
A woman inheriting property in her parental household must return this property to her 
brothers or their direct male descendants if she decides to get married afterwards. A woman has 
absolute rights only over Stridhan. Stridhan is property, which originates in the woman's own 
earnings, gifts from her parental household, her husband, and his household or from any other 
sources. Her access to sources of income are also limited by the ‘family law’, according to which 
the husband has the right to decide the place of settlement, and the wife has to have her 
husband’s permission to work outside the home. In addition, a woman can make legal contracts 
only in connection with her Stridhan. These provisions severely limit economic and political 
options for women. Attempts at integrating women in development programmes and projects 
invariably come unstuck by these social and economic constraints. Women activists at various 
levels have waged a constant struggle over the last 5-6 years for reforms in inheritance laws so 
that daughters may inherit parental property. Discrimination against women covers the domain 
of physical survival, especially during infancy, childhood and childbirth, health and educational 
opportunity, work burden, and wage employment and income opportunities, ownership of 
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productive and other assets and overall cultural status. It should be noted that the construction of 
gender and gender relations varies to some extent by age life-cycle-related position with the 
family, cast, ethnicity, class, religion and so on. The high ritual and social value attached to sons 
as against daughters, places emphasis on gender specific socialisation and highly gender-
segregated access to household productive resources, income and to a certain extent, household 
decision making and schooling. The female infant and child mortality rates are significantly 
higher than the rate for male child. The girl child spends more time than the boy sharing in house 
holding and family production responsibilities, including farm work. Schooling and other public 
experience, partly as a result, remain much more limited for girls. Primary school enrolment 
rates between male and female were 79 percent and 36 percent respectively during 1980-85 
(according to the World Bank social indicators). Cultural norms that prescribe early marriage (by 
19 years of age), early childbirth, and higher fertility inhibit women's educational and other 
opportunity. With the exception of certain ethnic communities of the Tibeto-Burman group, 
Nepali society is predominantly patriarchal, governed by Hinduism as a strong ideological force. 
All aspects of the growth and development of the child, both male and female, are shaped by a 
social structure value system informed by patriarchal traditions. 
Even among the Tibeto-Burman communities, an increasing trend towards the 
adoption Hindu values and norms is noticeable among upwardly mobile groups. Nepal is a 
country with a very high incidence of ‘son preference’. Sons are economic insurance against the 
insecurities of old age. They virtually open the gateway to heaven by performing the death rites 
for their parents, and they carry on the family name and legacy. Daughters, instead, are raised to 
be given away in marriage, to care for their husband’s parents and protect their husband’s 
property. In the consideration of many parents, daughter’s economic value is restricted to their 
childhood years, and investments in their future, as education and often health care, are poor 
investments. 
Thus, if a girl baby survives until early childhood, the peril of neglect faces her. 
Although girls receive the same care and nutrition as boys when infants, older girls often receive 
less health care and less food, resulting in higher mortality and morbidity rates among girls than 
boys. In middle and late childhood, they assume a large share of domestic responsibilities, 
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including sibling care, often to the detriment of their education and social participation. As 
adolescents, Nepali girl children are burdened with early marriage and pregnancy. Combined 
with poor health and inadequate prenatal practices, they face a high risk of prenatal 
complications and death. Their nutritional deficiencies may have effects on their children, 
resulting in infants' low weight birth, disabilities, or death. As they grow older, repeated 
pregnancies, continued malnutrition and excessive workload can result in early death, and Nepal 
is one of the few countries in which women’s average life expectancy is shorter than men’s. 
1.6 Socialisation Patterns of the Male and Female Child 
The socialisation patterns in Nepali society are such that young boys are prepared for 
the world of productive work and decision-making, while girls are trained to be housewives, 
mothers and service-providers. From a very young age, girls are instilled with the notion that 
their duty lies in providing services to their family; firstly their own, then their husbands’ family. 
Boys’ and girls’ tasks are quite distinct in Nepali society, and boys, while helping with their 
fathers’ work, seldom participate in household tasks. Decision-making, strength of expression, 
opinion-formation, and assertion of their needs and interests are implicitly discouraged in the 
socialisation process. In terms of social interaction, girls are for the most part confined to the 
inside world of the home. They have little contact with males outside their family or females 
outside their community, and lack access to the outside world of information, knowledge, and 
resources. Although not the case among all of Nepal's ethnic communities, open and frank 
discussions between young daughters, mothers and senior women regarding menstruation, sex 
and pregnancy are not the normal rule in traditional Hindu households. Girls often learn the facts 
of life from their peers and may be embarrassed to talk about their concerns with older women. 
Adolescent girls have little access to health education or medical services to deal with their 
problems, and virtually no access to sex education. This among other things leads to high 
mortality rate of childbirth and low life expectancy of women in Nepal. 
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1.7 Rural Society and Kinship 
Nepal is predominantly a rural-agricultural society, where more than 90 percent of the 
people live in rural areas and more than 80 percent people depend on farming as a source of 
livelihood. Even in settlements designated as urban areas, the rural-urban distinction is easily 
blurred; more than 50 percent of urbanites outside the three cities in the Kathmandu Valley are 
engaged in farming for their livelihood. Even in the Kathmandu Valley cities, 30 to 40 percent of 
city dwellers are agriculturists. In this sense, most urban areas were economic extensions of rural 
areas; but with an urban manifestation and a commercial component. Farming is the dominant 
order of society and the mainstay of the economy, a situation that was unlikely to change, given 
the extremely sluggish pace of economic transformation. 
The basic social unit in a village is the family, consisting of a patrilineally extended 
household. The extended family system should not, however, be construed as a necessarily 
harmonious form of village life. Many extended families break apart as sons separate from 
parents and brothers separate from each other. At the time of separation, the family property is 
equally divided among the sons. If parents are alive, they each receive a share. Family separation 
generally occurs in cases where the head of the household is less assertive and domineering, 
when the father dies, or when all sons marry. Unmarried sons normally do not separate from 
their parents; if the parents are deceased, unmarried sons usually stay with their older brothers. 
Because family separation always results in a division of family landholdings, landholdings are 
extremely fragmented and limited, both geographically and socially. 
Beyond the immediate family, there exists a larger kinship network that occasionally 
involves sharing food. This network is also an important means of meeting farm labour needs, 
especially during the planting and harvesting seasons, when labour shortages are common.  
Above the kinship network is the village, which functions as a broader unit of social 
existence. Some villages are no more than hamlets made up of just a few houses; others are 
sizeable communities of several neighbouring hamlets. In more populous villages, the caste 
groups contained occupational low (untouchable) caste groups, such as the Kami (ironsmiths 
who make tools), the Sarki (shoemakers), and the Damai (tailors and musicians), who fulfil the 
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vital basic needs of the village as a fairly self-contained production unit. Villagers occasionally 
pool their resources and labour together to implement village-level projects, such as building 
irrigation ditches or channels, or facilities for drinking water. If a household cannot afford to hire 
farm labour, it usually relies on the reciprocal labour-sharing system called parma, which allows 
villagers to exchange labour for labour at times of need. 
Although farming traditionally ranked among the most desirable occupations, villagers 
frequently encourage some of their children to leave in search of civil service, army, and other 
employment opportunities. Individual migration is often the result of a family decision and an 
important economic strategy; it not only serves as a safety valve for growing population 
pressures but also generates cash incomes, thereby averting any undue economic crises in the 
family. Well-to-do village families usually push their children to obtain civil service jobs as a 
means of climbing the bureaucratic ladder and of developing valuable connections with the elite 
political structure. 
Farming is the most important source of livelihood in rural areas, but the scarcity of 
land places severe constraints on agricultural development. Landholding is the most important 
basis for, or criterion of, socio-economic stratification. The 1981 agricultural census data 
identifies five classes of peasantry: land-less and nearly land-less, people with no land or less 
than half a hectare; subsistence, those with half a hectare to one hectare; small, holders of one to 
three hectares; medium, people with three to five hectares; and large, farmers of more than five 
hectares. In terms of production relations, the first two classes are dependent on large 
landowners for survival. Small landowners, on the other hand, are relatively independent; they 
do not have to depend on the large land-owning class for survival, especially if they are involved 
in circular migration as a source of supplementary cash income. Nor do they regularly employ 
members of the first two classes. Landowners of medium-sized plots are independent of large 
landowners. Their engagement in wages labouring or tenancy farming is sporadic, if present at 
all. In some cases, they employed others during peak farming seasons. The large land-owning 
class regularly employ farm workers and benefit from the existence of excess labour, which keep 
wages low. In general, the situation of landholders is exacerbated by the archaic nature of 
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farming technology and the absence of other resources. It is not surprising that rural poverty is 
widespread. 
1.8 Social Classes and Stratification 
In terms of differences in wealth and access to political power, Nepalese society may 
be divided into a small ruling elite; a growing, intermediate-sized group of government officials, 
large landholders, and merchants; and the vast majority of the population, consisting of a peasant 
base. These divisions are descriptive, functional class categories rather than social class entities 
based on the Marxian concept of the social relations of production. In a way, all three classes 
have been a long continuum in Nepal's social structure because most members of the ruling elite 
and government functionaries had their direct roots in the rural landed class, which was one 
stratum of the farming population. 
Even though the agricultural sector as a whole has been faced with similar economic 
and technological circumstances, it was able to diffuse these pressures through a structure of 
diverse strata in landholding, relative economic dependence, and independence. The numerically 
small intermediate stratum of the farmers was only slightly less diverse than the rest of the rural 
population in terms of members' ethnic and geographical backgrounds. The relative economic 
and educational advantages of this group and its occupational activities, however, made its 
members relatively homogeneous in terms of shared interest. They generally aspired to achieve a 
middle- or elite-class status. The smallest and least diverse of the three categories was the ruling 
elite, largely composed of high-caste, and educated Paharis, namely different strata of 
Brahmans and Chhetris. At the zenith of this class was the monarch, whose authority was 
derived from the orthodox Hindu contention that the king was the reincarnation of Vishnu 
(Hindu God), whose assigned role in the Hindu trinity is protection. The monarch's authority 
was not based on electoral support. The continued expansion of the bureaucracy was a direct 
response to a consistent increase in the educated population. Because of the lack of development, 
a large number of educated people failed to find gainful employment upon graduation. Because 
they constituted the most potent revolutionary force, and happened to be geographically 
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concentrated in urban centres, the ruling class was almost compelled to absorb them into an 
already bloated bureaucracy in order to neutralise any socio-political disturbance they might 
cause. 
1.9 The Economy of Nepal 
Nepal is the one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, with more 
than one third of its population living below the poverty line. Nepal had a late start in economic 
development. The government did not create a system of modern infrastructure and 
administration until the 1990s. Since then, however, Nepal has seen a number of positive results: 
school enrolment ratios have improved with nearly all boys and 90% of girls enrolling in 
primary school. Irrigation coverage has reached 25% of cultivated land (1999); road networks 
have increased from 124 km in 1956 to 15,000 km in 1998. Electricity used by number of 
households has increased from less than one per cent in 1956 to 15 percent in 1999. Despite 
these advances, Nepal's social indicators remain well below the average of South Asian region. 
Health and education indicators particularly of women are discouraging - life expectancy for 
women, as already said, is lower than that of men; and 81% of Nepal's women are illiterate 
compared with 46% of men. The pressure of population growth on scarce and fragile land means 
that the benefits of better education are often outweighed by more fragmented land and reduced 
availability of forest products upon which most of the rural population depends for its livelihood. 
The ratio of population to arable land (around 600 persons per square kilometre in 1998) is one 
of the highest densities in the world.  
We now turn to a consideration of the structure of the Nepalese economy. 
1.9.1 Agriculture 
Agriculture plays an important role in the country. It provides employment to 80% (in 
1998) of the population and, has a significant bearing on the manufacturing and export sectors. It 
contributes 40% of GDP (in 1998) and more than 50% of household income (more than 80% of 
population owns lands and 86% of them actually farm). 
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In 1995/96, a detailed NLSS (Nepal Living Standard Survey) study was undertaken. It 
revealed that even after decades of development effort, the number of poor people continues to 
grow in Nepal. More that 40% of population live below the poverty line. For almost 90% of the 
poor and very poor (those of bottom 25%) of household have remunerative activities in 
agriculture. Even at the top of the consumption scale, nearly 3/4 is engaged in agriculture. For 
both the lowest and the highest groups, farming income represents more than half (55% and 54% 
respectively) of all income. Nationwide, the importance of agriculture is unquestionable. 
However, the share of agriculture in GDP has constantly declined from 64.0% in 1977 to 40.5% 
in 1998. The average growth rate of agriculture in the last decade has been only 2.3% a year, 
which hardly meets the fast growing population of 2.5% per annum. 
Rice is the leading staple. Corn, wheat, sugarcane, barley, and millet are widely grown. 
These are the major crops. Major cash crops such as sugarcane, jute, oil seeds, tea, and lentils are 
grown. Besides Nepal has potentiality to grow all kinds of vegetable and fruits due to her 
climatic biodiversity. Nepal is a major producer of medicinal herbs, which grow in the 
Himalayas. Cattle, buffalo, goat, sheep etc, are also commercially raised. Livestock production 
accounts for one third of the agricultural production. 
Forestry is an important industry and wood from the forests is mostly used for fuel. It 
supplies most of the energy consumed in Nepal. This has resulted in widespread deforestation 
and severe erosion of the tree-depleted areas. 
1.9.2 Non-agriculture 
Industry: The growing industrial sectors accounts for only around 22.0% on GDP 
which is almost double compared to GDP in 1977 (with only 11.2%). The leading manufactures 
include cotton garments, carpets, bricks and tiles, papers, construction materials and processed 
foods. It also includes production of exportable items, namely ready-made garments and woollen 
carpets, which account for one third of manufacturing output. 
Services: the service sector has now assumed a more prominent place in the structure 
of the economy. The marked increase in the share of service sector to GDP is mainly attributed 
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to the expansion of trade and tourism services. It accounts for more than 37% (in 1998) of GDP; 
against 25% in 1997. Tourism is an increasingly important source of foreign exchange. 
Expenditure (including that for development) by the central government greatly 
exceeds recurrent revenues, which are largely derived from tariffs and excises and from taxes on 
business and individuals. The difference between recurrent revenues and expenditures is mainly 
made up by external aid. India dominates Nepal's foreign trade, and has granted only limited 
transit rights for Nepalese goods. The average per capita agriculture GDP growth rate during the 
period 1977 – 1998 is very low, an ominous sign in an economy where employment continues to 
be heavily agriculture-based. This has accelerated poverty in the rural and agricultural 
households. 
 
Figure 1.4 Structure of the Nepalese economy (percentage of GDP at current prices) 
 




Figure 1.5 Average annual growth of economy (percentage) 
 
Source: Author’s own estimate from Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators (2003 & 2004) data 
1.9.3 Income, consumption and saving 
Nepal, with a per capita income of US$ 210 (GNP per capita 1998 and PPP $ = 1,186), 
belongs to the group of very low-income countries in the world. Given the high population 
growth rate of 2.5 percent per year, per capita income has grown by only 1.8 percent per annum 
during the last 20 years. With 42% of population living below the poverty line, the average 
consumer has remained at 0.867 during 1986-96. This high share of consumption in income is 
attributed to the rapid growth in both private and public sector consumption that grew by a 
compounded rate of 15.4 percent and 13.8 percent respectively during the period 1986-96 (see 
Table 1.4). The country’s Gross Domestic Saving (GDS) is very low, as it stood around 10 
percent on average during the last two decades. Public savings remained either negative or 
marginally positive. The low level of savings in both the public and private sectors has led to an 
unsustainable dependence on foreign aid and other sources of foreign financing. 
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Table 1.4 Structure of consumption and gross domestic savings (GDS) in million rupees 
  
1985 1990 1995 1996 Annual growth rate in % (1986-96) 
Consumption 40,348  95,273  192,436   222,392   16.8 
Private 35,977  86,314  174,394   200,917   15.4 
Public 4,371  8,959  18,042   21,475   13.8 
GDS 6,239  8,143  27,146   27,504   14.4 
Public -454  328  6,533   6,418   - 
Private 6,693  7,815  20,613   21,086   11.0 
GDP 46,587  103,416  219,582   249,896   16.0 
Consumption as % of 
GDP 86.6  92.1  87.6   89     
GDS as % of GDP 13.4  7.9  12.4   11     
Source: Nepal Human Development Report (1998) 
 








1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
 
Source: Author’s own estimate from World Bank data 
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1.9.4 Distribution of productive assets and income 
Agriculture is the main productive resource of Nepal, and yet it is an extremely limited 
resource. Moreover, it is an unevenly distributed resource. Disparity in the distribution of the 
productive assets (especially land) is very high. Land is highly divided, for example, around 
seventy percent of the landholdings are less than one hectare in size. Income earning 
opportunities have significantly influenced income distribution. For instance in Kathmandu the 
average per capita income lies between rupees 24,000-25,000; in urban areas still above 15,000 
rupees; whereas in rural western average per capita is below than 7,000 rupees. 
1.9.5 Poverty in Nepal 
Nepal remains one of the poorest countries in the world with more than 11 million 
people living below the international poverty line. Additionally 90 percent of the people live in 
rural areas. Nepal's per capita GDP of $220 against the South Asian per capita GDP of $380 
places it amongst the very poorest countries in the world. Poverty is greater and more pervasive 
in rural areas, 44 percent as compared to 23 percent for urban areas; and it is also varies across 
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regions. The Mid and Far Western Development Regions (72 percent), as well as the Mountain 
Belt, are much poorer than the Eastern Region (28 percent). Marked disparities exist among 
income groups. 
The inequality of income distribution has increased over the last decade. Around 80 
percent of the poor work in agriculture, generally on small and dispersed plots of low-quality 
land. While many poor people in rural areas do own some land, this is seldom sufficient for 
survival, and many have to supplement their income with low-wage labour. The demand for 
such agricultural labour, however, is highly seasonal and there are few opportunities for non-
farm employment. As a result, there is insufficient work. 
Poverty has generally been less acute in urban areas. Handicapped by numerous 
constraints, economic development is changing task in Nepal. The country has been moving 
towards a more market-oriented economy since the early 1990s. A series of economic reforms in 
the late eighties and early nineties enabled Nepal to achieve good progress in terms of 
accelerating economic growth and modestly improving its social and economic indicators; while 
the economic growth has just barely kept pace with its expanding population.10 On the political 
front, it made a major transition from an absolute monarchy to a democratic government in 
1991. In the past few years, however, Nepal has experienced considerable political instability, 
with nine different governments in power since the system of democratic government has been 
implemented. Notwithstanding, successive governments have found it difficult to forge a 
consensus to implement key reforms that are necessary to improve economic management. 
Moreover, this period has witnessed: 
• An increasing politicisation; 
• Increasing corruption and governance problems; 
• Poor economic policies including ineffective public expenditure, insufficient public 
enterprise, weak tax administration etc. 
                                                 
10 Growth as measured by GDP at factor cost, reached 3.3% while the population growth rate was 2.4% in 
1999. 
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In addition to the inadequate political support for a coherent reform agenda, the overall 
quality of economic management has suffered from several structural factors. 
1.10 Most Relevant Causes of Poverty in Nepal 
1.10.1 The centrality of agriculture 
Nepal must make the most of its very limited resources of arable land if the large 
shares of the population and of the poor who depend on it, are ever to taste well being. 
Agriculture employs more than eighty percent of the country's work force, as self-employed 
farmers. It provides more than two-thirds of all household income. Eighty percent of Nepalese 
keep some kind of livestock. For almost 90 percent of the poor and very poor (i.e. those in the 
bottom 25% of households measured by consumption) it is effectively the only remunerative 
activity available. The importance of agriculture is unquestionable. Nevertheless, as we said 
Nepal’s agriculture is barely yielding to match population growth. The output in both volume 
and value terms is well below its potential. Paddy yields, which were once the highest in south 
Asia, are now the lowest and per capita production of staple food grains is actually declining. 
Many Nepalese in the hills still live more than a day’s walk from the road. Intensive cropping 
has reduced soil nutrients as inadequate government fertiliser distribution and increased use of 
biomass for fuel and stall-feeding has limited nutrient replacement. 
1.10.2 The dearth of infrastructure 
Nepal is isolated from the most of the world's land, air, and sea transport routes. Poor 
road access is an important factor in reducing land productivity for the poor and the better off 
alike: higher costs of inputs and reduced access to product markets relegate large parts of the 
Nepalese countryside to subsistence production, with little market activity. Roads are the 
missing link in the development of the rural Nepal. On average, it takes three and half-hours on 
foot to reach the nearest point where transportation services is available. Especially in the rural 
hills, the deficit of roads and the poor quality of the roads act as a bottleneck to agriculture 
growth. The lack of roads is compounded by the lack of other infrastructure and the poor are 
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especially at a disadvantage. Not only are 61% of Nepal's rural communities without telephone, 
only 3% of the poorest Nepalese have electricity as against a countrywide average of 14 percent. 
1.10.3 Low social indicators 
The standard of living in Nepal is very low and infant mortality is extremely high; the 
average life expectancy is only 57 years. The social-welfare system consists of village 
development programs that attempt to provide basic necessities. Health facilities are inadequate 
and inaccessible to most of the rural population. Overcrowding and poor sanitation, as well as 
shortage of medical personnel, is common. 
Table 1.5 The Social Indicators in Nepal, early 1990s 
Indicators Male Female Total 
Life expectancy in years (1992-95) 58 57 57 
Infant mortality (1994) for thousand births 96 98 100 
Access to maternal health care in % (1996) - - 55.7 
Child malnutrition under age 5 in % (1970-97) - - 47 
Population with access to safe water in % (1970-97) - - 71 
Population with access to sanitation in % (1995) - - 20 
Human development index (USA = 0.939)11 - - 0.504 
Education: adult literacy (%) - - 48 
Source: UNDP report 1998 (Nepal) and UNDP report 2002 (World) 
1.10.4 Poor productivity of rural labour 
Labour productivity is very low in rural areas. Farming is still highly labour intensive, 
with very little mechanisation and severe land fragmentation-house holder may have to walk 
                                                 
11 For 2002. 
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hours just to visit highly dispersed but tiny land holdings. The pressure of the rapid growing 
population severely exacerbates an already difficult situation. The growing population 
unfortunately has very few opportunities outside agriculture, with non-agricultural production 
still rudimentary. It contributes only less than 20% of rural house income. Adult literacy is very 
low. Only 19% of women are literate as against 38% in India and 87% in Sri Lanka. This is a 
major obstacle to improving productivity, since women do the major share of productive works. 
In addition, foreign employment is not easy, as most Nepalese job seekers do not possess skills 
appreciated in the international labour market. 
1.10.5 Early stage in industrialisation 
Industrialisation in Nepal began only after the country opened its border to the outside 
world in 1951. The industrial base in Nepal remains weak. The manufacturing sector is small, 
accounting for less than 10 percent of GDP. Nepal experiences a very low rate of growth and the 
financial system is underdeveloped. The regulatory system is weak. The sector generates only 
limited employment. About 95% of all manufacturing establishments are cottage industries that 
employ about 90% of the persons engaged in the manufacturing; but they contribute only 20% of 
the manufacturing output. Because Nepal's industrial sector depends so heavily on imported 
inputs, Nepal's exchange rate and trade policy regime crucially influences the availability of 
imported inputs. Nepal's trade regime is unique: the Nepalese rupee (currency) is convertible 
vis-à-vis the Indian currency but inconvertible against other currencies. Several other constraints 
to the growth of Nepal's industrial sector include a limited natural resource base, small domestic 
effective demand, lack of a skilled managerial work force, and an isolated landlocked location 
coupled with a rugged terrain that constrains access to inputs at a competitive price. 
1.10.6 Late start in economic development 
Until the 1950s, Nepal had virtually no modern social infrastructure, cash economy, or 
significant economic linkages to the rest of the world. Since then Nepal has made major strides, 
opening up the country and putting in place many of the basic elements of a modern government 
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and market economy, at least in Kathmandu valley. An estimated 40-50% of the population still 
lives below the poverty line. The absolute number of poor people is rising as the population has 
grown faster than the economy's capacity to generate additional income. 
1.10.7 The unstable new democracy 
In 1990, a multiparty democracy was established and a new democratic Government 
gave increased momentum to the reform process, aiming at accelerating development. In the 
1994 parliamentary election, no party won an overall majority. Since then there have been series 
of shifting coalitions, with no government able to last more than a year and a half. Political 
stability has been further compromised by deep splits within major political groupings, with two 
of the three major parliamentary parties now formally divided. The political instability has 
focused the attention of politicians on short term manoeuvring and led to increasing 
politicisation of the administration. The economic reforms have also been delayed by an unstable 
political environment. 
1.10.8 Poor governance and increasing allegations of corruption 
Nepal has many of the formal prerequisites for effective governance, but 
implementation remains weak and often lacks efficiency, transparency, and accountability in the 
administrative system. There are increasing allegations of corruption at many levels, and these 
represent a key constraint to effective delivery of essential services. Corruption is a further major 
obstacle to using Nepal’s assets more productively. Corruption is generally perceived to be 
widespread, contributing to misallocation of government resources. Government salaries are low 
- well below executive pay in the private sector – and this may be a contributing factor to high 
levels of corruption. There are frequent allegations of corruption in the media. The country’s 




The Changing Income Inequality in Nepal (1984-
96) and its Comparison with Other Countries of 
South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the changing income distribution in Nepal from 1984 to 1996 is 
investigated using various inequality measurements such as the Gini coefficient, generalised 
Lorenz Curves and other economic inequality measurements (see section 2.4 on the inequality 
measurements). The primary aim of this chapter is to study the earnings distribution in Nepal 
using the inequality indexes as a starting point. Moreover we shall try to identify the winning or 
losing social categories during the period considered. The second aim is to assess, through the 
use of the generalised Lorenz curves, the gains or losses in terms of general economic welfare, 
with the intent of providing a more vivid picture of the changing pattern of the earning 
distributions in Nepal in this crucial period. 
The considerable recent expansion in the availability of household survey micro-data 
means that the study of income distribution has more recently gained enormous impetus. But 
 53
what exactly is inequality? How is it measured? When is inequality in country A greater than in 
country B? These questions are fundamental for studies on income distribution. The World Bank 
cites inequality means different things to different people: whether inequality should encapsulate 
ethical concepts such as the desirability of a particular system of rewards or simply mean 
differences in income, is the subject of many debates. Here we shall define inequality as the 
dispersion of the distribution of income/wealth or consumption. We shall examine inequality by 
using various indicators first introduced by Sawyer (1976) for five South Asian nations and then 
making comparisons between them. This examination will take place within a broader process of 
distributional dynamics. Obviously, poverty and inequality are very closely linked, as we shall 
see: for a given mean income, the more unequal the income distribution, the larger the 
percentage of the population living in income poverty (Litchfield 1999). 
Inequality is normally studied within the broader context of poverty and welfare, 
although these concepts are quite distinct. Inequality is a broader concept than poverty, since it is 
defined over the whole distribution; and not only the censored distribution of individuals or 
households below a given poverty line. Incomes at the top and in the middle of this distribution 
may be equally important to us in perceiving and measuring inequality of those at the bottom. 
Indeed some measures of inequality are driven largely by incomes in the upper tail (Atkinson, 
1975, chapter 1 and 2). Inequality is also a much narrower concept than welfare. Although both 
of these capture the whole distribution of a given indicator, inequality is independent of the 
mean of the distribution. This latter quality is a desirable property of an inequality measure - to 
be solely concerned with the second moment, the dispersion - of the distribution. These three 
concepts are closely inter-related, however, and are sometimes combined in composite measures 
such as those proposed by Sen (1973). 
2.2 Tools of Analysis 
This study expounds the results derived from a cross-sectional analysis of the 
distributional effects on income distribution. To measure the impact of income inequality we use 
income data per quintile group, since more detailed data are not available. Additionally, we 
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compare the results from Nepal with those of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
Studies on the distribution of income show that Nepal has a relatively high level of income 
inequality compared to other countries during the 1990’s. In this study we want to measure 
income inequality in Nepal and other SAARC nations by using the quintile data of household 
survey. In section 2.3 to section 2.5 we discuss the significance of methodological procedures of 
inequality measures. Section 2.6 focuses on the inequality of income in Nepal. In section 2.7 we 
provide a short description of some basic facts of SAARC countries. Sections 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, and 
2.11 provide the trends of inequality for Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka respectively. 
We then go on to compare the results of Nepal with those of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka in section 2.12. Section 2.13 summarises the results of this chapter. 
2.3 The Lorenz Curve 
It is a widely used technique to represent and analyse the size distribution of income, 
wealth as well as many other magnitudes. The curve plots the cumulative portion of income 
units and the cumulative proportion of income received when income units are arranged in 
progressive order of their income. 
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Figure 2.1 The Lorenz curve 





















Line of absolute equality
 
 
In Fig 2.1, the population is arranged in percentage terms from the poorest to the 
richest along the horizontal axis OB. The percentage of income enjoyed by x percentage of the 
population is shown on the vertical axis OD. The straight line OA is called the egalitarian line, 
where each unit of population receives the same income. This corresponds to the case of perfect 
equality of incomes. In case of perfect inequality, the Lorenz curve coincides with angle OBA in 
the above chart, which implies that all income is received by only one unit. Obviously 0% of the 
population enjoys 0% of income and 100% of the population enjoys all the income. 
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The Lorenz curve displays the deviation of each individual’s income from perfect 
equality.  In a sense, it captures the essence of inequality. The nearer the Lorenz curve is to the 
egalitarian line, the more equal is the distribution. The Lorenz curve is closely related to the 
frequency distribution. For example, if we let income be distributed according to a distribution 
function F12, the mean income μ will be given by ( )ydF y∫ , where the integration is performed 
over the entire range of y, and the proportion of total income received by those who have an 
income no greater than y is given by 1( ) ( )
y
G y ydF y μ −⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ . 
2.3.1 The features of the Lorenz curve 
The essential features of the Lorenz Curve are as follows: 
1) The Lorenz curve graphically shows the degree of dispersion of income (or of consumption, 
wealth, etc). 
2) If income is equally distributed – for example every 10 percent of the population receives 10 
percent of total income – the Lorenz curve overlaps the line of absolute equality. 
3) If the Lorenz curves for two distributions do not intersect, then we can say unambiguously 
that the distribution closer to the diagonal (egalitarian line) is less unequal than the other. 
4) It is quite possible to reach different conclusions if the Lorenz curves intersect. 
It is useful to compare the size distribution of income between countries, or over time, 
in terms of degree of inequality. To do so the number of such curves must be drawn as many 
observations are to be compared. For instance, in Fig 2.2, the comparison of income inequality 
between Norway and the United States is illustrated by reference to the Lorenz curves. 
 
                                                 
12 Suppose that the income y has a distribution in the population that can be approximated by a 
continuous function F: F(y) is the proportion of the population with an income less than or equal to y. F 
(y+δ)-F (y) is the relative frequency of the population that falls in a particular income interval [y, y+δ]. If 
F is differentiable then limit of [F(y+δ)-F(y)]/δ as δ→0, namely dF(y)/dy, is the density function of y 
written as f(y). 
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Figure 2.2 The Lorenz curves for pre-tax income distribution  
in the USA 1972 and Norway 1970 
 
Author’s own estimates from the Sawyer (1976) data 
 
It is reasonably safe to say that the after tax income distribution represented by Lorenz 
curve for Norway is ‘less unequal’ than that represented by Lorenz curve for the USA since it is 
closer than the USA to the egalitarian line. The real problem occurs when the Lorenz curves of 
two distributions intersect, as in Fig 2.3, where they depict post tax household income 
distribution for the UK and Germany. 
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Figure 2.3 The Lorenz curves for the UK and Germany, 1975 
 
 
Author’s own estimates from the Sawyer (1976) data 
 
It may be seen that the poorest and the richest quintile shares in the UK are relatively 
less rich than their German counterpart. Hence, it is not easy to state whether the UK or 
Germany has the least unequal distribution. In this case, the researcher clearly must make a 
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value judgement, which is a notoriously bad method of economic assessment13. Hence, to avoid 
the problem of subjectivity, we need other inequality indicators or techniques to assess the effect 
on the ranking of countries in terms of their income inequality. Numerous measures of inequality 
may be found in the literature. The most frequently used inequality indicators will be applied to 
assess the inequality of Nepal and of other south Asian countries. 
In order to estimate inequality it is necessary to make choices. There are many ways of 
measuring inequality, each of them with some mathematical appeal (see Cowell, 1995). For 
example, variance from the mean is one of the simplest measures of inequality, but it is not 
independent of the income scale. Simply doubling all incomes would register as a quadrupling of 
the estimate of income inequality. Most people would argue that this is not a desirable property 
of an inequality measure. Therefore, it seems appropriate to discuss a set of axioms that must be 
satisfied. 
2.3.2 The axiomatic approach 
Litchfield (1999) discusses some key axioms required by inequality measures: 
The Pigou-Dalton transfer 14 
This axiom requires the inequality measure to rise (or at least not fall) in response to a 
mean preserving spread. When an income is transferred from a poor to a rich person it should be 
registered as a rise (or at least not as a fall) in inequality. In a similar manner, when income is 
transferred from a rich to a poor person it should register as a fall (or at least not as an increase) 
                                                 
13 For example, one may wish to stress the shares occurring to the poorest quintile, in that case German 
income inequality is less unequal and in contrast, another may stress the shares of the richest quintile. So 
in this case since in the UK has a low-income share in richest quintile, it can be less unequal to the 
opposite view. 
14 See Dalton (1920); and Pigou (1912). 
 60
in inequality. Most measures to be found in the literature, including the Generalised entropy 
class, the Atkinson class, and the Gini Coefficient, satisfy this principle.15 
Income scale independence 
This axiom requires the inequality measure to be invariant to uniform proportional 
changes. If each individual’s income changes by the same proportion (for example when 
changing currency unit) then inequality should not change. Hence for any scalar λ>0, the 
inequality indicator ‘I’ must have the property: I(y)=I(λy). Again, most of the standard measures 
pass this test; except the log variance.16 
Principle of population 
The population principle requires inequality measures to be invariant to replications of 
the population – merging two identical distributions should not alter inequality. For any scalar 
λ>0, I(y) = I(y[λ]), where y[λ] is a concatenation of the vector y, λ times. The inequality 
measurements should be independent of the size of the population. All that matters are the 
position of the population that earns a different level of income. 
Anonymity 
This axiom (sometimes also referred to as ‘Symmetry’) requires that the inequality 
measure be independent of any characteristic of individuals other than their income (or the 
welfare indicator whose distribution is being measured). Hence for any permutation y’ of y, 
I(y)=I(y’). We measure the inequality regardless of who is earning the different income. 
Decomposability 
This requires overall inequality to be related consistently to constituent parts of the 
distribution, such as population sub-groups. If inequality were seen to rise amongst each sub-
group of the population, then we would expect overall inequality to increase. Some measures, 
such as the Generalised Entropy class of measures, are easily decomposed into intuitively 
                                                 
15 See Atkinson (1970), Cowell (1983, 1985) and Sen (1973). The logarithmic variance is an exception 
(see Cowell, 1995). 
16 See Cowell (1999). 
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If one Lorenz curve is everywhere closer to the diagonal than another, the associated 
measurement of the income inequality should be judged less unequal. 
2.4 Inequality Measurements 
A variety of approaches may be employed to summarise the characteristics of income 
distribution and its evolution over time – the Lorenz curve and various inequality indexes (such 
as the Gini coefficient) have been widely used for this purpose. These are described below. 
Income distributions can be measured by an index number. However, these do not all yield the 
same results as they are more or less sensitive to movements in different parts of the distribution. 
Six indexes are discussed in this section. 
2.4.1 The Gini coefficient 
The Gini coefficient, named after the Italian statistician, may be represented in two 
ways: 
2.4.1.1 Geometrically 
The Gini coefficient = Area between Lorenz curve and diagonal
Total area under diagonal
 
In Fig 2.1 above the Gini coefficient is equal to the area occupied between the Lorenz 
curve OCA and diagonal OA divided by the area occupied by triangle OBA. The coefficient may 
range from 0, when all incomes are equal (the Lorenz curve follows the diagonal) to 1 at the 




Suppose we choose two people at random from the income distribution, and express 
the difference between their incomes as a proportion of the average income; then this difference 
turns out to be, on average, twice the Gini coefficient; i.e. a coefficient of 0.4 means that the 
expected difference between two people chosen at random is 80 percent of the average. In the 
literature, there are many different formulae and methodologies for deriving the Gini 
Coefficient. Needless to say, different methodologies have advantages and limitations. Some 
Gini formulae are very complicated and impractical. Some are biased estimators and/or not 
decomposable. The Gini coefficient formula may be used for individual data and for evenly or 
unevenly grouped data. The Gini index incorporates the more detailed share data into a single 
statistic, which summarises the dispersion of the income shares across the whole income 
distribution. It may be expressed as a proportion or as a percentage. The Gini coefficient equals 
0 when the distribution is completely egalitarian. Conversely if the society's total income accrues 
to only one person/household unit, leaving the rest with no income at all, then the Gini 
coefficient will be equal to 1, or 100%. 












n n = =
Δ = −∑ ∑−  
Yi being the income or expenditure of the ith unit, μ being arithmetic mean income/expenditure of 
the distribution, and n the total number of units or observations and Δ is the arithmetic mean of 
the n(n-1) differences of all possible pairs of income/expenditures taken as absolute values. 
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The maximum value of Δ is 2μ, which would be obtained when one unit receives all 
the income or incurs all the expenditure, as the case may be. On the other hand, the minimum 
value of Δ is zero, and would be obtained when every individual receives/incurs the same 
income/expenditure. Consequently, the Gini coefficient ranges from zero (indicating perfect 
equality among persons) to one (indicating perfect inequality). 
The formula for computing the Gini with N elements sorted from poorest to richest is17  
1 2 12
1 21 ( 2 3 ... )n n nG Y Y Y nYn nμ − −
⎛ ⎞= + − + + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (2.2) 
where Yn ≥ Yn-1 ≥ ...≥ Y1 
n is the total number (given) in consideration, μ is the arithmetic mean and Yn, Yn-1, ..., Y1 the 
income units in decreasing order. We have derived a simple formula for the Gini index in 
appendix 2A. 
2.4.2 The Kuznets index 







= −∑  (2.3) 
where the term |yi-0.1| is the absolute divergence of the share of class i from its share. If incomes 








−∑  dividing by 1.8 normalises the index to 0. On the other hand, if all 
                                                 
17 See Sen (1973). 
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−∑  dividing by 1.8 
normalises the index to 1. A close related index divides the summation by 2 rather than 1.8, and 
this is of the proportion of total income that needs to be moved from the rich to the poor in order 
to achieve full equality. Although the measure is simple and appealing, it does have the obvious 
shortcoming, that one unit taken from the rich has the same impact on measure inequality as one 
unit given to the poor. Moreover, it does not change when transfers occur between deciles, both 
of which have shares on the same side of 10 percent of income.18 
2.4.3 The Theil index 
While the Gini is the most widely used inequality index, relying as it does on 
household surveys poses problems. Only a few countries have data for virtually every year. 
There is no way to construct Gini coefficients for countries and years for which adequate 
household sample surveys were never constructed in the first place. The Theil’s index can be 
computed from almost any type of grouped data, even if incomes within the groups overlap. The 
Theil statistics also has the property, which other measures of inequality lack. For example, it 
can be broken down into components without residuals when the data on which it is based are 
organised into groups; while Gini index is frequently decomposed with the condition that there is 
a residual after the decomposition. However, if we want to measure total inequality, only 
household surveys used in the calculation of the Gini index suffice; since everything else is a 
subset of the population. 
                                                 







= −∑  when quintile data are used. In this case the denominator 1.6 
















− =∑  and this results the index 1 by dividing 1.6. 
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Members of the Generalised Entropy class of measures exhibit the general formula as 
follows: 
1







⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= − ≠∑ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠− ⎣ ⎦
 (2.4) 
where, n is the number of individuals or households or earners, in the sample, yi 
is the income of the individual i ∈(1,2,3,...,n), μ the arithmetic mean income, and c reflects 
the different 'perception of inequality' with lower values indicating a higher degree of 'inequality 
aversion'.  
The value of the index ranges from 0 to ∞. When all income units (individuals or 
families) get the mean income, the GE index has value 0, representing the perfect equality. 
Obviously, the higher values represent the higher levels of inequality. Litchfield (1999) stresses 
that in the presence of any zero income value GE (c=0) will always tend to infinity (∞). 
Additionally the parameter c in the GE class represents the weight given to distances between 
incomes at different parts of the income distribution, and can take any real value. Lower values 
of c are more sensitive to changes in the lower tail of the distribution and the higher values affect 
the upper tail of the distribution. When c takes the value zero, the GE(0) becomes the Mean 
Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) as shown in equation 2.5 below (see appendix 2B for the 









= ∑  (2.5) 
Similarly, when c takes the value one, the GE(1) becomes the well known Theil index 








n μ μ== ∑  (2.6) 
These are the two Theil measures of inequality (Theil 1967), the MLD and the Theil 
index respectively, which have been developed from the GE measures with parameters zero and 
one. Sometimes the index with c=2 is also used in the literature. As it takes the value 2, the GE 









Var yGE y y CV
n
μμ μ== − = =∑  (2.7) 
Therefore a value of c=0 gives more weight to distances between incomes in the lower 
tail, a of value c=1 applies equal weights across the distribution, while a value of c=2 gives 
proportionately more weight to gaps in the upper tail (see Litchfield, 1999). 
For simplicity, it has been used with the logarithm base on 10 in this chapter. The 
incidence of one unit transfer of income of poor depends on the logarithmic relation between the 
two income units in case. In the original formula, the logarithms were calculated with the base 2. 
For convenience, logarithms to 10 have been used here, but this change does not affect the 
inequality rankings given by the measures. For a small transfer of income, its impact depends on 
the logarithm of the ratio between individual income and the average income. 
2.4.4 The Atkinson index 















⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= − =/⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑  (2.8) 
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where yi denotes the income of those in the ith income ranges (n ranges altogether); y  
denotes the mean income and fi denotes the proportion of the population with incomes in the ith 






⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟∑ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠== −   
Equations 2.8 introduces distributional objectives through an explicit parameter ε. This 
parameter represents the weight attached by society to the inequality in the distribution. It ranges 
from zero, which means that the society is indifferent about the distribution, to infinity, which 
means that society is much concerned with the position of the lowest income group [∞ ≥ ε ≥ 0]. 
For simplicity, we assume the world of two persons A and B with earnings distribution $5 and 
$15. We consider that a transfer of $5 from the richer to the poorer person brings about perfect 
equality. In terms of the Atkinson Index, the distributional value of the parameter ε can yield the 
index 0 (perfect equality) when the value of ε is 0 (ε=0). Thus, the key role is played by the 
distributional parameter ε. In our example this is done by taking one unit (5 dollars) from B and 
giving a portion ‘x’ to A. At what level of ‘x’ do we cease to regard the redistribution as 
desirable? 
The answer, if the person is concerned at all about inequality, is that ‘x=1’ is  
desirable.19 What is crucial is how far he is prepared to let ‘x’ fall below one before calling for a 
stop. It determines the implicit value of ε  in the following formula (2.9): 
1 2
x
ε=  (2.9) 
                                                 
19 x=1 stands for the whole portion i.e. 5 dollars; that yields the distribution egalitarian. In the formula 2.8 
we can see that when the value of ε is equal to zero, the transfer from rich to poor is maximum i.e. x=1 
and the index coincides the minimum value. The new distribution will be $7.5and $12.5 in the above 
example. This will lead to an Atkinson index of value 0.032. 
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For example, if the person stops at x = ½, this corresponds to ε=1 from equation 2.10. 
In other words, the parameter ε =1 implies that the transfer from the richer person (B) to the 
poorer person (A) is only half of ‘x’ (in the above example ½ of 5 dollars i.e. 2.5 dollars)20. 
When the values of ε are 2 and 3, the shares of ‘x’ transferred from B to A correspond to 1/4 and 
1/8 respectively21. 
The Atkinson’s measure explicitly introduces a value judgement on inequality through 
the value of the parameter ε, which has to be selected. We give another example: 
 
Table 2.1 Income distribution in UK and W. Germany in 1964 
Cumulated share of income Deciles 
UK  W. Germany  
1 2.00 2.10   
2 5.10 5.30   
3 9.30 10.00   
4 15.30 15.40   
5 22.80 21.90   
6 31.90 29.10   
7 42.90 37.50   
8 55.80 47.10   
9 70.70 58.60   
10 100.00  100.00   
Author’s own estimates from the Atkinson (1975) data 
                                                 
20 The new distribution will be $7.5and $12.5 in the above example. This will lead to an Atkinson index 
of value 0.032. 
21 In this case, the new distributions between A and B are (a) $6.25 and $13.75, and (b) $5.625 and 
$14.375 regarding to the values of ε with 2 and 3 respectively. The Atkinson indexes for the new 
distributions are 0.141 and 0.259. In this way the explicit parameter ε  represents the degree of inequality 
aversion. 
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Table 2.2 Value of Atkinson’s index for the UK and W. Germany 
Value of ε UK W. Germany Difference (W. Germany-UK) 
0.5 0.12 0.17 0.05   
1.0 0.24 0.29 0.05   
1.5 0.34 0.38 0.04   
2.0 0.43 0.45 0.02   
2.5 0.55 0.54 -0.01   
Author’s own estimates from Table 2.1 data 
In Table 2.2 the total income would be required to achieve the same level of social 
welfare as at present if incomes were equally distributed. A value of 0.12 means that we would 
reach the same level of social welfare with only (1-0.12) 88 percent of present total income. 
Alternately, the gain from the redistribution to bring about equality would be equivalent to rising 
total income by 12 percent. In this way, the measure is an index of the potential gains from 
redistribution, and provides a tool, which can be used to attach some absolute measure to the 
degree of inequality. 
We have given the value of the Atkinson index for the UK and W. Germany. These 
values are calculated for different levels of ε. A higher value of Atkinson’s index denotes a 
greater degree of inequality. The values of the Atkinson index are lower in the UK for all values 
of ε up to 2.0. As the weight of ε rises (the value of ε ≥ 2.5) the Atkinson index is lower in W. 
Germany than the UK. In terms of interpretation of ε given the value 3, a transfer of one eight 
would lead to W. Germany as having a less unequal distribution compared with the UK. In this 
respect, we may conclude that a lower value of ε is sensitive to the position of the low-income 
groups; and a higher value of ε is sensitive to the position of the upper income groups. 
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2.4.5 The variance of logarithms 
The variance of logs is defined as: 
2
1




⎡ ⎤−= ∑⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (2.10) 
The impact on this measure of a small transfer of income is proportionate to: 




⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (2.11) 
Since the term 1 log y
y y
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 does not always increase with an increase in y, there can be 
a negative impact on the variance of logs indicating a decrease in the inequality measure arising 
from a transfer of income from a relatively rich household to an even richer one.22 The inequality 
measure thus resolves the problem of ranking size-distributions by degree of inequality in 
circumstances where the Lorenz curves intersect23, but only in terms of the value judgements 
built into each particular measure. They do not, however, measure relative degrees of inequality 
in the sense that inequality may be said to be ‘x’ percent more in one case than in another. 
                                                 
22 If both households have income above the mean, and at least one of them an income in excess of 2.718 
times the mean, then this “perverse” effect may occur, if both are excess of 2.718 times the mean then it 
will occur (Sawyer 1976). In the illustrative calculations made below, these conditions are not met. 
23 There is an exception in the case of the variance of logs, since as indicated in the text above, it does not 
fulfil the Pigou-Dalton condition. This means that in turn, under some circumstances, it may rank two 
distributions differently to that given by inspecting the Lorenz curves, even when the Lorenz curves do 
not intersect. 
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2.4.6 Champernowne’s index  





μ= −  (2.12) 
Where, μg is the geometric mean, and μa is the arithmetic mean of household income. 
In this case a transfer of income from a unit with income y1 to a unit with income y2 there will be 
an impact on this measure of inequality, which is proportional to the difference of the reciprocals 
of the income of the two units involved (i.e. 
1 2
1 1
y y− ). If we take y1=λy2, then the impact on this 






− ⋅ . Thus the impact depends on the relative income of the two 
income units involved (λ), and the absolute level of the recipient unit is in such a way that the 
impact on the measure is greater, the poorer is that unit. The impact on the Champernowne 
coefficient of a transfer of income depends on the incomes of the units involved, whereas for the 
Gini coefficient it depends upon the ranks of the units involved. 
2.5 Sensitivity of Selected Inequality Measurements 
Table 2.3 shows the effects on the various measures of making specific changes in a 
given income distribution. All measures show the same direction of change in inequality. They 
would give rather different ideas of the extent of change in inequality if interpreted cardinally. 
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Table 2.3 Sensitivity of the various indicators of income inequality for hypothetical 
redistribution 
  Atkinson 
  
Theil Kuznets LV Champernowne Gini 
ε=0.5 ε=1 ε=1.5 ε=2 
Nepal 1984 0.0562 0.2665 0.0496 0.1201 0.2790 0.0628 0.1201 0.1709 0.2149 
A 0.0406 0.2134 0.0330 0.0716 0.2168 0.0314 0.0716 0.1097 0.1450 
B 0.0323 0.2040 0.0271 0.0698 0.2122 0.0362 0.0698 0.1005 0.1281 
C 0.0313 0.2040 0.0255 0.0668 0.2068 0.0348 0.0668 0.0957 0.1213 
D 0.0365 0.2040 0.0286 0.0759 0.2168 0.0401 0.0759 0.1074 0.1347 
E 0.0360 0.2040 0.0277 0.0742 0.2148 0.0394 0.0742 0.1045 0.1366 
F 0.0752 0.3040 0.0660 0.1560 0.3188 0.0829 0.1560 0.2182 0.2694 
G 0.0628 0.2790 0.0583 0.1360 0.2948 0.0706 0.1360 0.1945 0.2455 
H 0.0612 0.2790 0.0538 0.1298 0.2908 0.0681 0.1298 0.1836 0.2292 
I 0.0601 0.2790 0.0519 0.1265 0.2868 0.0666 0.1265 0.1786 0.2227 
J 0.0401 0.2290 0.0362 0.0887 0.2388 0.0455 0.0887 0.1288 0.1652 
K 0.0500 0.2540 0.0425 0.1061 0.2628 0.0556 0.1061 0.1506 0.1890 
L 0.0515 0.2540 0.0460 0.1140 0.2684 0.0578 0.1140 0.1589 0.2026 
M 0.0256 0.2540 0.0476 0.1143 0.2708 0.0592 0.1143 0.1641 0.2081 
Author’s own estimates: the indexes are calculated from the data on income distribution of Nepal for 1984 
 
 
Notes to Table 2.3: 
A= hypothetical redistribution of 5% of total income from the top quintile to all other quintiles with equal 
share. 
B= hypothetical redistribution of 5% of total income from the top quintile to the bottom three quintiles, the 
first quintile obtains 2.5% of total income, the second quintile 1.67% of total income and the third 
quintile obtains 0.83% of total income. 
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C= hypothetical redistribution of 5% of total income from the top quintile to bottom two quintiles, quintile 
1 obtains 3% and quintile 2 obtains 2%. 
D= hypothetical redistribution of 5% of total income from the top two quintiles (top quintile 3% and 
fourth quintile 2%) to the bottom two quintiles in the same proportion. 
E= hypothetical redistribution of 5% of total income from the top two quintiles (top quintile 3% and fourth 
quintile 2%) to the bottom two quintiles, the first obtains 3% and second obtains 2%. 
F= hypothetical redistribution of 4% of total income from all the bottom four quintile by one percent each 
to top quintile. 
G= hypothetical redistribution of one percent of total income from the bottom quintile to the top quintile. 
H= hypothetical redistribution of one percent of total income from the second quintile to the top quintile. 
I= hypothetical redistribution of one percent of total income from the third quintile to the top quintile. 
J= hypothetical redistribution of 4% of total income from the top quintile to all bottom quintile by one 
percent each. 
K= hypothetical redistribution of one percent of total income from the top quintile to the bottom quintile. 
L= hypothetical redistribution of one percent of total income from the top quintile to the second quintile. 
M= hypothetical redistribution of one percent of total income from the top quintile to the third quintile.
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Table 2.3 shows the change in various indicators of income inequality for a given 
income distribution for Nepal in 1984. We observe that all measures tend to follow the same 
direction to changes in inequality. For instance, a hypothetical redistribution of the income share 
from the top quintile to the other quintiles reduces inequality indicators24. The same may be said 
for the redistribution of income from the lower quintiles to the higher quintile, which increases 
the level of income inequality25. It is obvious that the sensitivity of inequality indexes reflect the 
differences between size distributions of income. As a result, the changes in magnitude of 
inequality vary according to the characteristics of inequality indicators.  The results in Table 2.3, 
however, show that the proportional change in income distribution leads, in certain cases, to 
significant variations while in other circumstances they are insignificant. 
The initial income inequality can result in different magnitudes according to the size of 
the redistribution being made. In terms of the ratio in respect to the initial size, the Gini 
coefficients and Kuznets inequality measurements obtain a higher mark; while Champernowne, 
Theil, and Variance of logarithms inequality measures mark lower points in inequality. 
Additionally, the Atkinson inequality indexes with the lower aversion value represent lower 
inequality changes; and the higher aversion values provide the higher variation respectively. But 
in terms of percentage points the results from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 lead to the following 
conclusions: 
The Theil index 
The redistribution to the lowest quintile from the highest quintile of one percentage of 
total income sharply reduces the Theil index (by more than 11 percentage points). 
Simultaneously, a redistribution of 1% each from the second third and fourth quintiles to the 
poorest quintile respectively reduces the Theil index by the rates 8.36%, 6.41% and 4.45% (see 
Table 2.4). On the other hand, a redistribution of 1% from the lowest quintile to the highest 
                                                 
24 The exception is found in some cases of the Kuznets index. For example in Table 2.3, rows B, C, D and 
E, the Kuznets index remains unchanged. 
25 Again the exception is found in some cases of the Kuznets inequality index. For example, it remains 
unchanged in the cases K, L and M. 
 75
quintile increases the index by 11.74% points. The redistribution from the second, third and 
fourth quintiles by one percentage point each to the richest quintile raised inequality at 
diminishing rates 8.9%, 6.94% and 4.8% percentage points respectively (See Table 2.5). 
The Kuznets index 
The Kuznets index shows that the redistributional effect of any transfer of income from 
all the quintiles (from the top quintile to others or from the other quintiles to top quintile) have 
the same effect except for the redistribution between the fourth and the richest quintile (see 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5). 
The Variance of logarithms (LV) 
The LV exhibits the highest shifts in inequality both for the redistribution from the 
richest to the poorest quintile as well as from the poorest to the richest quintile. It is measured by 
14.32% and 17.5% points respectively. But the variances are sharply reduced for the other 
quintiles. The results of a redistribution of income from the top quintile to the other quintiles, 
and from the other quintiles to the top quintiles, are reproduced in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. 
The Champernowne index 
The Champernowne inequality indicator is more sensitive than the Theil’s index. 
When we redistribute 1% of total income from the top quintile to the poorest quintile, the index 
is reduced from 100% to 88%26. It is lower than the corresponding Theil index. On the other 
hand, by redistributing income from the poorest quintile to the richest quintile, the 
Champernowne index is increased more than the Theil index; whereas in other cases the 
redistributional influence from the top quintile to the other three quintiles monotonically 
decreases the inequality when compared to the Theil index. In contrast, the redistribution of 
income from these three quintiles to the top quintile raises monotonically the inequality 
measurements in comparison with the Theil index (see Table 2.4 and Table 2.5). 
                                                 
26 The actual ratio before redistribution is assumed 100%. 
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The Gini index 
Compared with the other inequality indexes (i.e. the Theil index, the Variance of 
Logarithms, and Champernowne’s index) the Gini index varies less when a redistribution of 
income is implemented. On the basis of one percent of total income transferred from the top to 
the poor quintile and vice-versa, the variation is lower than with the other indexes (see Table 2.4 
and Table 2.5). 
The Atkinson Index 
Atkinson’s indexes are typically determined by the value of the distributional 
parameter ε. The inequality rises as the parameter value increases in terms of percentage value.27 
By contrast, inequality falls according to an increase in the distributional parameter. 
Redistribution from the top to the poorest quintile results in higher changes compared to the 
Theil index. But the redistribution of income from the top quintile to the second quintile, third 
quintile, and fourth quintile respectively, has a relatively lower effect on the index compared to 
the Theil index. On the other hand, the redistribution from the lower quintile to the top quintile 
has a lower incidence on the Atkinson index compared to the Theil index. The transfer of one 
percent of income share from the poorest quintile to the richest quintile, leads to increases in the 
Theil index by 12.6%, 13.2%, 13.81%, and 14% with the aversion parameter ε=0.5, ε=1, ε=1.5 
and ε=2 respectively. While the Theil index for the same unit of transfer from poor to rich is 
11.74%. It is lower than all Atkinson’s indexes observed in Table 2.5, whereas in all other 
transfer cases, e.g. of one percent of income share transferred from the second, third and fourth 
quintiles to the top quintile, has a smaller impact in equality compared to the Theil index. Thus, 
Atkinson’s measures emphasises either the high or the low end of the distribution. 
 
                                                 
27 Assuming the actual value is 100%. 
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Table 2.4 The share of various inequality indexes 
 (for a redistribution of income from rich to poor) 
  Atkinson 
 Stage  Theil  Kuznets  LV   Champer-nowne 
Gini ε=0.5 ε=1.0 ε=1.5 ε=2.0 
1 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
2 88.97 95.31 85.68 88.34   94.19 88.68 88.34 88.12 87.95 
3 91.64 95.31 92.74 92.76   96.20 92.19 92.76 92.98 94.28 
4 93.59 95.31 95.97 95.17   97.06 94.42 95.17 96.02 96.84 
5 95.55 100.00 98.19 97.17   98.49 96.33 97.17 97.89 98.46 
Author’s own estimates from the Multipurpose Household Budget Survey data in Nepal (1984) 
 
Notes to Table 2.4: 
In stage 1, all inequality measures are normalised to 100 percentage. 
In stage 2, the normalised percentage of the inequality measures when one percentage of the total income 
is transferred from the richest quintile to the poorest quintile. 
In stage 3, the normalised percentage of the inequality measures when one percentage of the total income 
is transferred from the richest quintile to the second poorest quintile. 
In stage 4, the normalised percentage of the inequality measures when one percentage of the total income 
is transferred from the richest quintile to the third quintile. 
In stage 5, the normalised percentage of the inequality measures when one percentage of the total income 
is transferred from the richest quintile to the fourth quintile. 
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Table 2.5 The changes of various inequality indexes 
(for a redistribution of income from poor to rich) 
Atkinson indexes 
Stage  Theil Kuznets LV Champer-nowne Gini ε=0.5 ε=1 ε=1.5 ε=2 
1 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
2 111.74 104.69 117.50 113.24 105.70 112.60 113.20 113.81 114.00 
3 108.90 104.69 108.50 108.08 104.20 108.60 108.10 107.43 107.00 
4 106.94 104.69 104.60 105.33 102.80 106.20 105.30 104.51 104.00 
5 104.80 100.00 102.20 103.16 101.40 104.00 103.20 102.46 102.00 
Author’s own estimates from the Multipurpose Household Budget Survey data in Nepal (1984) 
Notes to Table 2.5: 
In stage 1, all inequality measures are normalised to 100 percentage. 
In stage 2, the normalised percentage of the inequality measures when one percentage of the total income 
is transferred from the poorest quintile to the richest quintile. 
In stage 3, the normalised percentage of the inequality measures when one percentage of the total income 
is transferred from the second poorest quintile to the richest quintile. 
In stage 4, the normalised percentage of the inequality measures when one percentage of the total income 
is transferred from the third quintile to the richest quintile. 
In stage 5, the normalised percentage of the inequality measures when one percentage of the total income 
is transferred from the fourth quintile to the richest quintile. 
The arguments are represented in the graphs below: 
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Figure 2.4 The graphical representation of the sensitivity of various inequality measurements 



































Author’s own estimates from the Multipurpose Household Budget Survey data in Nepal (1984) 
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In Fig 2.4 the vertical axis represents the inequality percentage (normalised).28 The 
horizontal line represents the change in the inequality measures, by assuming the redistribution 
of 1% of total income to the richest quintile from the other quintiles.29 At the initial stage, the 
vertical line provides all the inequality indicators at 100 percent. The horizontal axis provides 
the different stages of inequality levels, which shifted 1% share of total income from the lower 
quintiles to the richest quintile. It represents the variation of various inequality measurements in 
the case of a 1% transfer from the poorer quintiles to the top quintile. For stage 2 the vertical 
axis represents the variation in all inequality indicators from the initial inequality level while 
redistributing 1% of total income from the second richest quintile (fourth) to the richest quintile 
by keeping the remaining quintiles constant. The stage 3 identifies the variation in all inequality 
indicators from the initial inequality level when redistributing 1% of total income from the third 
quintile to the richest quintile by keeping other quintiles constant. At stage 4, the vertical axis 
identifies the variation of all inequality indicators from the initial inequality level when 
redistributing 1% of total income from the second poorest quintile to the richest quintile by 
keeping other quintiles constant again. Finally at stage 5, the vertical line identifies the variation 
of all inequality indicators from the initial inequality level when redistributing 1% of total 
income from the poorest quintile to the richest quintile again by keeping other quintiles constant. 
In this way, the lines for the various inequality measures provide the variation of the distribution 
of income (in this instance the distribution of income in Nepal for 1984) with the hypothesis of a 
simulation of transferring 1% of total income from the poorer quintiles to the richest quintile. 
The process of transferring is successively allocated to each quintile starting from the highest 
one. It is worth noting that the Atkinson index for ε =1 and the Champernowne index overlap 
each other at all stages. It seems these indexes are perfectly replaceable. 
                                                 
28 The initial inequality before the redistribution (hypothetical) is assumed to be 100%. 
29 At the initial stage (denoted by 1), all the inequality indexes are normalised to 100%. In the successive 
stages 2, 3, 4, and 5 the inequality indexes are measured after transferring 1% of total income from the 
rest of the quintiles to the richest quintile respectively. 
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Figure 2.5 The graphical representation of the sensitivity of various inequality measurements 



































Author’s own estimates from the Multipurpose Household Budget Survey data in Nepal (1984) 
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In Fig 2.5 we attempt to map the sensitivity of various inequality measures used thus 
far. To do so, we transfer 1% share of total income from the top quintile to the other quintiles 
respectively. The various inequality measurement lines show the effect on a given income 
distribution. The sample refers again to the distribution of income for Nepal in 1984. The figure 
shows the fluctuation of the inequality measures while transferring 1% of income to the poor 
quintiles from the richest quintile. It thus involves a simulation of a transfer of 1% successively 
allocated to each quintile starting from the fourth quintile to the poorest quintile. 
2.6 Measuring the Trend of Income Inequality in Nepal 
As we have seen, there are several ways to express the degree of income inequality in a 
given society. The simplest way is to arrange whatever units, one chooses (i.e. persons, families, 
dynasties, or households) in rank order, from the poorest to the richest; then to divide the 
hierarchy into fifths (quintiles) or tenths (deciles), and compute either the average income by 
decile or quintile or the share that each grouping has of the society's total income. Then, the 
shares or averages of the rich and poor can be compared. In the case of Nepal, for the reasons 
expounded above, we have data only for 1984 and 1996 (two observations only). In Table 2.6 
the five columns on the left give the share of income earned by each quintile of households, from 
the poorest to the richest. In addition, columns six through nine show the ratios of those shares 
for the richest to poorest, the middle to the poorest, and the richest to the middle30. 
 
                                                 
30 Note that from 1984 to 1996 the increase in inequality was almost entirely the result of the rich getting 
richer at the expense of the lower-middle and middle ranks. 
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Table 2.6 Income distribution in Nepal (1984 and 1996) 
  Share of income by quintile Ratio 
  Poorest Second Third Fourth Richest Q5/Q1 Q3/q1 Q5/Q3 
1984 9.11 12.89 16.68 21.82 39.50 4.34 1.83 2.37 
1996 7.60 11.50 15.10 21.00 44.80 5.90 1.99 2.97 
Change -1.51 -1.39 -1.58 -0.82 5.30 1.56 0.16 0.60 
Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
The selected ratios in Table 2.6 also indicate an increase between 1984 and 1996. All 
the selected ratios have risen significantly in 1996. The quintile shares for 1984 and 1996 reveal 
that the amount lost by the entire bottom four quintiles on average is more than one percent 
point. The gain of the top quintile is 5.3 percent of total income. Every income group, except for 
those at the top of the income scale, received a significantly smaller share of national income in 
1996 than in 1984. The highest-income groups consequently earned larger shares. In 1996 the 20 
percent of households with the highest incomes received nearly half — 44.8 percent — of 
national income, while the other 80 percent of the remaining population divided the other half 
(56.2 percent) of national income. The 44.8 percent of national income going to the top fifth of 
households represents a statistically significant change from the 39.5 percent figure for 1984 of 
5.5 percent points. The share going to the middle three-fifths of the population combined was at 
a record lower than 50 percent of total income. This argument is shown in the following chart31: 
 
                                                 
31 The first, second, third and fourth quintiles have lost their share in national income between 1984 and 
1996 by 1.51, 1.39, 1.58, and 0.82 percent points respectively and the income share of the top fifth of 
households rose by 5.3 percent. 
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Figure 2.6 The change in quintile shares of income in Nepal between the 1980s and 1990s 
Poorest Second Third Fourth Richest Q5/Q1 Q3/Q1
1984 9.11 12.89 16.68 21.82 39.5 4.34 1.83
1996 7.6 11.5 15.1 21 44.8 5.9 1.99

























Author’s own estimates 
In Fig 2.6 we have presented the quintile shares for 1984 and 1996 and their changes 
between these two periods. The vertical line shows the percentage of total national income 
received by income groups, and the horizontal line represents the quintile share of population 
from the poorest to the richest respectively. The line depicted for 1996 is always below the line 
for the first four quintiles for 1984. It means that all four quintiles had lower percentage shares in 
national income in 1996 than in 1984, while the top quintile line for 1996 is above the line for 
1984. This variation is also provided by a change-line. This has clearly been a worsening in the 
distribution of income in Nepal between these two periods. This technique is simple and 
revealing, but not without awkwardness: which comparison to choose? 
Now we begin plotting the distribution through the Lorenz curves. In the graph below, 
the horizontal axis shows the cumulative shares of population and the vertical axis, the 
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cumulative share of income earned by the plotted quintile.32 The graph plots these values for 
1984 and 1996. The Lorenz curve for Nepal for 1996 is further away from the egalitarian line 
than in 1984. Hence, the distribution of income in Nepal in 1984 was less unequal than the 
distribution of income in 1996. 
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Author’s own estimates 
                                                 
32 For example, for 1984, the cumulative value for quintile 1 is the share earned by the poorest quintile, or 
9.11%; that for the quintile 2, 12.89% +9.11%, or 22%; and so on, up to quintile 5, when the sum is 
100%. 
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Though income quintile shares and the Lorenz curves clearly show the situation of 
income distribution in Nepal, they do not represent the whole distribution in one unit. Thus, it is 
important to define a country’s inequality level as a whole in order to facilitate the comparison 
of results across countries. In addition, we provide several different indicators given that these 
indicators vary in sensitivity to observations in the tails of the distribution. We begin with the 
following chart, which includes all the measures of inequality that we discussed in section 2.4 
(above) to explain Nepalese income inequality. 
 












































Author’s own estimates 
The above Fig 2.8 shows the inequality measures in Nepal between 1984 and 1996 by 
various indicators. It also shows the change in inequality between 1984 and 1996. The Gini 
index for the earnings varies from 0.279 in 1984 to 0.336 in 1996; a change of 0.057 points. The 
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Kuznets index shows a higher inequality change than the Gini index. It increases from 0.267 in 
1984 to 0.323 in 1996, showing an increase of 0.056 points. The Champernowne index, the 
Theil index and the Variance of logarithms show very small inequality variations compared with 
the Gini index and Kuznets index in terms of inequality size. The Atkinson indices vary 
according to the distributional parameters. The absolute magnitude is determined by ε. As this 
parameter rises, the inequality also increases. The inequality measures in 1984 and 1996 with the 
lowest parameter ε=0.5 are 0.063 and 0.092 respectively. The inequality measure is thus 
increased by 0.029 points. With the highest distributional parameter ε=2, inequalities are 
measured for 1984 and 1996 at 0.215 and 0.295 respectively. Here again, the inequality degree is 
slightly greater, and the concentration in the distribution of income between 1984 and 1996 is 
increased by 0.080. The worsening in income distribution from 1984 to 1996 is therefore 
confirmed by all inequality measurement indexes analysed. 
2.7 Measuring the Trends of Income Inequality in Other SAARC Nations 
The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) includes the seven 
countries of South Asia, i.e. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka. It is an association based on the objectives of peace, freedom, social justice, and 
economic prosperity, which are thought to be best achieved in South Asia by fostering mutual 
understanding, good neighbourly relations, and meaningful co-operation among the member 
states. The idea of regional co-operation in the South Asia was first proposed around November 
1980. The Foreign Secretaries of South Asian countries expressed their desire for regional co-
operation at this time when they held several meetings in Colombo. Consequently, the SAARC 
was formally launched on 8th December 1985. Its goal was to promote the well-being of the 
populations of South Asia and improve their standard of living; to speed up economic growth, 
social progress and cultural development; to reinforce the links between the countries of this 
area; and, finally, to promote mutual collaboration and assistance in the various fields. With 1.3 
billion inhabitants in 1999, these countries represented almost 22% of the world population, but 
earned only 1.97% of world GNP (575 billion US$ in 1999). Average per capita income in the 
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region was $441 (World Bank, 1999). Thus one could say that, poverty is a fundamental 
characteristic of South Asia. 
As discussed in section 2.4 (above), rather than relying on one-inequality measures, 
this analysis uses nine measures of inequality. Given the associated welfare function in the 
inequality measurements, this analysis will try to ascertain their impact, while simultaneously 
analysing the inequality trend in selected SAARC countries.33 
2.8 Measuring Inequality Trends in Bangladesh 1981-96 
Bangladesh (a member of SAARC countries) experienced a falling income dispersion 
during the last two decades. The aggregate income share of the richest quintile has decreased 
from 1981 to 1996, though in the mid 1980s and from 1992-96 it had a tendency to increase. The 
income share of the poorest quintile has consistently increased throughout the period, while the 
middle three quintiles experienced a mixed pattern with a rise and fall of their income share in 
the national income. The variation in these three quintiles is relatively low. On average, the 
lowest quintile has gained approximately 1.5 percent of income; while the top quintile has lost 
almost 3 percent of income share between the 1980s to 1990s.  The third and fourth quintiles 
gain around 0.8 percentage each; whereas the fourth quintile remains constant during the same 
period.34 These results are depicted in Fig 2.9 below. 
                                                 
33 We have selected only five SAARC countries out of seven i.e. Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka because income distribution data are available only for these countries. 
34 Average share is used to compare for the periods 1980s and 1990s. 
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Figure 2.9 Changes in the quintile shares in Bangladesh during the last two decades 
Poorest Second Third Fourth Richest
1981 7 11 15 22 45
1983 7 12 16 22 43
1986 7 12 15 20 46
1989 10 13 17 22 39
1992 9 14 17 22 38
1996 9 12 16 21 43
664 1072 1520 2212 4532
720 1175 1594 2173 4338
699 1236 1507 1955 4603
950 1330 1700 2160 3860
935 1351 1724 2199 3791























Poorest Second Third Fourth Richest  
Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
Between 1981 and 1983, the two richest quintiles have lost their share of income; 
while the rest of the quintiles gained. In this case we can say that inequality of income has fallen 
in Bangladesh because the only poor quintiles have gained in income share. In 1986, the richest 
quintile and the second poorest quintile gained their income shares at the cost of other quintiles. 
It is not easy to judge whether inequality has risen or fallen here, but we will examine this later 
with the help of inequality measures. Between 1986 and 1989, all four lower quintiles have 
gained their share of income at the cost of the richest quintile.  We can unambiguously say that 
the distribution of income has improved because the only gainers are the poor income groups. 
The lower four quintiles continued to gain their share of income until 1992 then between 1992 
and 1997, the shares of all four quintiles dropped. These modifications of income shares have 
led to the following shifts in the various inequality measurements (see Table 2.7). 
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Table 2.7 Changes of income inequality in Bangladesh 1981-96 
Atkinson 
 Gini Kuznets Theil LV 
Champer-
nowne ε=0.5 ε=1 ε=1.5 ε=2 
1981 0.3550 0.3430 0.0917 0.0890 0.1946 0.1024 0.1946 0.2729 0.3368 
1983 0.3294 0.3139 0.0789 0.0749 0.1686 0.0882 0.1686 0.2385 0.2974 
1986 0.3411 0.3198 0.0884 0.0797 0.1820 0.0971 0.1820 0.2533 0.3117 
1989 0.2660 0.2525 0.0512 0.0447 0.1096 0.0571 0.1096 0.1564 0.1974 
1992 0.2624 0.2488 0.0493 0.0442 0.1072 0.0554 0.1072 0.1541 0.1957 
1996 0.3080 0.2950 0.0704 0.0601 0.1453 0.0773 0.1453 0.2028 0.2502 
Average 1980s 0.3229 0.3073 0.0776 0.0721 0.1637 0.0862 0.1637 0.2303 0.2858 
Average 1990s 0.2852 0.2719 0.0599 0.0521 0.1263 0.0664 0.1263 0.1784 0.2229 
Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
Note: Quintile shares are used to calculate the indexes. 
Table 2.7 summarises the nine inequality measures for income distribution in 
Bangladesh. The picture of diversity from Table 2.7 shows the changes in the various inequality 
measures since 1981. They show that inequality fell between 1981 and 1983. The Gini index has 
decreased by over 2% and then rose slightly between 1983 and 1986. Bangladesh experienced 
the largest decline in the Gini index ever between 1986 and 1989 with more than 7 percentage 
points. It reached the lowest inequality in 1992 and it began to rise (most probably the largest 
change) between 1992 and 1996. However, Bangladesh improved income distribution in the 
1990s compared with 1980s (see average inequality measures for the 1980s and the 1990s in 
Table 2.7). 
To facilitate comparisons, we standardise all measures with 100% for 1981. The graph 
of the results is plotted in Fig 2.10. This will not only facilitate the time-series patterns of 
inequality, but also the comparisons among the inequality indexes. 
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Figure 2.10 Standardised Inequality indexes: Bangladesh 1981-96 (1981=100%) 
Gini Kuznets Theil LV Champernown Atk 0.5 Atk 1 Atk 1.5 Atk 2
1981 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1983 93 92 86 84 87 86 87 87 88
1986 96 93 96 90 94 95 94 93 93
1989 75 74 56 50 56 56 56 57 59
1992 74 73 54 50 55 54 55 56 58
1996 87 86 77 68 75 76 75 74 74
Atk 0.5 Atk 1 Atk 1.5 Atk 2
1981 100 100 100 100
1983 86 87 87 88
1986 95 94 93 93
1989 56 56 57 59
1992 54 55 56 58
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Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
Fig 2.10 demonstrates the homogeneity among inequality measures over time. For 
example, all inequality measures show a decline in inequality between 1981-83, a rise in the 
 92
inequality in 1983-86, a fall in the inequality in 1986-89 again, and so on. There is no inequality 
measure that shows an opposite result of another inequality measure. Nevertheless, the 
sensitivity among the inequality measures varies. For example, the Gini index and Kuznets’ 
index are less sensitive compared with the rest of the indexes because the change of inequality 
over time is quite slow. For example, between 1986 and 1989 the Gini index declines from 96% 
to 75%, as does the Kuznets’ index. The Theil index declines from 96% to 56%. The change in 
LV is more rapid than other measures. This evidence may be observed in the above figure given 
that the slope of this measure is the steepest downward (when the inequality declines). Hence, 
we can see that except for the Gini index and Kuznets indexes, the measures are sensitive in the 
lower tail. It is also noteworthy that one of the measures between Champernowne’s index and 
Atkinson’s index (ε=1,5) disappears in the graph because they overlap each other. We have 




Figure 2.11 Lorenz curves of income distribution in Bangladesh for the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
The Lorenz curve for the 1990s is closer to the egalitarian line than the Lorenz curve 
for the 1980s. We used household income data for the 1980s and individual expenditure data for 
the 1990s for the analysis of inequality. Therefore, we cannot compare our results for the 1980s 
and 1990s directly. Inequality has declined in our study between the 1980s and the 1990s; but 
the result is opposite to that obtained by Wodon (2000). In his study the inequality of 
expenditure has increased slowly in the Eighties, while in the Nineties it has increased sharply, 
reaching the Gini coefficient 0.31 in 1997 from 0.26 in 1983 (Table 3, Wodon 2000). Although 
the Gini coefficient has increased sharply between the 1980s and 1990s, the level of inequality 
registered is the lowest among the South Asian Nations. Furthermore, his analysis of inequality 
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decomposition shows that the between groups inequality is increasing over time35, suggesting 
that the rural and urban gap is widening. The report of Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh (2003) 
specified that inequality in urban areas has increased much more than in rural areas in the 
Nineties. Hence the level of inequality has increased over time in Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh achieved independence in 1972 and it is the third poorest country in the 
world and has the largest number of poor people. Bangladesh witnessed a quite high growth rate 
(5% on average) of GDP in 1980s and 1990s. In terms of value added, the share of agriculture 
declined while the non-agricultural sectors expanded their share. Given a large number of poor 
people is engaged in the agriculture (62% of labour force in 2000), a slow growth in this sector 
has widened a large gap in income between rich and poor. The growth of income has benefited 
all segments of the population in the Nineties, but growth rates varied considerably across 
income groups. Higher income groups have benefited relatively more than other groups, which 
led to a higher Gini coefficient in the Nineties. 
 
                                                 
35 See Wodon (2000), Table 3. 
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Figure 2.12 Growth incidence curve for Bangladesh, 1991/92 to 2000 
 
Source: Figure adapted from the World Bank (2002), Report no. 24299-BD 
 
The World Bank 2002 (Report No. 24299-BD, p. 7) states: ‘In part, the rise in 
inequality over the decade reflects increased fragmentation and inequality of landholdings, as 
well as higher premiums enjoyed by the segment of the population fortunate enough to have 
relatively better skills and education’. The inequality of income distribution in Bangladesh 
increased over time largely as a consequence of the land tenure system and uneven access of the 
population to education skill development and employment, and gender discrimination. ‘The 
sources of rising inequality are linked with the uneven spread of economic and social 
opportunities, unequal distribution of assets especially in respect to human capital and financial 
capital, growing disparity between urban and rural areas as well as between developed and 
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underdeveloped areas. As a result, income sources associated with human capital (such as 
services) and financial capital intensive activities (such as trade and many non-farm activities 
requiring considerable injection of capital) as well as remittances were found disequalising in 
both urban and rural areas.’ (Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh 2003, Chapter Two, p. 8) 
2.9 Measuring Inequality Trends in India 1981-96 
The income data from 1983 to 1997 are based on the household surveys. In the last two 
decades nine household surveys have been done to estimate the income distribution of the 
country. Based on the Deninger and Squire database (1996) and the World Bank Development 
Report (1998) we have estimated the trends of quintile shares for these periods. 
The richest quintile share obviously increased in the period 1990-97. Between 1983 
and 1986 it is slightly increased and then remained almost constant between 1986 and 1987. 
Then it started to decrease until 1990. Then, again, it increased between 1990 and 1991. The 
drastic rise took place between 1992 and 1997. It marked almost 5 percent points, which is 
statistically significant. Although during these periods there are ups and down, the increase of 
the richest quintile share is clearly seen for the period 1983 to 1997 (see Fig 2.13). 
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Figure 2.13 Changes in the quintile shares in India during the last two decades 
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
1983 9 13 17 22 41 100.00%
1986 9 13 16 22 41 100.00%
1987 9 13 16 21 41 100.00%
1988 9 13 16 21 41 100.00%
1989 9 13 17 22 40 100.00%
1990 9 13 17 22 39 100.00%
1991 9 13 16 21 42 100.00%
1992 9 13 16 21 41 100.00%
1997 8 12 15 19 46 100.00%
1983 860 1270 1650 2170 4050
1986 850 1250 1640 2150 4110
1987 890 1250 1630 2130 4100
1988 900 1270 1640 2140 4050
1989 910 1290 1660 2170 3970
1990 910 1310 1690 2180 3910
1991 900 1250 1590 2070 4190























Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
 
Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
On the contrary, the poorest quintile share has lost around 0.4 percent points between 
the 1980s and 1990s. The trend in Fig (2.13) shows that the poorest quintile slowly increases its 
share until 1990, and then starts to decline. The variance during these periods is negligible. The 
second quintile share has the same trend as the poorest one. It decreases by around 0.6 percent 
points between the 1980s and 1990s. It experiences a small increase in 1990 and then drops 
down again. The third quintile share remains almost constant for the whole decade (the 1980s) 
and then falls down by almost 1 percent point in 1991. In 1992 it recaptures its previous 
position, but again in 1997 it drops by 0.7% point. Thus, the third quintile also experiences a 
decline of its share in national income between the 1980s and 1990s by approximately 1 
percentage point. Analogously, the fourth quintile share also declines between the 1980s and 
1990s by more than 1 percentage point. This quintile experiences a small decline in the 1980s 
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and it regains its share in the early 1990s; but between 1992 and 1997 it drops more than 2 
percentage points. 
In this way, the only one to gain has been the richest quintile at the expense of the 
other quintiles. The shift turns up in the various income inequality indicators. The results are 
presented in Table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.8 Changes in the distribution of income inequality in India 1983-1997 
Atkinson 
 Gini Kuznets Theil LV 
Champer
-nowne ε = 0.5 ε = 1 ε  = 1.5 ε = 2 
1983 0.2912 0.2775 0.0614 0.0551 0.1312 0.0686 0.1312 0.1865 0.2341 
1986 0.2968 0.2825 0.0641 0.0572 0.1361 0.0713 0.1361 0.1928 0.2412 
1987 0.2920 0.2788 0.0624 0.0542 0.1312 0.0691 0.1312 0.1852 0.2309 
1988 0.2868 0.2738 0.0600 0.0523 0.1268 0.0666 0.1268 0.1794 0.2242 
1989 0.2800 0.2675 0.0568 0.0499 0.1210 0.0633 0.1210 0.1721 0.2161 
1990 0.2748 0.2613 0.0544 0.0484 0.1170 0.0609 0.1170 0.1672 0.2110 
1991 0.2960 0.2825 0.0651 0.0550 0.1348 0.0716 0.1348 0.1887 0.2336 
1992 0.2940 0.2813 0.0631 0.0552 0.1330 0.0700 0.1330 0.1878 0.2341 
1997 0.3340 0.3250 0.0854 0.0714 0.1712 0.0926 0.1712 0.2350 0.2855 
Average 1980s 0.2894 0.2760 0.0609 0.0537 0.1293 0.0678 0.1293 0.1832 0.2293 
Average 1990s 0.2997 0.2875 0.0670 0.0575 0.1390 0.0738 0.1390 0.1946 0.2410 
Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
Table 2.8 summarises the nine inequality-measures for the income distribution of 
India. Between the 1980s and 1990s India registered an increase in inequality. All inequality 
measures support the exacerbation of the Indian income distribution from the 1980s to the 
1990s. For example the Gini’s index is increased by more than 1 percentage point; this is also 
true for Kuznets’ index and Atkinson’s indexes (with ε=1.5 and ε=2). Other inequality indexes 
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show a change of less than 1 percentage point. This conclusion is derived from the time series 
analysis of income distribution in India for 1983-97. 
Between 1983 and 1986 inequality slightly increased in India – the Gini’s index 
increased by 0.56 percent point. Indian experienced a decline in inequality for the next four 
years. It reached the lowest inequality level of the last two decades in 1990, with a Gini index 
equal to 27.48 percentage points. Then it begins again to increase. 
The results of income inequality until 1990 are supported by all indexes examined in 
this study. Nevertheless, between 1991 and 1992 the result yields a different story pertaining to 
the various inequality-indexes. The seven inequality measures show a decline in equality in this 
period; but LV and Atkinson’s indexes with inequality aversion parameter ε=2, reveal an 
increase in the inequality. In this case it is difficult to interpret the trend. This is yet another 
reason why in this study we chose to use various indexes to examine the inequality trend instead 
of relying on a unique measure. We must however be careful while choosing the inequality 
measures. 
From this study we identify some of the reasons why the different inequality measures 
have contradictory results. 
We have examined all the quintile shares of income distribution for 1991 and 1992. 
The richest quintile declines by 0.8 percentage points. The second richest quintile gains 0.7 
percentage points of its income share and the third quintile also gains 0.3 percentage points. Yet 
the second poorest quintile remains constant, and the poorest quintile decreases by 0.2 percent 
point. The LV and the Atkinson index with ε=2 tend to increase, although the reduction in the 
lowest quintile is much smaller than for the highest quintile. At this standpoint, these inequality 
measures are very sensitive to the lower tail of the distribution, while other measures are less 
sensitive to the lower tail or even upper tail sensitive. 
For income distribution of these two periods, the Lorenz curves have been tested. The 
areas between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal line for both income distributions (1991 and 
1992) are almost equal. The Lorenz curves intersect for these periods (see Fig 2.14). This may 
be the reason why all inequality measures do not follow the same direction; i.e. some measures 
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show a decline in income inequality and the other measures show an increase in income 
inequality. 
 





























Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) 
 
Coming back to the interpretation of the trend in income inequality in India, between 
1992 and 1997 we find a higher inequality. The Gini index increases by 4 percent points and all 
other measures of inequality also reveal an increase. Thus we can see that income distribution in 
India in 1983-97 has been exacerbated. The results are presented in the following figure (2.15). 
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Figure 2.15 Standardised inequality indexes: India 1983-97, disposable income (1983=100%) 
Champernowne Atk 0.5 Atk 1 Atk 1.5 Atk 2
100 100 100 100 100
104 104 104 103 103
100 101 100 99 99
97 97 97 96 96
92 92 92 92 92
89 89 89 90 90
103 104 103 101 100
101 102 101 101 100










































Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
 
Fig 2.15 demonstrates the standardised trend in inequality for the period 1983-97. We 
have divided the graph in two parts according to the sensitivity of the inequality measures. In 
Fig. A we gather all measures that show the same trend; although the magnitude of the change 
over time varies according to the inequality indexes. In Fig. B we gather the inequality indexes, 
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which do not always follow the same trend, collected in Fig. A. In Fig. A all indexes show an 
increase in inequality for the period 1983-86. It decreases until 1990 and then rises again. In 
1991-92 inequality slightly declines then rises rapidly between 1992 and 1997. The process of 
increasing and decreasing in inequality, except for the Gini and Kuznets indexes, is quite fast. 
The figure shows that in early 1990s and mid 1990s income distribution worsened drastically. 
For example between 1992 and 1997, the Gini’s index has increased by 14% and the Theil’s 
index has increased by 36%. 
In Fig. B, LV and Atkinson’s (with ε=2) index show the income inequality in India for 
the same period. The results for the same period in this figure are slightly different compared 
with the other inequality indexes. For other periods, these two indicators also show similar 
changes as demonstrated by other indicators, though the magnitude varies from one indicator to 
another. The exception is found between Champernowne’s index and Atkinson’s index with 
ε=1.5, that show the same magnitude and the same tendency. Finally, to capture a change in 
inequality between the 1980s and 1990s, we draw the relative Lorenz curves (see Fig 2.16). 
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Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
The Lorenz curve for the 1990s is slightly farther from the diagonal compared to the 
Lorenz curve for the 1980s.36 This suggests that the inequality of income distribution has 
increased in the Nineties. Our result is supported by numerous other studies.37 
A possible reason for the increase of inequality in India could be due to the more 
pronounced growth of the service sector in comparison to that of agriculture. In Fig. 2.17 it can 
be seen that the growth rate of the agricultural sector is much lower than that of the other sectors 
(industries and services) in the Nineties. 
                                                 
36 The curves are estimated from the average quintile shares for the decade. 
37 See Deaton and Drèze 2002, Sen 2004, Datt 1999, Tendulkar and Jain 1995, Chaturvedi and Upadhyay 
(2004) and others. 
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Author’s own estimates from the Asian Development data 
 
Normally, higher income sectors such as industries and services seek higher educated 
people. When such sectors grow faster, relatively few people with high education are privileged; 
while the majority of population does not have access, initially because they do not possess 
sufficient qualification. For this reason a rapid growth of the service and industrial sectors 
initially caused an increase of inequality in the Nineties in India. Deaton and Drèze (2002) have 
studied interesting aspects of the income distribution. They find that during the Nineties the real 
salary of farmers have increased on average by 2.5% per year, while that of public officials by 
5%. This causes an increase of inequality in income distribution between rich and poor. Besides, 
they find a large gap between rural and urban income. The liberalisation of the market according 
to the same authors, is the fundamental factor for the growth of income inequality, especially in 
the Nineties. Indian government carried on economic reforms in 1991 based on competition 
market and privatisation. 
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Little (1996) stressed that the reforms must be leading to the following characteristics 
in the economy: 
• Free trade and freedom of investment (by foreigners in India and Indian in the foreign 
countries). 
• Predominant privatisation, competition, and fair trade. 
• The State relieves extreme poverty, and ensures that the poor have access to primary 
health and educational services. 
Deaton and Drèze (2002) find that after the liberalisation, some individuals are 
excluded from the economic growth. Structural changes of the 1990s in India led also to the 
disappearance of some economic sectors; particularly some big industries experienced 
insolvency. Income inequality was further aggravated by the introduction of competitive 
markets; here state intervention was less pronounced, some subsidies were cut down and poor 
people had a sudden reduction of their income. In this process, most probably, rural peasants 
(basically, the low-income groups of the society) slashed the price of their products in the 
competitive markets; whereas the productivity was very low in the agricultural sector. 
Sacks et. al (2002) carried out a study on economic growth over the Indian states. 
Bihar is the poorest state with a per capita income of 1010 rupees per month compared with the 




Table 2.9 Rates of growth of per capita Gross State Domestic Products (GSDP) 
 
Sources: Adapted from Table 4, p. 30 of Sacks et.al. (2002) 
We can see from the above Table 2.9 that the poor states (Bihar, Orissa, and Uttar 
Pradesh) experienced a slow and even negative growth in the Nineties; while the rich states 
enjoyed a higher growth during the same period. In this way the regional inequality has 
apparently increased; to which has led to a more unequal distribution of income/expenditure in 
overall India. 
2.10 Measuring Inequality Trends in Pakistan 1985-97 
The household survey data for Pakistan for the last two decades is available from 1983 
to 1997. In the last two decades only six household surveys were carried out to estimate income 
distribution of the country. Following the Deninger and Squire Database and the World Bank 
Development Report (1998), we have estimated the trends of the quintile shares for the six 
observations. In the last two decades the poorest quintile share of income has consistently 
increased. Although between 1988 and 1991 the share of this quintile slightly decreases, it 
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recovers between 1991 and 1997. In 1985 this quintile held 8.54 percent of national income, 
while in 1997 its quota reached 9.50 percent. The average quintile share for the 1980s was 8.46 
percent, which increased to 8.95 percent in the 1990s. Hence the poorest quintile has improved 
its share in 1985-97. 
The second poorest quintile also increased its share of income consistently in 1985-97, 
from 12.34 to 12.90 percent. There is no downturn in the whole period. The average between the 
1980s and 1990s has increased by 0.37 percentage points. In Fig 2.17, the quintile 2 line is 
always upwards sloping from left to right, which proves its gaining process. 
On the contrary, the third quintile share decreased in 1985-97, from 16.22 to 16 
percent. The average in the 1980s was 16.45 percent and it remained almost constant in the 
1990s. From 1985 the third quintile share increased until the early Nineties. In 1991 its share 
reached the maximum for the last two decades; but suddenly it declined between 1991 and 1997 
by 0.87 percentage points. This trend is shown by the quintile 3 line in Fig 2.18. 
 
Figure 2.18 Changes in the quintile shares in Pakistan during the last two decades 
1985 9 12 16 22 41
1986 8 12 17 22 41
1987 8 13 16 22 41
1988 9 13 17 22 40
1991 8 13 17 22 40
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Author’s own estimates from Deninger and Squire Database (1996) and the World Bank Development Report (1998) 
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The fourth quintile also experienced a decline from 1985 to 1997. In 1985 its share was 
21.53 percent, and it declined by more than 1 percent point in 1997. The average share in the 
1980s was 21.72 percent and it declined to 21.33 percent in the 1990s. In the mid Eighties its 
share increased, but then it decreased in the late Eighties. This quintile share, regaining in the 
early Nineties, fell again in mid Nineties. Thus the Pakistanis fourth quintile share of income 
experienced a trend of rises and falls over the last two decades. This picture is depicted by 
quintile 4 in Fig 2.17. 
The richest quintile share did not change much from 1985 to 1997. It loses around 0.25 
percentage points during this period. The average for the 1980s was 40.86 percent. In the 1990s 
the average declined by 0.46 percentage points. Until the early Nineties, the richest quintile 
experienced a regular decline of its income share; but it recovered suddenly between 1991 and 
1997. These modifications in the quintile shares have caused the following consequences in 
inequality measurements: 
 
Table 2.10 Changes in the distribution of income in Pakistan 1985-1997 
  Atkinson 
  
Gini Kuznets Theil LV Champer-nowne ε = 0.5 ε = 1 ε = 1.5 ε = 2 
1985 0.2994 0.2863 0.0653 0.0579 0.1381 0.0725 0.1381 0.1951 0.2434 
1986 0.2983 0.2845 0.0641 0.0591 0.1381 0.0719 0.1381 0.1969 0.2477 
1987 0.2966 0.2828 0.0638 0.0573 0.1359 0.0711 0.1359 0.1928 0.2415 
1988 0.2898 0.2754 0.0608 0.0546 0.1301 0.0679 0.1301 0.1851 0.2325 
1991 0.2876 0.2733 0.0593 0.0549 0.1290 0.0668 0.1290 0.1849 0.2339 
1997 0.2832 0.2700 0.0600 0.0496 0.1239 0.0658 0.1239 0.1734 0.2148 
Average 1980s 0.2960 0.2822 0.0635 0.0572 0.1355 0.0709 0.1355 0.1925 0.2412 
Average 1990s 0.2854 0.2716 0.0597 0.0523 0.1264 0.0663 0.1264 0.1792 0.2244 
Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
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Table 2.10 summarises the nine inequality-measures for income distribution in 
Pakistan for 1985-97. The initial inequality is 0.2994 for the Gini index and it is 0.0579 for the 
LV. Between 1985 and 1986, the Gini index, Kuznets’ index, Theil’s index, and Atkinson’s 
indexes (with ε=0.5 and ε=1) reveal a rise in inequality; while the Champernowne index and 
Atkinson index (with ε=1.5) remain unchanged. In addition, LV and Atkison’s index with ε=2 
show a small increase in inequality. In such a way, we have three different results for the same 
distribution. These results derive from the impact of the alteration in quintiles share between 
1985 and 86 – the middle three quintiles share increased and the poorest, and the richest quintile 
declined. 
From 1986 to 1988, Pakistan experienced a decline in inequality. All inequality 
measures show a decrease in this period (see Table 2.10). Between 1988 and 1991, except LV 
and Atkinson’s index (with ε=2), all other inequality measures exhibit a decline in inequality. 
This is the same case in India between 1991 and 1992. The reasons may be drawn from the 
Indian case study. In 1997, except for the Theil index, inequality decreases in Pakistan. The 
Theil index increases by 0.07 percentage points. In 1991-97, a transfer from the 3rd and 4th 
quintile to the poorest and the richest quintiles took place. The Theil index, as was anticipated, 
seems more sensitive to the middle components of the distribution. 
By standardising all measures with 100% for 1985, we compare the behaviour of the 
inequality measures over time for Pakistan in Fig. 2.19. It represents graphically the summary 
results of the standardised inequality. The figure is separated into three categories. Fig. A gathers 
5 inequality measures – Gini’s index, Kuznets’ index, Atkinson’s indexes (with ε=0. and ε=1) 
and Champernowne’s index. The idea of collecting these indicators in the same group is to show 
the homogeneity of the evolution of the inequality; in fact all indicators show a decline in 
inequality from 1985 to 1997. The Atkinson indexes with parameters ε=0.5 and ε =1, and the 
Champernowne’s index, all declined rapidly while the declining process of Gini’s index and 
Kuznets’ index was slow (see Fig. 2.19 A). 
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Figure 2.19 Standardised Inequality indexes: disposable income Pakistan 1985 to 1997 
(1985=100%) 
Gini Kuznets Theil LV Champernowne Atk 0.5 Atk 1
1985 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1986 100 99 98 102 100 99 100
1987 99 99 98 99 98 98 98
1988 97 96 93 94 94 94 94
1991 96 95 91 95 93 92 93
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Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
In Fig. B we have depicted the Theil index. It also declines from 1985 to 1991, but, 
unexpectedly, it reveals an increase of inequality in Pakistan between 1991 and 1997; while all 
indicators presented in Fig. A show a decline in inequality for the same period. Fig. C gathers 
LV and Atkinson’s indexes (with ε =1.5 and ε =2). These indicators reveal an increase in 
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inequality between 1985 and 1986 and between 1988 and 1991; while other indicators (gathered 
in chart A) show a decline in inequality for the same period. 
In this way, the trend of inequality in Pakistan varies according to the different 
inequality measures. This prevents us from concluding whether inequality in general is rising or 
declining in Pakistan. However, inequality in Pakistan declines between 1985 and 1997 by more 
than 1 Gini percentage point. The average inequality for the 1990s has also declined compared to 
the average inequality for the 1980s. In this regard, we may conclude that inequality in Pakistan 
has declined during the last two decades. To capture the change in inequality between the 1980s 
and the 1990s we draw the Lorenz curves (see Fig 2.20). 
 
Figure 2.20 Lorenz curves for income distribution in Pakistan 
 
Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
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The Lorenz curve for the 1990s in Pakistan is slightly nearer to the diagonal compared 
to the Lorenz curve of the 1980s.38 Thus we may conclude that during the 1990s the inequality 
was lower in Pakistan than in the 1980s. In our analysis on income inequality, we used 
expenditure data and found that the inequality has gradually decreased over the years 1984-97. 
The result of the 1980s is similar with the trend registered income inequality (see Iqbal and 
Siddiqui 1999 and 2001, and Kemal 2001 for the result of income inequality), i.e. inequality in 
income distribution has also declined in the same period. In their studies, income inequality 
increased in the 1990s, while in our study expenditure inequality has declined. In the Eighties 
most of developing countries, including Pakistan, faced persistent budget deficits and balance of 
payment crises. Pakistan adopted the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP)39 and 
stabilisation programs in the late Eighties, aiming at reducing fiscal and budget deficits. The 
rationalisation of tariff structure, import liberalisation, tax reforms, reduction in subsidies etc. 
was implemented. Iqbal and Siddiqui (1999 and 2001), Kemal (2001) and others examined the 
SAP in Pakistan and found that the reforms initially worsened income distribution. The 
reduction of tariffs in Pakistan made their goods cheaper, and hence probably the purchasing 
power of the poor increased and inequality of expenditure has decreased; whereas Kemal et al. 
(2001) finds that the reduction of tariff increased the gap between rich and poor (the share of 
capital has increased while the share of labour has declined) in the 1990s. This has worsened 
income distribution. 
Balance budget is another component of the SAP, which can be maintained by raising 
taxes, but this is restricted by the IMF policies. Hence most of the countries cut government 
spending on education, health etc., and removed state subsidies. These policies hurt especially 
the poor groups of the society. Kemal (2001) stressed that government revenue in Pakistan has 
                                                 
38 The curves are estimated from the average quintile shares for the decade. 
39 SAP are World Bank and IMF made economic policies that countries must follow in order to qualify 
for new World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. SAP generally require countries to 
devalue their currencies against the dollar; lift import and export restrictions; balance their budgets and 
not overspend; and remove price controls and state subsidies. 
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deteriorated after reforms, which has resulted in a higher budget deficit. Further, expenditure on 
development programs has been reduced, which has led to a reduction in the earnings of the 
poor. 
Pakistan succeeded in reducing poverty and inequality of income distribution in the 
Eighties with a rapid economic growth. The average growth rate accounted for more than 6 
percent in the Eighties. The growth slowed down to 4 percent on average in the Nineties, causing 
higher unemployment and exacerbating income distribution. 
 
2.11 Measuring Inequality Trends in Sri Lanka 1980-95 
The household survey for Sri Lanka from 1981 to 1995 is based on disposable income 
and expenditure. In the last two decades, four household surveys were done to estimate the 
income distribution of the country. Based on the Deninger and Squire database and the World 
Bank Development Report (1998) we estimate the trends of the quintiles share for the available 
periods. Sri Lanka experienced a decrease in income dispersion during the last two decades. Fig 




Figure 2.21 Changes in the quintile shares in Sri Lanka during from 1981 to 1995 
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
1981 6 10 13 19 52
1987 5 9 13 20 52
1990 9 13 17 22 39
1995 8 12 16 22 43
Average 1980s 540% 934% 1338% 1975% 5215%
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Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
The share of the poorest quintile was 5.73 percentage points in 1981; and in 1995 it 
rose to 8.10 points. The changing pattern is however highly unstable. In the 1980s this quintile 
declined for a whole decade. Between 1981 and 1987 the poorest quintile share declined by 0.67 
percentage points. In the early Nineties, it rose by 3.86 percentage points then, it fell again in the 
mid Nineties. In the 1980s the average share of the poorest quintile was thus 5.40 percent; while 
in the 1990s it rose to 8.51 points. 
The second poorest quintile also experienced a trend similar to the poorest quintile for 
Sri Lanka. Between 1981 and 1987, there was a decline of its share and in 1990 it reached 13.13 
percentage of national income. The increase was more than 4 percentage points between 1987 
and 1990. Then it decreased to 11.80 points between 1990 and 1995. The average in the 1980s 
marked 9.34 percentage points; while in the 1990s it reached 12.47 percentage points. 
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The third quintile also followed the same trend. Between 1981 and 1987 there was an 
insignificant change. Between 1987 and 1990, this quintile share increased by 3.51 percentage 
points; then it declined between 1990 and 1995. As a result, the average share of the 1990s 
increased by around 3 percentage points compared with the average share of 1980s. 
The fourth quintile share rose continuously from 1981 to 1990; and then between 1990 
and 1995 it declined slightly. The average share for the Nineties was 19.75 percentage of 
national income; while in the Nineties it increased to 21.61 percentage points. 
The share of the richest quintile decreased from 1981 to 1995 in Sri Lanka. In the 
1980s, the average share was 52.15 points of national income; which declined to 41.07 
percentage in the 1990s. More than 10 percent of national income was thus transferred from the 
richest quintile to the other quintiles between the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Table 2.11 Changes of income inequality in Sri Lanka 1981-96 
Atkinson 
Year Gini Kuznets Theil LV Champer-nowne ε=0.5 ε=1 ε=1.5 ε=2 
1981 0.4087 0.3989 0.1274 0.1198 0.2539 0.1383 0.2539 0.3436 0.4109 
1987 0.4227 0.4060 0.1348 0.1359 0.2736 0.1479 0.2736 0.3722 0.4461 
1990 0.2777 0.2633 0.0557 0.0499 0.1198 0.0623 0.1198 0.1713 0.2161 
1995 0.3164 0.3038 0.0732 0.0654 0.1536 0.0811 0.1536 0.2159 0.2677 
Average 1980s 0.4157 0.4024 0.1311 0.1278 0.2638 0.1431 0.2638 0.3579 0.4285 
Average 1990s 0.2971 0.2835 0.0644 0.0577 0.1367 0.0717 0.1367 0.1936 0.2419 
Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
Table 2.11 summarises the inequality measures for income distribution in Sri Lanka. 
The initial inequality is measured at 0.4087 for the Gini index; it is measured at 0.1198 for the 
LV. The inequality of income increases between 1981 and 1987. During this period the 
inequality marks the highest point for the period considered – the Gini coefficient is 42.27%. All 
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measures of inequality show the same trend. Sri Lanka experienced the largest decline in 
inequality ever between 1987 and 1990. The Gini index declined by more than 14 percentage 
points and other measures also declined sharply (see Table 2.11). In the mid Nineties, inequality 
rose again in Sri Lanka. Hence the pattern is more mixed. However, Sri Lanka improved income 
distribution in the 1990s compared with 1980s (see average inequality measures for the 1980s 
and the 1990s in Table 2.11). Fig 2.22 below demonstrates the trends of the inequality indexes 
for the distribution of income in Sri Lanka. 
Figure 2.22 Standardised Inequality indexes: Sri Lanka 1981-95 (1981=100%) 
Gini Kuznets Theil LV Champerno Atk 0.5 Atk 1
1981 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1987 103 102 106 113 108 107 108
1990 68 66 44 42 47 45 47






































Atk 0.5 Atk 1 Atk 1.5 Atk 2
 
Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
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All inequality measures show a rise in inequality for the period 1981-87. Sensitivity 
among the inequality measures varies. For example, the LV is more sensitive when inequality 
rises; and the Gini and Kuznets indexes are less sensitive compared with the rest of the indexes 
when inequality decreases (see Fig 2.22, 1987-90). Fig 2.22 clearly shows the inequality trend, 
which rises in mid Eighties and then falls sharply in the early Nineties in Sri Lanka. Then again 
in the mid Nineties, inequality rises. We have drawn the Lorenz curves to capture a change in 
inequality between the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Figure 2.23 Lorenz curves of income distribution in Sri Lanka for the 1980s and 1990s 
1981 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.52
1987 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.52
1990 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.39
1995 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.43
0.05 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.52
0.09 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.41
P oorest Second T hird Fourth Richest
1980s 0 0.05 0.15 0.28 0.48 1.00












P oorest Second T hird Fourth Richest
















Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
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The Lorenz curve of the 1990s for Sri Lanka is closer to the diagonal compared with 
the Lorenz curve of the 1980s.40 Thus we may conclude that the distribution (of income or 
expenditure) in Sri Lanka clearly improved in the 1990s. 
We found that the inequality of income distribution has decreased in the 1990s 
compared with the 1980s in Sri Lanka. In our analysis, we used income data for the 1980s and 
expenditure data for the 1990s. Since the inequality of expenditure (consumption) tends to be 
lower than of income for various reasons41, we cannot compare directly the inequality measures 
between 1980s and 1990s. A working paper of the Asian Development Bank (Gunetelle and 
Senanayeke 2004) analyses the personal income distribution and finds an increase of inequality 
from the 1970s to the 1980s. Since then the Gini coefficient remained at 0.50 for the last two 
decades. The Gini coefficient for Sri Lanka is much higher for not only South Asia but also for 
the whole Asia. 
Sri Lanka (home of 19 million people), also known as Ceylon in the past, gained 
independence in 1948. The government soon adopted socialist policies. Four ethnic groups are 
found in Sri Lanka; (1) the Sinhalese, practicing Buddhism, comprising the majority (74 percent) 
of the population, (2) the Tamils, generally practicing Hinduism, comprising almost 18 percent 
of the population (3) the Muslims, making up 7 percent of the population and (4) others 
(Burghers, Eurasians, Malay, Veddha) 1 percent. Each of the main ethnic groups is subdivided 
into several major categories. The Sinhalese, dominant in population and public influence, has a 
caste system based on commercial activities. The Tamil communities are fragmented according 
to the Hindu caste system. These traditional systems of social stratification create, to some 
extent, differences in wealth holding which also influence income distribution. The country's 
ethnic conflicts escalated in the 1980s due to the concentration of wealth and influence of public 
works among the Sinhalese. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the militant 
movement of the Sinhala community have led to the civil war between the Tamils and Sinhalese, 
which lasted for at least two decades. 
                                                 
40 The curves are estimated from the average quintile shares for the two decades. 
41 We will describe the reasons in the data appendix at the end of this chapter. 
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In a study of the World Bank on the poverty reduction, some reasons of the poverty in 
Sri Lanka are recognized and may explain the increase in inequality in the 1980s. First of all, it 
is important to mention the civil war initiated in the 1970s, which intensified in the 1980s and 
1990s. The social costs of the conflict were very high and the government had to spend a lot of 
money to oppose the civil war, while the government did not have sufficient fund to invest in the 
welfare of poor. This has led to worsen the condition of the poor in the Eighties. 
Secondly, during the last 20 years the public institutions have deteriorated. For many 
years the government offered a large numbers of public jobs, leading to a better distribution of 
public resources across all social classes and ethnic groups. This is one of the reasons why the 
Sri Lankan distribution has improved. 
The World Bank (2000, p. iii ‘executive summary’) argues that ‘the political bias in the 
implementation of successive state sponsored poverty programs has rendered the poor 
vulnerable to changes in the political climate’. For many years government resources for the 
poverty program were allocated in the wrong way, i.e. the top three quintiles came to benefit of 
around 50 percent of the resources. This could be another reason of the high inequality in 
income distribution in Sri Lanka. 
Privatisation of State owned enterprises was announced as a state policy in 1987; still 
the State continued to dominate the financial sector and some commercial enterprises. Though 
the size of the public sector has declined over the years, the rigid rules in the labour market have 
hampered the efficiency of the private sectors. Despite these obstacles, Sri Lanka has succeeded 
in maintaining high economic growth. The manufacturing and service sectors have been the 
main sources of the economy. The agricultural sector continues to decline, while the majority of 
the poor live in rural areas and agriculture remains the main employment source. This has led to 






2.12 Comparison of Nepalese Income Inequality with other SAARC Countries 
There was a considerable change in income inequality in the selected SAARC 
countries. Unfortunately, for Nepal we only have data for 1984 and 1996. In general, the other 
SAARC countries have experienced rising and falling income dispersion since 1981. With the 
shortcoming of yearly data, we compare income distribution in five SAARC countries based on 
the average of the decades. We begin the comparison with the quintiles share of these countries 
for the 1980s and 1990s42. In the 1980s, Nepal had the highest poorest quintile share with 9.11 
percent; while Sri Lanka had the lowest in the same quintile share with 5.40 percent, followed by 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India. In the 1990s, in Nepal the poorest quintile lost 1.51 percentage 
points that places it at the lowest rank among the SAARC countries. In this period, Bangladesh 
with 9.03 percentage of the poorest quintile share is the highest in ranking followed by Pakistan, 
India, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Nepal and India are the only countries that experienced a decline of 
the poorest quintile. The poorest quintile of Sri Lanka gained more than 3 percentage points 
between the 1980s and 1990s. 
In the 1980s, the second poorest quintile of Nepal also held the highest share of 
national income followed by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The second poorest 
quintile share of Nepal was 12.89 percent; in Sri Lanka 9.34 percent. In the 1990s, the second 
poorest quintile of Pakistan held the highest share of national income (with 12.89%), followed 
by Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, and Nepal (with 12.67%, 12.47%, 12.43%, and 11.50% 
respectively). This quintile share of Nepal decreased by more than one point; while that of Sri 
Lanka increased by more than 3 points between the 1980s and 1990s. Pakistan and Bangladesh 
experienced a moderate increase of the second poorest quintile share; while India registered it 
with a decline. 
 
 
                                                 
42 We use an average quintile share of the decade for the countries, which have more than one observation 
in the given decade. 
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The third quintile share of Nepal accounted for 16.68 points of total income in the 
1980s, followed by Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The difference between the 
shares of Nepal and Sri Lanka was more than 3 percent in the 1980s. In the 1990s, Bangladesh 
held the highest third quintile share with 16.47% followed by Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India, and 
Nepal. Thus, Nepal experienced the highest decline of the third quintile share between the 1980s 
and 1990s. Nepal, India, and Pakistan experienced a decline of the third quintile share between 
the 1980s and 1990s; while Sri Lanka and Bangladesh experienced a rise between the same 
periods. 
Nepal also held the highest fourth quintile share of the national income in the 1980s 
(with 21.82%) followed by Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka (with 21.72%, 21.52%, 
21.25%, and 19.75% respectively). In the 1990s Sri Lanka held the highest fourth quintile share 
of national income, followed by Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and India. Sri Lanka experienced 
the highest gain and Pakistan and Bangladesh experienced a moderate gain of his fourth quintile 
share between the 1980s and 1990s. On the contrary, Nepal and India experienced a decline of 
the fourth quintile share of income between the 1980s and 1990s. 
The richest quintile of Sri Lanka held the highest national income share, followed by 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Nepal in the 1980s. The richest quintile share of Sri Lanka 
accounted for 52.15 percent while Nepal accounted for only 39.50 percent. Fig. 2.24 exhibits the 
graphic presentation of quintiles income share of these countries for the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Figure 2.24 Quintiles income share of disposable income in SAARC countries 
 between the1980s and 1990s 
Bangladesh India N epal Pakistan Sri Lanka
1980s 8 9 9 8 5
1990s 9 9 8 9 9
1980s 12 13 13 13 9
1990s 13 12 12 13 12
1980s 16 16 17 16 13
1990s 16 16 15 16 16
1980s 21 22 22 22 20
1990s 21 21 21 21 22
1980s 43 41 40 41 52








































































































Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
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Fig 2.25 below represents the changes in all quintiles share of five SAARC nations 
between the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Figure 2.25 Changes in quintiles share in SAARC countries between the 1980s and 1990s 
nges in quintile shares betw een the 1980s and 1990s
Banglade India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Poorest 1 0 -2 0 3
Second 1 0 -1 0 3
Third 1 0 -2 0 3
Fourth 0 -1 -1 0 2















































Author’s own estimates from the data sources–Deninger and Squire database (1996) and World Bank Development 
Report 1998 
We divide these countries into three groups according to the patterns of changes, which 
occurred (see Fig. 2.26). For example, in Fig. 2.26 Group ‘A’ – Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
register a rise for the bottom four quintiles. The share of these countries for the top quintile 
declines between these periods. Group ‘B’ provides the change of the quintile share of Nepal and 
India between the 1980s and 1990s. Both countries experienced a decline of the bottom four 
quintile shares and only the richest quintile share increased between the same periods. Group C 
exhibits a mixed pattern of changes of the quintiles share in Pakistan for the 1980s and 1990s. 
Therefore the two poorest quintiles share of income in Pakistan increased, the third quintile 
share remained almost constant, and the fourth and richest quintiles share decreased between 
these period (see Fig 2.26). 
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Figure 2.26 Patterns of changing quintiles share in SAARC countries between the 1980s and 1990s 
Changes in quintile shares betw een the 1980s and 1990s
Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Poorest 1 0 -2 0 3
Second 1 0 -1 0 3
Third 1 0 -2 0 3
Fourth 0 -1 -1 0 2




























































































































Fig. 2.26 ‘A’ shows that the lower four quintiles gained ground at the expense of the 
richest quintile in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh between the 1980s and 1990s. On the contrary, Fig. 
2.26 ‘B’ indicates the only richest quintile gained at the expense of four poor quintiles in Nepal 
and India between the 1980s and 1990s. While Fig. 2.26 ‘C’ shows that the poorest two quintiles 
gained income shares at the expense of the two richest quintiles in Pakistan between the same 
periods. These modifications of income quintiles lead to changes in the inequality measure 
between the 1980s and 1990s. The ranks of the measures are shown in Table 2.12 below. 
 
Table 2.12 Inequality ranking of SAARC countries with various indicators 
1980s 
 Atkinson's indexes 
 
Gini Kuznets Theil LV Champer-nowne ε =0.5 ε =1 ε =1.5 ε =2 
Bangladesh 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
India 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Nepal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pakistan 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Sri Lanka 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
1990s 
 Atkinson's indexes 
 
Gini Kuznets Theil LV Champer-nowne ε =0.5 ε =1 ε =1.5 ε =2 
Bangladesh 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 
India 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 
Nepal 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Pakistan 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 
Sri Lanka 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 
Author’s own estimates  
Note: The rankings are in ascending order - i.e. rank 1 implies the lowest inequality, etc. 
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Given the sharp differences in the equivalence scales across countries between 
inequality measurements, the question on the sensitivity of inequality rankings put forward has 
special policy significance. Table 2.12 exhibits the inequality ranking for five SAARC countries 
for the two decades. They are obtained by using various equivalence scales of inequality 
indicators, which represent the ranks of the countries according to the lower levels of inequality. 
For example, in the 1980s, Nepal ranks first; which means that it had the most equal distribution 
of income. 
The rank of inequality for the 1980s shows that all indicators of inequality displayed in 
Table 2.12 (above) show that Nepal has the least unequal distribution of income, followed by 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. 
For the 1990s, the rankings of inequality of these countries vary according to the 
different inequality measures. This is because the sensitivity of these measures varies. Nepal 
displays, by far, the most unequal distribution of income, followed by Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, 
and Bangladesh when we use  the LV and Atkinson’s index (ε =2) to measure the inequality in 
these countries. When we use the Gini index, Atkinson’s indexes with ε =1 and ε =1.5 and 
Champernowne’s index, the worst distribution of income is in Nepal, followed by India, Sri 
Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. For the remaining inequality measures, Nepal had the worst 
distribution of income followed by India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Hence Table 
2.12 for the 1990s shows that the rank of the countries (on the basis of inequality) varies with the 
different inequality measures. The rankings of these countries show the state of inequality 
among SAARC countries. However, they do not necessarily represent the degree of inequality 
over time; for example, the improvement of ranking may not mean the improvement of 
inequality between the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, it is not sufficient to compare the inequality 
measures only by the rankings. To capture the inadequacy of rankings of inequality, we discuss 
the results of the inequality indexes among these countries. 
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Figure 2.27 The comparison of income inequality in SAARC countries between the 1980s and 
1990s via 9 inequality measures 
Gini Kuznet Theil LV ChampernoAtk  0.5 Atk 1 Atk 1.5 Atk 2
Banglad 0.04- 0.04- 0.02- 0.02- 0.04-        0.02- 0.04-     0.05-   0.06- 
India 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01        0.01 0.01     0.01   0.01 
Nepal 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05        0.03 0.05     0.07   0.08 
Pakista 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-        0.00- 0.01-     0.01-   0.02- 







































Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
            Change ratio
 
Author’s own estimates 
Fig 2.27 above shows the changes of various inequality measures between the 1980s 
and 1990s in SAARC countries. The horizontal straight line represents the ‘no change’ of 
inequality between these periods. Lines below this line represent a decrease of inequality and 
lines above the same line represent an increase of inequality. The lines of various inequality 
measures for India and Nepal are above the horizontal line. Hence we deduce that the 
distribution of income in India and Nepal worsened between the 1980s and 1990s. On the other 
hand, the lines of various inequality measures for Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are below 
the “no change line”. This means that income distribution in these countries improved between 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
To show the comparison of inequality in these countries, we also provide in Figs 2.28 
and 2.29 the dispersal diagrams of inequality for each measure separately. The dispersal figure in 
the horizontal line represents the level of inequality for the 1980s; and the vertical line represents 
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the level of inequality for the 1990s. The diagonal separates the inequality for the two time 
periods. The diagonal with 45 degrees captures no variation of inequality for the given periods. 
While the countries situated in the upper triangle show an increase in inequalities for the given 
countries, and the countries situated in the lower triangle represents the decline in inequality. In 
doing so, we will be able to compare the inequality among these countries by capturing the level 
of inequality. In addition, the country closer to the origin exhibits the lower level of inequality, 
and vice versa in the both triangles (upper and lower). 
In Fig. 2.28 we plot the five inequality measures (i.e. Gini’s index, Kuznets’ index, 
Theil’s index, LV, and Champernowne’s index) by the dispersal diagram for the 1980s and 
1990s. Nepal and India are situated in the upper triangles. Income inequality rose in these 
countries between the 1980s and 1990s. On the contrary, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka 
are situated in lower triangles; hence inequality declined in these countries between the 1980s 
and 1990s.  
All five measures of inequality confirm an increase in inequality in Nepal and India 
and a decrease of inequality in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The countries closer to the 
horizontal axis have a lower inequality in the 1990s and the countries closer to the vertical axis 
have a lower inequality in the 1980s. It is clear in Fig 2.28 that Nepal is closer to the vertical 
axis, followed by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. On the contrary, Nepal lies distant 
from the horizontal line followed by India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. 
As in Fig. 2.28 we draw Fig. 2.29 for four Atkinson’s indexes. Table 2.12 shows that 
as the distributional parameter ε rises, the degree of income inequality also increases. In the 
entire value of the distributional parameter ε (0.5 – 2), the order is not affected though the size 
inequality is increased. During the 1990s Nepal displays the highest inequality compared to 
other countries for all measures of Atkinson. India and Sri Lanka show a moderate inequality 
during this decade. Pakistan and Bangladesh account for the lowest inequality. 
 129
Figure 2.28 Dispersal of inequality measurements in South Asian economies 
  
Author’s own estimates 
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Figure 2.29 Dispersal of inequality measurements in South Asian economies 
 
Author’s own estimates 
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2.13 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to study the pattern of income distribution and its 
trend in SAARC countries.43 Nine different inequality measurements (rather than simply 
comparing the percentage shares of income) allow us to take into account an in-depth 
examination of income distribution in Nepal and other SAARC countries. Though some 
countries experienced a worsening inequality and others experienced an improvement in income 
distribution, in general income inequality seems somewhat to converge across SAARC countries 
between the 1980s and 1990s. It may be the result of the progressive abolition of old-fashion 
frontiers; or it may be due to other factors. However, SAARC evolution does not give a precise 
notion of whether it has brought about a more unequal society or more equal society; since the 
process of the inequality changes follows a mixed pattern in these countries. 
The general conclusion of the evolution of income distribution pattern is that a 
substantial change has occurred from 1984 to 1996 in Nepal. The pattern of income distribution 
has rapidly approached the highest level of the inequality. Between these two periods there are 
gainers and losers in this process. All four poorer quintiles are losers and only the richest quintile 
is a winner. We also examined income distribution in the other four SAARC countries for the 
last two decades. The results reveal that inequality also increased in India between the last two 
decades. Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka however experienced an improvement of income 
distribution for the same periods. In particular, Sri Lanka has reduced income inequality by the 
highest mark, followed by Bangladesh between the 1980s and 1990s. Nepal has experienced the 
highest increase in income inequality followed by India for the same period. Income inequality 
was relatively stable in Pakistan between the 1980s and 1990s. The results summarised in Fig 
2.4 and Fig 2.5 show the sensitivity of different inequality indexes. The results of transferring 
1% income from lower quintiles to the highest quintile in the first figure and vice versa in the 
second figure visually indicate the extent to which income inequality measures are sensitive to 
                                                 
43 The available data are unfortunately not sufficient to permit a proper statistical appraisal as far as the 
comparison of the inequality in SAARC countries is concerned. 
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different degrees of the measurement choices. These results indicate that the inequality index 
matters – they can influence negatively or positively a given point in the distribution of income. 
We tried to catch the sensitivity of inequality measures while analysing the inequality trend in 
the selected SAARC countries. For example, Atkinson’s (1970) index explicitly incorporates 
social welfare criteria through the inequality aversion parameter ε. As the degree of ε increases, 
more weight is attached to transfers of income towards the bottom of the distribution. 
A summary of findings pertaining to the properties of the inequality indexes 
The following remarks of the inequality measures are confirmed from the evidence of 
SAARC country income distributions: 
1) The index registers a greater change of income inequality when income is transferred from 
the lower quintile to the middle quintiles (increase of the inequality), and from the top 
quintile to the middle quintiles (decrease of the inequality). Hence the Gini index is more 
sensitive to variations among the middle quintiles (Atkinson 1970, Sen 1973). 
2) Like the Gini index, the Kuznets index also registers a stronger increase or decrease when a 
transfer of income to the middle quintiles occurs. 
3) When a transfer occurs in the poorest quintile, the change of the LV is greatest. We reached 
the same results already pointed out by Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973) regarding to the LV. 
4) Like the LV, the Theil index registers a greater change when the transfer is made to the 
poorest quintile. 
5) Atkinson’s indexes, as ε rises, are more sensitive when a transfer is made in the lower 
quintile of the distribution (see also Atkinson, 1970; Champernowne & Cowell, 1998). 
6) Using the quintile share of income, the Champernowne index is perfectly replaceable by the 
Atkinson’s index with ε =1. 
7) When the Lorenz curves intersect, it is possible that two inequality measures will rank the 
distributions differently. 
These conclusions in part confirm previous works in this field, and in part are original; this is 
why due caution here must be used in this context. 
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2.14 Data Appendix 
This study uses cross-country databases with two types of data. The main source of 
data from 1980 to 1994 is the Deninger and Squire study (1996); and after 1994 data are 
gathered from the World Development Report 1998 (World Bank). The data for the 1980s 
included in the database are a slightly updated version of the full version of the database 
described in Deininger and Squire (1996). They assembled them by starting with the full set of 
all measurements of the income distribution - 682 observations for 108 countries. In this study, 
we use data covering the five SAARC countries for the last two decades. We only use data that 
are described as “high quality” by Deninger and Squire. The other data, those that are not highly 
qualified, are omitted from this analysis. The high quality data set described in the paper of 
Deninger and Squire can be obtained by utilising only the data marked with “accept” in the 
quality column. The main shortcoming of this data is its limited coverage. Additionally the data 
in the distribution of income is reflected in the percentage shares (quintiles) of either income or 
consumption. 
We use the latest observation for each country from the World Development Reports 
1998 (World Bank). Data on personal or household income or consumption are drawn from 
nationally representative household surveys. The survey year indicate whether the rankings are 
based on per capita income or consumption. The quintile shares are estimated from the available 
grouped data (World Bank, 1998). The following sources of non-comparability should be noted. 
First, surveys can differ in many respects, including whether they use income or 
consumption expenditure as the living standard indicator. Given that the cross-countries 
household data are based on different measures of living standard, it is problematic to compare 
directly the inequality of income distribution. Income based inequality measures are bound to 
show higher inequality than those based on consumption. At one survey date, income will 
usually be low for some households and unusually high for others, with some opportunities for 
saving or borrowing; consumption will be less unequal than income. Hence, we feel that the 
figures are not sufficiently comparable to those of the countries selected for this study. We 
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define some important reasons why inequality of income distribution is more unequal than the 
distribution of consumption: 
• Savings are proportionally higher for the high-income groups, which will reduce the share 
of their consumption. As a result, inequality, which is calculated from consumption, will 
be lower than inequality that is calculated from income. 
• Transfers accrue mainly to the low-income groups; thus the share of their consumption 
will increase, which in turn will result in a lower inequality. 
• Low-income groups may also borrow to maintain their standard of living, which will 
reduce the disparity of the distribution. 
Additionally data are available only for quintile shares, so that selected inequality 
measurements in this study are calculated on quintiles. It follows that the calculations may differ 
from the calculations, which are done through decile-based statistics. That is why the figures are 
not directly comparable with other studies. 
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2.15 Appendix 2A 
Gini Index 
The Gini coefficient may be derived from the Lorenz curve, which plots cumulative 
shares of the population, from the poorest upwards, against the cumulative share of incomes that 
they receive. If incomes were equally distributed, the plot would trace a diagonal 45°-line (‘line 
of perfect equality’). At the other extreme – if the richest unit received all income – the Lorenz 
curve would lie along the horizontal axis, and then along the vertical axis at the 100 per cent 
income share (‘line of perfect inequality’). The Gini coefficient is defined as the area between 
the Lorenz curve and the 45° line, taken as a ratio of the whole triangle. 
First of all we begin with the simple formula for a Gini coefficient. 
 






























In the above graph the horizontal axis shows the population percent or ratio p1, p2, ..., 
pn for 1, 2 , ..., n groups. 
1 2 ... 100%  or  1np p p+ + + =  
The vertical axis shows the income percent or ratio y1, y2 , ... , yn for 1, 2, ..., n groups. 
1 2 ... 100%  or  1ny y y+ + + =  
Total population is divided into n income groups (a group can contain just one person, 
or one household, or many people or many households). 
The Gini coefficient is the ratio between the area occupied by Lorenz curve and 
diagonal, which is denoted by A and the area occupied by triangle MNO in the graph is (A+B). 
Therefore the Gini coefficient (G): 
G = Area occupied by A divided by area occupied by triangle ABC or Area (A+B) and 
given the measure of population and income are in ratios, the Area of triangle is equal to ½ 
(ΔMNO = ½ or 0.5). Since the Gini coefficient is the ratio between area A and area of the 
triangle MNO, we can write in following form: 
  A BG or ΔΜΝΟ −= ΔΜΝΟ ΔΜΝΟ  
Because [ ]A B+ = ΔΜΝΟ   
1 2G B∴ = −  
Calculation of 2B: Referring to the above figure, we first calculate the area of 2B as follows: 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 21 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
1 2
1 1 1 2 1
( ) ( ) ... ( ... ) ... ( ... ... )
or,  
(2 ) (2 2 ) ... (2 2 ... 2 ) ...1 = 2 (2 2 ... 2 ... 2 )
2 (2 ) (2
i i n i n
i i i
n i n n
B p y p y y p y y y p y y y y
p y y p y y y p y y y y
B
p y y y y y
B p y y p y
= + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
− + + − + + + + + − + +⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ + + + + −⎝ ⎠
⇒ = − + 2 2 1 2
1 2
2 ) ... (2 2 ... 2 ) ...
              (2 2 ... 2 ... 2 )                                                               ( 1)
i i i
n i n n
y y p y y y y
p y y y y y A
+ − + + + + + − + +
+ + + + + + −
 




1 1 1 1
,    ,    ...,    ,    ...   ,    ,
i n
k k i k n k
k k k k
q y q y q y q y
= = = =
= = = =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  and we substitute these values in 
equation A1, then we get 
1 1 1 2 2
1
1
2 (2 ) (2 ) ... (2 ) ... ( )  (2 )
Therefore, the Gini index ( ) 1 (2 )                                                               (A2)
n





B p q y p q y p q y p q y p q y
G p q y
=
=





We introduced equation A2 as an alternative of calculating the Gini index for its 
simplicity. However, equation A2 is valid since it is equivalent to equation 2.2. The proof will be 
given below. From equation A1, we get: 
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In equation 2.2, the population (income receivers) is divided into n identical groups, and 
therefore 
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Note that equation A4 is derived from equation A2 (expression for the Gini calculation) and it is equal to 
equation 2.2. 
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2.16 Appendix 2B 
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Appendix Table 1: Income/consumption share 





Bangladesh 1981 6.64 10.72 15.20 22.12 45.32 Income Household 
Bangladesh 1983 7.20 11.75 15.94 21.73 43.38 Income Household 
Bangladesh 1986 6.99 12.36 15.07 19.55 46.03 Income Household 
Bangladesh 1989 9.50 13.30 17.00 21.60 38.60 Expenditure Personal 
Bangladesh 1992 9.35 13.51 17.24 21.99 37.91 Expenditure Personal 
Bangladesh 1996 8.70 12.00 15.70 20.80 42.80 Expenditure Personal 
India 1983 8.60 12.70 16.50 21.70 40.50 Expenditure Personal 
India 1986 8.50 12.50 16.40 21.50 41.10 Expenditure Personal 
India 1987 8.90 12.50 16.30 21.30 41.00 Expenditure Personal 
India 1988 9.00 12.70 16.40 21.40 40.50 Expenditure Personal 
India 1989 9.10 12.90 16.60 21.70 39.70 Expenditure Personal 
India 1990 9.10 13.10 16.90 21.80 39.10 Expenditure Personal 
India 1991 9.00 12.50 15.90 20.70 41.90 Expenditure Personal 
India 1992 8.80 12.50 16.20 21.40 41.10 Expenditure Personal 
India 1997 8.10 11.60 15.00 19.30 46.00 Expenditure Personal 
Nepal 1984 9.11 12.89 16.68 21.82 39.50 Income Personal 
Nepal 1996 7.60 11.50 15.10 21.00 44.80 Expenditure Personal 
Pakistan 1985 8.54 12.34 16.22 21.53 41.37 Expenditure Household 
Pakistan 1986 8.21 12.46 16.57 22.06 40.70 Expenditure Household 
Pakistan 1987 8.47 12.50 16.41 21.66 40.96 Expenditure Household 
Pakistan 1988 8.61 12.76 16.60 21.64 40.39 Expenditure Household 
Pakistan 1991 8.40 12.87 16.87 22.16 39.70 Expenditure Personal 
Pakistan 1997 9.50 12.90 16.00 20.50 41.10 Expenditure Personal 
Sri Lanka 1981 5.73 9.59 13.37 19.40 51.91 Income Household 
Sri Lanka 1987 5.06 9.08 13.38 20.09 52.39 Income Household 
Sri Lanka 1990 8.92 13.13 16.89 21.72 39.34 Expenditure Personal 
Sri Lanka 1995 8.10 11.80 15.80 21.50 42.80 Expenditure Personal 
Data sources: Deninger and Squire database (1996) and the World Bank Development Report 1998 
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Chapter 3 
Wealth Distribution in Nepal 
3.1 Introduction 
Wealth may be defined as the aggregate of all marketable assets of a given individual 
or family. Wealth is also a source of a consumption flow. It provides direct money when needed 
because assets can be directly converted into cash. Wolff (1998) argues that the availability of 
financial assets may provide liquidity to a family in times of stress, such as occasioned by 
unemployment, sickness, or family break up. 
Economics began as the study of wealth (e.g. Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations) and 
how levels of wealth change during a given period. Keynesian economic theory tends to place a 
greater emphasis on income as the object of study in macroeconomics. However, it has since 
been accepted that income tends to affect the behaviour of individuals as it affects their wealth. 
Household savings and wealth accumulation may be calculated based on yearly data on income 
and consumption. Unfortunately, the lack of yearly data prevents us from studying trends in 
aggregate household wealth. In this study we shall confine ourselves to analyse wealth 
distribution in Nepal for the year 1995 and 1996 more thoroughly also due to absolute lack of 
other data. We estimate all possible components for personal wealth distribution in Nepal. 
Consequently, it seems that our estimation of wealth distribution gives maximum information on 
cross-section comparison of Nepalese wealth. Wealth is highly concentrated among few rich 
families, which leads to a high level of inequality. To assess the economic and social role of 
wealth, the state of wealth inequality is extensively examined. 
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3.2 An Overview of Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) 1996 
One of the principal objectives laid down in the five-year Plan of Nepal is the 
alleviation of poverty. However, the scarcity of reliable and timely data regarding the living 
standard of the people and, consequently, the level of poverty has hindered such efforts 
significantly (NLSS, 1996). An understanding between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal 
(HMGN) and the World Bank was reached so that a Living Standards Survey could be launched 
in Nepal. With the assistance of the World Bank, similar surveys have been conducted in a 
number of developing countries. The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) of Nepal, launched the 
Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) in June 1995 jointly with the World Bank. According to 
its objectives, the survey envisaged the collection of  a comprehensive set of data covering 
various topics as well as highlighting the various determinants of poverty. The NLSS also 
provided household level data to evaluate the impact of various government policies and 
programmes on the living conditions of the population. 
Data collection has been done to cover a complete cycle of one-year duration, to avoid 
seasonal variations likely to occur in various socio-economic activities of the households. This 
survey gathers information at the national level concerning household data on population, housing, 
education, agricultural activities, consumption, and other socio-economic characteristics. 
Community level data have also been collected. Due to its comprehensive data collection design, 
the data from the survey can be used to study the impact of education on health or on employment 
and so on. 
The sample is divided into four strata based on the geographic and ecological regions 
of the country: (i) the Mountains, (ii) urban Hills, (iii) rural Hills, and (iv) the Terai. This sample 
is designed to provide enough observations within each ecological stratum to analyse the results 
separately.  
The NLSS (1996) was designed as a multi-topic survey collecting a comprehensive set 
of data on different aspects of household welfare such as consumption, income, housing, labour 
markets, education, health, wealth, migrations etc. The sample size for the NLSS is made up of 
3373 observations. This sample was divided into households by various criteria. 
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Because of lack of time series data on Nepalese wealth distribution, we are not able to 
examine the trends of wealth distribution, but we provide the cross-section comparisons among 
the family groups.44 These regional and social aspects of the country have heavily influenced the 
distribution of wealth in Nepal. Understanding the distribution of wealth in Nepal through this 
study may enable the policy makers to design programs that are more effective in the future. 
In this chapter, we will study and analyse household wealth in both urban and rural 
levels of Nepal, analysing the pattern of wealth concentration and the level of wealth. 
Furthermore, we will compare the distribution of wealth between these areas and try to extract 
some findings about wealth inequality in these areas at the household level. Similarly, we will 
study the family wealth distribution of various development regions, ecological regions, various 
religious groups, as well as ethnic groups of Nepal. The following table shows how the sample is 
allocated among the four strata: 
 
                                                 
44 The Nepalese people can be sub-divided by various criteria. For example, these families may be 
divided into rural and urban families, families by development regions, families by ecological regions, 
families by ethnicity and families by religion. 
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Table 3.1 NLSS National Sample 
 Strata Number of Households % of Families 
 All Nepal 3,373  100.00  
 Rural Nepal 2,657  78.77  
 Urban Nepal 716  21.23  
 Ecological belts:      
 Mountains 409  12.13  
 Hills 1,740  51.59  
 Terai 1,224  36.28  
 Development Regions:      
 Farwest 352  10.44  
 Midwest  360  10.67  
 West 624  18.50  
 Central 1,320  39.13  
 East 717  21.26  
 Religion:      
 Hindu 2,927  86.78  
 Buddhist 275  8.15  
 Muslim 128  3.79  
 Others 43  1.28  
 Caste/Ethnicity:      
 Bramin 553  16.39  
 Chetry 662  19.63  
 Newar 360  10.67  
 Gurung 130  3.85  
 Rai 56  1.66  
 Magar 168  4.98  
 Limbu 63  1.87  
 Tamang 153  4.54  
 Tharu 185  5.48  
 Yadav/Ahir 102  3.02  
 Muslim 127  3.77  
 Sarki 52  1.54  
 Kami 154  4.57  
 Damai 56  1.66  
 Others 552  16.37  
Source: author’s estimation from the NLSS (1996) data 
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3.3 What are the Components of Nepalese Family Wealth? 
The NLSS (1996) contains many questions on household wealth holdings, in order to 
take a measure of available household wealth. The NLSS was designed to represent the full 
range of wealth distribution by the use of special sampling frames. 
Household wealth is not a simple concept in the Nepalese context. Since there is a vast 
difference in geographical regions, wealth stock composition varies from region to region. 
Furthermore, culture and religion have also complicated the shape of wealth holdings. For 
example, animal husbandry and its stock may be one of the main components of wealth. Some 
high-class Hindu households do not keep a pig, whereas in other families, pig ownership may 
represent the larger part of wealth. Because of the geographical dearth and the underdeveloped 
infrastructure of the country, the holdings of transportation such as a car, motor cycle, or bicycle 
tend to vary,  and may be concentrated only in some urban areas. In the rural Mountain and Hill 
areas, on the other hand, animals such as mules, horses and so on  are kept. Given that the value 
of the transportation holdings is also included in the durable goods as a part of wealth, question 
of transport ownership can play an important role in wealth composition. 
Table 3.2 shows the components of wealth in Nepal. Wealth is the total assets of a 
household from different sources minus borrowings. We briefly discuss the components 











Table 3.2 Balance sheet of family’s wealth in Nepal 
Liabilities Assets 
  The amount of borrowings     The value of dwellings   
        The value of land-holdings   
        The value of enterprises   
        The value of farming assets   
        The value of durable goods inventory   
        The value of livestock   
        The amount of lending   
  Net wealth     The value of other assets   
  Total     Total   
Source: author’s estimation from the NLSS (1996) 
3.3.1 The value of dwellings 
Dwellings or accommodation are largely related to the living standards of the 
population in the country. The well being of any family depends on the quality and the quantity 
its dwelling. Regarding the occupancy status of the households, one may imagine the wealth 
status of Nepalese families. The NLSS (1996) reported that in general the majority of 
households in Nepal are poor and lack facilities such as water, sewerage, refuse disposal and so 
on. Very few households have electricity. Whatever the condition of the dwelling, there is some 
value inherent in it. The amount assigned to the value of each dwelling is based on the recorded 
current value in NLSS for the year 1996. In the sampling, no family has bought or sold the house 
over the past 12 months, allowing us to set the same value for the year 1995 as well. The value 
of any house may depreciate or appreciate over time, but because of the lack of information in 
the NLSS, we retain the same value of the dwelling for 1995 and 1996. The value only accounts 
for the dwelling occupied by the family. The majority of households own their dwelling in 
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Nepal. Rented houses were found only in the urban areas and in the central regions. The NLSS 
also gathered information on the material used to build the houses. A large number of families 
have made their houses with mud bonded bricks and are stonewalled, with thatched or slate roof. 
In rural areas, more than one third of the households live in poorly constructed housing units. 
The rich families of Nepal have houses made up of cement bonded bricks and stones or concrete. 
Such houses are considered good dwellings. Nearly 10 percent of the families own the dwellings 
of this latter category and they account for half of the urban households. 
3.3.2 The value of land-holdings 
Land is considered the most valuable asset in an agrarian society, in which it is indeed 
the most important factor of production. Moreover, land and its characteristics inevitably 
determine the agrarian structure and directly bear upon and have implications for the economy as 
a whole. Land characteristics are physical, social, economic, and even political. Land is the only 
productive economic resource for rural residents of Nepal; its possession offers economic 
security. The well being of rural Nepalese society depends on the size of the landholding. The 
NLSS volume II (1996) has reported that 83 percent of total households have some farming land. 
Over 98 percent of the families in the Mountain regions operate land compared with 88 percent 
in the Hill and 76 percent in the Terai. But, the quantity distribution of land is very unequal. The 
average size of farmland for Nepal in the sample is 1.09 hectares per household. The top 6 
percent of agriculture households, however, occupy more than 33 percent of total land. The 
NLSS reveals that 40 percent of small farmers hold less than 0.5 hectares of land, on average, 
and 13 percent of large farmers hold more than 2 hectares of land in Nepal. The unequal 
distribution of land is a serious issue in Nepal, since more than 80 percent of the employment is 
offered by land. The value of the landholding is the current value of the farming land held by the 
households for 1996. The NLSS also collected data on how the value of the landholding has 
changed over the 12 months previous to the survey. Hence, we can also estimate the value of the 
landholding for 1995. The change in land holding takes place due to the sale or purchase of land. 
We add (subtract) the value of land; which is sold (purchased) over the past 12 months into the 
value of 1996 in order to estimate the value of landholding for 1995. 
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3.3.3 The value of enterprises 
The NLSS (1996) covers the data of all non-farming activities that the household is 
engaged in. The non-farm enterprises include all self-employment generated from non-
agriculture activities and enterprises45. Around 24 percent of the household are found to be 
operating non-farming enterprises. In the ecological belt of Nepal, around 25 percent in the 
Hills, 25 percent in the Terai and 17 percent in the Mountain of total households are engaged in 
non-farm enterprises. Among them, 52 percent are involved in trade. This is probably because 
the rural poor have no land or nearly landless, and they operate small enterprises for survival. 
We set the value of enterprises as another component of wealth for 1995 and 1996. 
3.3.4 The value of farm assets 
Farming assets are another important component of household wealth since many 
Nepalese are farmers and their living depends on these assets. Mechanization of agriculture in 
Nepal is found at a very low level. A traditional plough is the most common agricultural 
instrument of the Nepalese farmers. Less than one percent of the families own a tractor and 
around one percent of the families own a thresher. The current value (1996) of these assets is 
taken into account, we have estimated the value for 1995 adding the depreciated value over the 
past 12 months, and the farm assets bought (sold) are deducted (added). 
                                                 
45 They are: hunting, forestry and logging, fishing, coal mining, petroleum & gas, metal ore mining, other 
mining, food and beverages, textiles and apparel, wood, furniture, paper/printing, chemical/petroleum, 
other non-metallic, basic metallic, fabricated metallic, handicrafts and other, electricity/gas/water, water 
works, building, streets/highways, irrigation, sports projects, docks/communication, sewers/water mains, 
other construction, wholesale, retail, restaurant, transport, communication, finance, insurance, real estate, 
machinery fitters, sanitary, social, recreation/culture, personal/household, international, etc. 
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3.3.5 The value of durable goods inventory 
This includes the total quantity of goods, materials, and supplies held by a family and 
having values that can be ascertained as assets. It also includes work-in-progress as well as all 
finished products. Durable goods are substantial, usually costly, products and materials that can 
be expected to last and be functional over a long period.46 We use the current value for 1996 as a 
component of wealth. To estimate the value for 1995, we first find the rate or amount of 
depreciation or appreciation. Then we add (subtract) the amount depreciated (appreciated) over 
the past twelve months. If a family has bought (sold) some durable goods over the past 12 
months, the value is subtracted (added) to the current value (1996) in order to find the value for 
1995. The value of goods received as a gift or part of an inheritance or dowry is estimated 
according to the expectation of the family in the NLSS (1996). 
3.3.6 The value of live-stocks 
Section 12 (NLSS) covers the information on farming and livestock. The purpose of 
this section was to collect the data on the household’s income and expenditure from farming and 
livestock. Livestock is an important component of the Nepalese farming system providing food 
for humans, manure for plants, draft power for farms, and cash income for farm families. Cattle, 
buffaloes, sheep, goats, pigs, and poultry are the livestock species reared across different agro-
ecological zones. In Nepal, women are actively involved in livestock production. Poultry 
farming on a commercial basis in Nepal is a relatively new enterprise. Animal species such as 
cows, buffaloes, goats, sheep, yaks, pigs, donkeys/mules, poultry, and other livestock are included 
in the NLSS (1996). We use the current value (1996) of the stock of these animals as a part of the 
household wealth. We estimate the value of livestock for 1996 by adding (subtracting) animals 
sold (bought) over the past 12 months. 
                                                 
46 They include the following items: camera, bicycle, motorcycle/scooter, motor car, refrigerator/freezer, 
washing machine, television/VCR, telephone sets/cordless, sewing machine, furniture, kitchen utensils, 
jewellery and so on. 
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3.3.7 Credit and savings 
3.3.7.1 Borrowings 
Borrowing refers to the amount borrowed from either individuals, relatives/friends, an 
Agriculture Development Bank, commercial bank, Grameen-type Bank, or other financial 
institution, a local group, NGO or relief agency, landlord/employer, shopkeeper, moneylender or 
others. This section covers the loans that the households borrow. In total, 3030 loans were taken 
out by around 59 percent of the household in the sample. The distribution of loans shows that the 
highest number of loan transactions has taken place in the Hills followed by the Terai and 
Mountain regions. The NLSS volume II (1996) reported that 12 percent of the total loan is 
borrowed by 35 percent of urban household, while the remaining 88 percent is borrowed by the 
rural households. The three prominent sources, i.e., bank, family relatives, and local 
moneylenders are found in the survey. Only 16 percent of the total loan is financed through 
formal institutions to households. Major loans are taken out for household consumption (nearly 
49 percent). Around 29 percent of the loan is taken out for business purposes and the rest for 
other personal purposes. The amount that the household should still repay is recorded for 1996 
and the loan value for 1995 has been estimated by adding (subtracting) the repaid (new loan 
taken) over the past twelve months. Commercial bills, mortgage loans, bank overdrafts and other 
bank and non-bank domestic and foreign loans are included in this section. 
3.3.7.2 Lending 
It is the loan made by one household to another household or individual, reported in 
current value (1996). We estimate the value for 1995 by adding (subtracting) the payment 
received (new loan made) over the past twelve months. 
3.3.8 The value of other assets 
The other assets include fixed assets such as land, building, and other such real assets; 
which are not reported in the landholdings and dwellings. These assets are used for business 
purposes and thus are separated from previous sections. Other real assets include a taxi, a truck, 
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or similar vehicle that is rented out to other households or individuals. This section also includes 
the values of saving accounts, fixed deposits, treasury bills, stocks, shares, employee providence 
fund, pension, commission, etc for 1996 and the value for 1995 is estimated based on the 
information available in the NLSS (1996). 
3.4 Nepalese Wealth Comparison with Industrial Countries 
In this section we compare the concentration of personal wealth of Nepal for 1996 with 
wealth distribution of other industrial countries. Table 3.3 provides the comparison of Nepalese 
wealth distribution to other Western countries. The estimates allow us to conclude that the 
distribution of wealth in Nepal is highly concentrated compared to developed countries. For 
example, the wealth share of the top 1 is much higher for Nepal except for the US and France. 
Similarly, the top 5 wealth share for Nepal is even more concentrated than in other developed 
countries except the United States. 
 
Table 3.3 The inequality of household wealth in selected countries 
Percent of wealth held by  
 Countries 
Top 1% Top 5% 
   Nepal, 1996 24 53 
   United States, 1983 35 56 
   Canada, 1984 17 38 
   France, 1986 26 43 
   Sweden, 1985/86 16 31 
   United Kingdom, 1986 22 Na 
Sources: 1) Calculated from CBS (statistical bureau centre of Nepal) for 1996 Nepal. 2) For other countries, Edward 
(1998, Table 12) 
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3.5 Rural and Urban Households in Nepal 
The separation of rural and urban areas has been marked since the beginning of 
industrialisation. This process has been typically related to the growth of infrastructures such as 
transport, communication, power supply, and so on in any country. The high concentration of 
people, the predominance of non agricultural activities, better provisions for a social net 
including health, education, safe water and sanitation infrastructures are some of the 
characteristics of urbanisation. However, the classification of rural and urban areas across and 
between different nations has two important criteria: namely, the size of the population and the 
percentage of non-agriculture workforce. Hence, the major force behind urbanisation is 
industrialisation, whereas the rural community is treated as “residual” and synonymous with 
agricultural activities. Only the size of the population (more than 9000 people) is used to declare 
a settlement as urban in Nepal. For the United Nations (1993) any settlement with a municipal 
corporation, municipality, town committee and urban councils, etc, is considered to be urban.  
Nepal is made up of rugged mountainous terrain47 and has extremely limited means of 
transportation, communication and electrification. The country is characterised by a widespread 
disparity between urban and rural areas in the ecological versus the developed regions. Nepal is 
not only the least urbanised among the developing countries, but also among the South Asian 
countries. The population living in the urban areas is, however, gradually increasing. In the last 
50 years, Nepal’s urban population has increased from 3.6 percent to 14.2 percent. Nepal 
Population Report (NPR 2002) has identified three reasons for growth of the urban population in 
Nepal: 
• Declaring an area as urban is a political decision made by the government. 
• Old urban areas increase their geographical size by incorporating the neighbouring rural 
areas. 
• Increase in the urban population is due to the natural increase plus the migration. 
                                                 
47 The Mountain and Hill area account for nearly 77% of the total area. 
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3.6 Wealth Distribution in Urban and Rural Nepal 
Our study on wealth distribution reveals a large variation between urban and rural 
families. We have estimated the shares of net wealth held by the richest 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%, 
and the poorest 60% of the household in Nepal taken across urban and rural areas respectively 
(see Table 3.4). This gives us a more revealing picture of the concentration of wealth. Table 3.4 
also provides a comparison of wealth distribution between the two periods 1995 and 1996. We 
first compare the wealth by the measures mentioned above between rural and urban households 
for 1995 and 1996. From Table 3.4 we can also observe the changes of the concentration of 
wealth across rural and urban areas for two periods. When we measure the family wealth by the 
top 5 percent, 10 percent and 20 percent, the rural family seems to have a higher share of the 
total wealth than the urban family for both 1995 and 1996. The rural top 5 families have a higher 
share of total wealth (by around five percentage points) in both years compared with the urban 
top 5 percent of households. This sort of comparison is valid up to the top 20 percent share of 
wealth and hence we may say that wealth in rural areas is more concentrated; but the result is 
reversed when we use the top 40 percent share of wealth. We find that urban household share in 
the top 40 percent is higher than the rural household share. This is due to the higher proportion 
of wealth share in the second quintile of urban households than rural households. Thus wealth is 
more concentrated in the upper class households of urban areas than of rural areas. However, the 
bottom 60 percent of rural households are better off than urban households due to the level of 
wealth concentration. Furthermore, the wealth of the lowest 60 percent of households increases 
its share over time both in urban and rural areas. 
In overall, the survey indicates that the top percentiles have lost part of their share of 
wealth; while the bottom 60 percent has slightly gained between 1995 and 1996. This suggests 
that wealth distribution in Nepal has improved between 1995 and 1996. These measures give 
only the level of wealth concentration of a certain class of the distribution. For the distribution of 
income in Chapter 2, we use various inequality measures, i.e., the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson 
indexes, and the Theil index, which summarise the whole distribution of wealth. Wealth 
inequality in Nepal measured by the Gini coefficient is approximately 0.74. The Theil Index and 
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Atkinson Indexes are also presented in Table 3.4. We may confirm by these concentration ratio 
that wealth inequality has slightly decreased between 1995 and 1996. This is due to a decrease in 
both rural and urban wealth inequality. All measures of inequality prove that distribution of 
wealth in urban area is worse than in rural area. 
 
Table 3.4 Concentration of Wealth in Rural and Urban Families in Nepal (1996)  
 (Percentage share of wealth and inequality ratios) 
  All Nepal Urban Nepal Rural Nepal 
  1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996 
   Top 5 53.45  52.79  39.88  38.93  44.78  44.12   
   Top 10 68.19  67.44  55.96  55.30  57.38  56.58   
   Top 20 81.51  80.86  73.77  72.79  71.99  71.26   
   Top 40 92.38  91.99  92.13  91.20  87.28  86.80   
   Bottom 60 7.63  8.02  7.87  8.80  12.72  13.20   
                 
   Gini 0.742  0.735  0.698  0.687  0.661  0.654   
   Atkinson ε=0.5 0.485  0.474  0.444  0.422  0.376  0.367   
   Atkinson ε=1 0.762  0.744  0.795  0.741  0.637  0.623   
   Theil 0.612  0.597  0.448  0.430  0.491   0.477   
Source: author’s own calculations from the NLSS (1996) data 
3.7 The Household Wealth Structure in Rural and Urban Nepal 
In the NLSS (1996) household assets are divided into nine categories: dwellings, 
landholdings, enterprises, farm assets, inventory, livestock, borrowings, lending and other assets. 
We have estimated the net wealth from the value of these assets and liabilities. Table 3.5 
presents some dimension of wealth for 1995 and 1996. Average wealth (measured by the net 
wealth in Table 3.5) has increased in Nepal between 1995 and 1996. Urban and rural household 
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wealth has also increased between 1995 and 1996. This was a result of the growth of the values 
of inventory, enterprises, and other assets. The rest of the assets remained almost constant. The 
average household wealth in urban Nepal is around six times higher than that of rural Nepal and 
around three times higher than of the national average; the size of wealth in urban and rural areas 
varies significantly. However the ratio was almost constant in 1995 and 1996. Wealth inequality 
has slightly decreased in rural and urban areas. The most striking aspect of household wealth 
distribution is its extreme inequality. In the previous chapter we discussed the inequality of 
income. The higher inequality of income affects wealth inequality through past saving 
behaviour. Savings are included in the value of other assets. Given that other assets (average 
amount) are significantly large and savings are growing, the latter seems to have affected the 
distribution of wealth in Nepal. Thus, current income is important in explaining the disparity of 
wealth. Bequests may play a central role in wealth distribution in Nepal since the landholdings 
and dwellings include a major part of wealth because these assets are constant over time in the 
NLSS sample. In other words the inheritance of landholding and dwellings largely determine the 
level of inequality of wealth in Nepal.48 The result is much in line with what happens in the 
developed world as well (except may be the US). 
The average net wealth of the urban household is 1,584,388 compared with 296,817 
NC in 1996, which is above 5 times higher than the rural household. Except for the values of 
livestock ownership and agriculture tools, all the components of wealth in urban Nepal have 
higher values than in rural Nepal. This indicates that urban people are on average far wealthier 




                                                 
48 See sections 1.5 and 1.6 for the inheritance system in Nepal. 
 157
Table 3.5 Mean Wealth of Rural and Urban Families in Nepal (1996) 
 In NC = Nepalese currency 1996 price (1$ =57NC 1996) 
  All Nepal Urban Nepal Rural Nepal 
  1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996 
Dwellings 211,394  211,394  784,251  784,251  57,022  57,022  
Landholdings 230,486  227,609  383,719  371,193  189,193  188,916  
Enterprises 20,193  22,379  70,217  79,581  6,713  6,964  
Farm Assets 1,496  1,550  529  539  1,757  1,822  
Inventory of Durables 7,765  23,660  31,277  72,843  1,429  10,406  
Livestock 10,152  10,898  2,125  2,484  12,315  13,166  
Lending 2,831  2,738  6,348  5,758  1,883  1,924  
Other Assets 79,898  87,199  273,125  305,538  27,828  28,361  
Borrowings 16,647  17,290  36,851  37,800  11,200  11,763  
Net Wealth 547,574  570,135  1,514,740  1,584,388  286,945   296,817  
Source: author’s own calculation from the NLSS (1996) data 
Wealth distribution in both rural and urban Nepal is extremely concentrated. Given 
that the level of wealth is very low in rural Nepal compared with urban Nepal and inequality is 
higher, many interlocking barriers slow down any progress. Rural households have little land, 
less access to education and health services or other important assets. 
It is not surprising that wealth distribution in rural areas is extremely unequal, since 
differences between family backgrounds in rural areas are higher and progress towards equality 
is thus slower. 
The rural economy is mostly dependent on agriculture. Land is the only productive 
resource for rural families – we noted above that land possession offers economic security. The 
Central Bureau of Statistic of Nepal (1993) has reported that only 17 percent of the total area of 
the country is arable. The per capita land holding is 0.14 hectare. The bottom 40 percent of the 
families operate only 9 percent of the total agriculture land, while the top 6 percent occupy more 
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than 33 percent. Hence, the land is owned mostly by few rich households, called ‘Jamindar’ 
(Feudalist), in the rural areas; while most of the farmers are landless and marginal farm holders. 
They are the most disadvantaged group of Nepal. They don’t own anything else, so for 
livelihood they depend on a feudalist. 
In Chapter One we described the political history of Nepal. In the mid eighteenth 
century, the unification of Nepal took place. Over the past century, land remained the major 
source of economic wealth in Nepal. It was also an income-generator for the ruling elites. The 
surplus generated by the peasants was used by the elites to finance the military. After 
unification, the land seemed to become state owned for a period of time. Later on, the ownership 
was transferred to the people. The Birta system was introduced; wherein the land was awarded 
to the members of the royal family and nobility as a prize for their bravery. The Birta was also 
influenced by religion. The rich people gave land as gift to Bramins, who were privileged by the 
Hindu religion, as a medium to easily earn virtue, which is prized by the gods. The land under 
the Birta system was not taxable and the recipient of the land grant was entitled to the revenue 
assessed on it. The Terai lands were extensively redistributed under this tenure system. This 
system was took plant during the Rana regime and the land was granted in order to enrich the 
ruling elites and their collaborators. In this period the Birta land accounted for 86 percent (1.6 
million ha) of all land in the Terai. Thus, the land was concentrated in the hands of a few ruling 
elites and the surplus was generated by these classes through severe exploitation of labour from 
the farmers. The tenants were forced to work in Birta land and to accomplish other household 
work for the elite groups without a wage, because there was no alternative to survive49. The 
economic development was achieved by the extreme exploitation of labour class by the ruling 
class. Following the overthrow of Rana in 1951, some reforms were made to the land holdings. 
                                                 
49 This was in fact a slavery system, which was abolished in 1959. 
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The land act of 196250 was put in place to redistribute the land. The land redistribution 
process did not proceed immediately. Landowners were well informed before the act was 
supposed to become effective, giving an opportunity to the large estate-holders to handover 
excessive land to their relatives. Not surprisingly, the land redistribution system did not work 
because the lawmakers were the same ruling people who held excessive amounts of land. 
Apparently, the state protected the landowners, whereas the majority of the peasants remained 
landless or small landholders. The land act 1964 authorised registered tenants to lay claim to one 
fourth of the land or its equivalent value from the landowner in case the landowner would sell 
the land or release it from tenancy. 
In Birta system the landlords utilised the land without rent to the state (taxes, royalty 
etc), while the rest of the land became registered and liable to taxation. In order to collect the 
taxes from the registered land, the state selected non-official local functionaries from each local 
area. The Jamindar and Talikdar were the authorised bodies in the Terai and Hill regions 
designated respectively with collecting the government revenue at a local level. Given that the 
Terai region was infested with a high prevalence of Malaria, the elite class avoided collecting 
the taxes in this region. The state therefore selected a Jamindar from each area of the Terai 
region51 and gave it the authority to collect revenue. The Jamindar were also authorised to 
expand the land (normally by destroying the forest) in order to fulfil the demands of a growing 
population. They were also granted land as a prize of their work. Given the lack of state 
government supervision after their appointment, these Jamindar manipulated their easily won 
power and profited from the peasants under their charge. 
                                                 
50 It has recognised three important measures: (i) The fixed ceiling of land holdings: a person can hold 
16.93 ha in the Terai, 4.07 ha in the Hills and Mountain, and 2.54 ha in Kathmandu. (ii) Fixed rent: fifty 
percent of the crop grown in a year to the landlord was established like mezzadria system in Italy. (iii) 
The Birta system was abolished. 
51 The big landlords were selected as Jamindar. The idea behind this selection criteria was that the 
Jamindar could easily be a representative of the area that would facilitate his work of collecting revenue. 
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Until that time, internal migration from the Hills and Mountain regions to Terai area 
had been very limited. After the successful control of Malaria in the Terai region, migratory 
movement from Hill and Mountain areas to Terai increased. Motivating factors in this migratory 
movement included harsher condition in the Hills and Mountains, limited supply of arable land 
and lack of employment opportunities in these areas. Moreover, the availability of arable land in 
Terai immediately after the control of malaria and the Terai’s better infrastructural facilities, 
increased migration from Hills and Mountains to Terai. This migration was spurred along by the 
resettlement programmes set up by the government in the late sixties. All of the above factors 
contributed to the migration of Hill and Mountain people to Terai areas. 
Given that many families in rural areas do not hold sufficient land to earn their living, 
the access to credit is extremely important for other economic activities or even when these 
people have health problems and need money. Feudalists lend money to the poor at high interest 
rates, which make the former even wealthier, and the latter poorer. It often happens that people 
cannot repay money and so they are forced to sell and lose their lands. In rural areas, the 
informal financial market is the sole source of credit. In 1994 the National Bank of Nepal (NBR) 
published a survey of rural credit; which found that among the types of borrowings from 
landlords, the most prevalent is the bonded labour type. Kamaiyas in rural Terai and Haliyas in 
rural Hills are some forms of debt bondages that one may find in Nepal. In these systems the 
debtors (Kamaiyas or Haliyas) are forced to work for the creditors in lieu of interest payment as 
well as payment of the principle amount. Further, debts are inter-generationally transferable, so 
that class rigidity remains high. As a result these people find it difficult to improve their 
situation. 
The literacy rate among rural people is very low. This is another reason why educated 
feudalists exploit these people. For example, the landlords may invent fake papers concerning an 
imaginary debt, and thus take advantage of illiterate people and by taking away their 
possessions. These illiterates cannot promote legal actions against the landlord, given that the 
landlords have privileged links with the government bodies. Hence, to some extent, corruption 
has directly or indirectly favoured the rich in Nepal. The Human Development Report Nepal 
(1998) partially noted this systemic corruption by stating, “Some of the landlords, relying upon 
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the illiteracy and innocence of the Kamaiyas, are reported to illegitimately upscale the loan taken 
by the Kamaiyas”. 
In addition, an  inefficient transport infrastructure acts as a bottleneck to the rural 
economy. Poor rural families cannot afford to sell their products on major markets. They have to 
sell them in their own area, at a low price, to the local merchant. Furthermore, the social 
behaviour of the society (male dominated) has influenced economic activities of rural people. 
For example, in rural areas, males exclusively plough and; the remaining agricultural work is 
done by females. Provided that there are no other economic activities than agriculture for the 
males, they engage in gambling and drinking. This often leads to a reduction of their existing 
properties through subsequent debt accumulation and indenture. 
3.8 The Household Wealth Distribution in Development Regions of Nepal 
Administratively the country is divided into five development regions: far-western 
region, mid-western region, western region, central region and eastern region. Table 3.6 provides 
the degree of wealth concentration and the inequality measures for these regions. Among these 
regions, the household wealth distribution in the far-western development region is more equal 
than the distribution of other regions. The top 5 percent of the far-western region families holds 
around 33 percent and 31 percent in 1995 and 1996 respectively. The lowest wealth share of the 
top 5 percent in the far-western development region is followed by mid-western, western, 
eastern, and central development regions respectively. The share of the top five percent 
households has decreased by around 2 percent points between 1995 and 1996 in farwestern 
region. This share has decreased slightly for all regions except for Midwestern region. We also 
find a decrease of wealth share for the top 10%, 20% and 40% in four regions; while in the 
Midwestern region, these shares have increased. Similarly the bottom 60 percent of the 
households of all regions except the Mid-western region have gained their share of wealth. 
Hence, the less wealthy people are becoming better off. Wealth is heavily concentrated among 
the upper class of the society in the central development region followed by western, eastern, 
mid-western and far-western development regions. The bottom 60 percent of households in 
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central development regions enjoys the least share of wealth compared with other regions. From 
these results, i.e., the lower share of bottom percentile and the higher share of upper percentiles 
lead to the higher degree of inequality of wealth. The reverse will result to the less unequal of 
wealth distribution. This statement is checked with the measurements of inequality. 
All four indexes of inequality show the least inequality in wealth distribution in the far-
western development region followed by mid-western, eastern, western, and central 
development regions for both years 1995 and 1996. These measures also confirm that the wealth 
distribution has improved in all development regions except the mid-western regions (see Table 
3.6). The relative measurements do not show whether the households with low or high inequality 
are wealthier than others. We examine it with wealth size and its composition in Table 3.6 
below. 
 
Table 3.6 Concentration of Wealth in the Development Region’s Families of Nepal (1996) 
 (Percentage share of wealth and inequality ratios) 
  Farwestern Midwestern Western Central Eastern 
  1995   1996   1995   1996  1995  1996  1995  1996  1995   1996   
Top 5% 32.66  31.13   34.89  36.07  45.16 45.14  51.08 50.45  45.49  44.87   
Top 10% 45.27  43.44   49.74  50.81  61.32 61.01  67.13 66.33  58.87  58.31   
Top 20% 59.88  58.17   67.58  67.82  75.96 75.48  83.62 82.80  73.89  73.59   
Top 40% 77.99  76.68   84.89  84.92  89.49 89.17  94.51 94.06  89.06  88.82   
Bottom 60% 22.01  23.32   15.11  15.08  10.51 10.83  5.49 5.94  10.94  11.18   
                      
Gini 0.532  0.512   0.620  0.621  0.693 0.688  0.760 0.753  0.680  0.677   
Atkinson ε=0.5 0.235  0.216   0.330  0.328  0.416 0.407  0.517 0.503  0.404  0.400   
Atkinson ε=1 0.409  0.378   0.596  0.578  0.684 0.664  0.814 0.792  0.689  0.688   
Theil 0.259   0.239   0.346   0.353  0.485  0.478  0.597  0.582  0.551   0.533   
Source: author’s own calculation from the NLSS (1996) data. 
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3.9 The household Wealth Structure in the Development Regions of Nepal 
Table 3.7 provides the structure of wealth for the development regions in 1995 and 
1996. The wealth is estimated for the households of development regions in the same way for 
the rural and urban Nepal. The average net wealth in all development regions has increased 
between 1995 and 1996. Wealth of the central region is made up of a higher part of the value of 
dwellings, while the value of the landholdings contributes to the highest share in the wealth 
formation for other regions. It is clear that since the majority of the population earns their living 
through farming, the land is their capital and people tend to invest their saving in landholdings in 
order to increase their production. Although the value of dwellings represents the highest share 
for the central region, the value of landholdings also seems much more important, given that the 
average value of landholdings is the highest among all development regions. Hence, one of the 
important economic assets in all development regions of Nepal is the ownership of land. As 
ownership of land mainly determines the standard of living of the rural households, people tend 
to invest their savings in land rather than other sectors. 
Dwelling seems to be a less important asset than land ownership for all development 
regions, except for the central region. The value of other assets comprises a high amount in the 
central development region and the western development region. This confirms that the 
households of these regions also have been influenced by financial and stock markets. The 
values of livestock and farm assets have little weight in the composition of wealth for the 
households of central and western development regions but; in other regions these components 
have a relative high weight. Livestock and farm assets are an integral part of the farming system. 








Table 3.7 Mean Wealth of the Development Region’s Families in Nepal (1996) 
 In NC = Nepalese currency 1996 price (1$ =57NC 1996) 
  Far-western Mid-western Western Central Eastern 
  1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996 
Dwellings 42,937 42,937 45,191 45,191 183,562 183,562 402,206 402,206 50,482 50,482 
Landholdings 126,590 126,186 161,119 161,985 250,200 250,095 302,269 295,377 167,008 166,018 
Enterprises 2,163 2,239 11,667 17,347 31,986 32,548 26,431 30,448 11,579 11,087 
Farm Assets 2,147 2,365 1,906 1,934 1,205 1,252 744 766 2,609 2,659 
Inventory 790 10,401 1,452 10,479 10,768 25,607 12,999 37,413 2,109 9,772 
Livestock 16,064 18,295 13,291 12,935 9,701 10,577 7,344 7,975 11,236 11,907 
Lending 802 804 3,004 2,875 3,912 4,156 3,380 3,068 1,790 1,778 
Other Assets 11,726 10,173 22,746 25,271 59,772 72,368 151,317 161,974 28,094 31,350 
Borrowings 5,460 5,413 10,064 10,193 19,017 19,136 21,301 22,402 14,796 15,667 
Net Wealth 197,775 207,986 250,314 267,824 532,090 561,023 885,388 916,825 260,112 269,386 
Source: author’s own calculation from the NLSS (1996) data. 
The households of the central development region are wealthier by more than four 
folds compared with the households of the far-western development region and by more than 
three folds when compared with households of the mid-western and eastern development 
regions. The households of the western development region are wealthier by approximately two 
folds when compared with the households of three poor regions. The value of enterprises for the 
households in the central and western development regions is higher; suggesting that the families 
in these regions have alternative income resources apart from the agriculture income. Hence 
these families are less dependent on agriculture. 
In this section we found that the families of the western development region hold the 
least average wealth and the inequality of wealth is also low compared with other regions. As we 
examine the level of average wealth, the families of the mid-western and eastern development 
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regions have slightly higher wealth than the far-western development region. If we carefully 
examine further, the level of average wealth in the households of the western and central 
development regions is much higher than other regions and the inequality of wealth is much 
higher. It seems that the wealthier development regions face higher inequality, while the poor 
development regions have better distribution of wealth. 
Why is the distribution of wealth more equal in far-western region than in others? Here 
we put forward some possible explanations: 
 
1) Population density is very low in the far-western region. This means more arable land and 
pasture land are available for the households. Given that the major part of wealth is the 
value of land and the distribution of land in this region is more equal than others, 
consequently the distribution of wealth is less skewed. 
2) Most of the households are poor and the wealthiest households also do not hold much 
wealth. This causes less fluctuation in holding wealth. 
3) Although the size of landholding is high in this region, the level of productivity is low due 
to the lack of farming infrastructure such as irrigation system, roads, and the financial 
institution, which may play an effective role to the production process. Furthermore, this 
region has less rainfall, which has further hindered the progress in agro-economy. The 
market activities are also low and people are very poor. The richest feudalists are not 
attracted to this region and the level of feudality is also lower. This has reflected upon the 
lower inequality in wealth distribution. 
4) A high proportion of young people from poor households emigrates to India in search of 
work. Their income possibly fills the gap between the rich and poor families, which results 
in lower inequality of wealth. 
These are some reasons why the household wealth distribution in far-west 
development regions of Nepal is more equal than in other regions. 
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3.10 The Household Wealth Distribution in the Ecological Regions of Nepal 
As we have already pointed out Nepal is a Mountainous country and the terrain is 
extremely diverse within a relatively small area of less than 150,000 sq. km. The altitude ranges 
from less than 100m to 8848m the highest point on Earth, Mount Everest. Geographically, the 
country is divided into three ecological regions: Mountain, Hill and southern flat land called 
Terai. In this section we examine the distribution of the household wealth in these regions. We 
begin with the same percentile shares and inequality indexes that we used in previous sections in 
order to analyse the concentration of wealth. We provide the summary of these indexes in Table 
3.8. 
The households of the Mountain, Hill, and Terai regions have experienced a small 
decrease in their shares of wealth for the top 5%, 10%, 20%, and 40% between 1995 and 1996. 
On the other hand the bottom 60 percent of the households in all regions has slightly increased 
(around 0.6 percent in Mountain, 0.5 percent in Hill, and 0.3 percent in the Terai region). As a 
result, the inequality indexes have decreased between 1995 and 1996. For example, the Gini 
index has decreased by 2 percent points in the Mountain regions and it has decreased by one 
percent point in other regions. 
Among these three regions the household share of wealth of the top 5%, 10%, 20%, 
and 40% are large in the Hill area compared with other regions. The top 5 percent of the 
Mountain region held only around 33 percent in 1995 and 31 percent in 1996. These household 
shares of wealth are smaller than the households of other regions. For example, these household 
shares of wealth are smaller by 8.13 percent points compared with the Terai region household 
shares of wealth for 1996. This gap is even lager between the Mountain and Hill regions. The 
other top percentile shares of the Mountain region are much smaller than the other regions. The 
bottom 60 percent of households seem to be better off in the Mountain region than other regions 
because its share of wealth is approximately 21 percent for 1996. However, it is only the relative 
share and, hence, it is not clear whether they are better off than the other regions’ households. 
This will be clear below when we analyse the absolute average share of family wealth. However 
the distribution of wealth in the Mountain region is far better than the other regions. The Gini 
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index for this region is 0.53 in 1996; which is smaller by 21 percent points compared with the 
Hill region and is smaller by 13 percent points against the Terai region. The other inequality 
measures also show a smaller inequality for the Mountain region compared with the other 
regions (see Table 3.8). Although the inequality of wealth distribution has decreased between 
1995 and 1996, it is still large for the Hill region compared with other regions. 
 
Table 3.8 Concentration of Wealth in the Ecological Region’s Families in Nepal (1996) 
 (Percentage share of wealth and the inequality ratios) 
  Mountain Hill Terai 
  1995   1996  1995  1996  1995   1996  
Top 5% 32.83  30.83  50.86 49.96  39.64  38.96  
Top 10% 45.16  43.34  67.03 65.94  54.30  53.51  
Top 20% 60.18  59.14  83.18 82.29  71.85  71.20  
Top 40% 79.41  78.82  93.51 93.00  89.03  88.75  
Bottom 60% 20.59  21.18  6.49 7.00  10.97  11.25  
             
Gini 0.547  0.534  0.749 0.741  0.669  0.663  
Atkinson ε=0.5 0.252  0.238  0.495 0.480  0.393  0.386  
Atkinson ε=1 0.454  0.431  0.775 0.749  0.695  0.687  
Theil 0.286   0.264  0.585  0.567  0.458   0.445  
Source: author’s own calculation from the NLSS (1996) data 
3.11 The Household Wealth Structure in the Ecological Regions of Nepal 
We present the average household wealth and its compositions with absolute values in 
Table 3.9 for the Mountain, Hill, and Terai regions. The amount of the average wealth has 
increased in all three regions between 1995 and 1996. The household wealth of all regions is 
composed mainly of the value of dwellings and landholding. In the Mountain region, the 
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livestock also seems to be important in the formation of wealth, while in the Hill region, the 
other assets and enterprises are also important components. The household wealth of the Hill 
region is around three times higher than that of the Terai region and it is around five times 
higher than that of the Mountain region for 1995 and 1996. Although the value of enterprises in 
the Mountain region is small, it is an important component because Mountain families do not 
have sufficient agricultural production. The traders lack the sufficient investment, as can be 
observed from the value of enterprises, which is very low. Therefore, most of the Mountain 
households are poor; they hold the least wealth compared with other households of the Hill and 
Terai regions. 
 
Table 3.9 Mean Wealth of Ecological Region’s Families in Nepal (1996)  
 In NC = Nepalese currency 1996 price (1$ =57NC 1996) 
  Mountain Hill Terai 
  1995   1996  1995  1996  1995  1996   
Dwellings 32,234  32,234  357,547  357,547  63,495  63,495   
Landholdings 93,935  95,277  285,986  281,122  197,217  195,753   
Enterprises 6,796  6,713  32,594  36,706  7,041  7,245   
Farm Assets 316  342  375  387  3,485  3,608   
Inventory 570  9,439  13,590  37,921  1,888  8,138   
Livestock 13,349  15,778  9,239  9,910  10,381  10,672   
Lending 1,712  1,728  4,232  4,113  1,213  1,121   
Other Assets 12,618  11,006  134,468  150,480  24,805  22,699   
Borrowings 8,415  9,530  22,116  22,732  11,627  12,146   
Net Wealth 153,116   162,987  815,928  855,452  297,898  300,585   
Source: author’s own calculation from the NLSS (1996) data 
The Mountain region is characterised by rugged topographic conditions and economic 
activities are extremely limited. This region is sparsely populated. The farming activity exists 
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only in the low-lying valleys. Given that their heavy dependence on herding and trading, the 
value of livestock is relatively high in this region. The traders migrate seasonally between 
highlands and lowlands, buying and selling goods and commodities in order to generate much 
needed income and to secure food supplies. The average wealth in this region is very low and the 
inequality of wealth is also low compared with other regions, suggesting that most of the 
households are poor in terms of wealth. 
The density of the population in the Hill region is very high. The agriculture is the 
predominant economic activity supplemented by livestock raising, foraging, and seasonal 
migrating of labourers. The vast majority of the households living in the Hills are land-hungry. 
The poor economic situation is due to lack of sufficient land. Furthermore, the acute inequality 
of land distribution has caused high inequality of wealth distribution in this area. The bonded 
labour Haliyas in rural Hills are some forms of debt bondages found. This might be another 
reason why the distribution of wealth is highly unequal in this region. 
3.12 The Household Wealth Distribution of Religion Groups of Nepal 
Nepal is unique in being the world’s only country which is considered a Hindu state. 
Nepal is constitutionally a Hindu kingdom with legal provisions of no discrimination against 
their religion. The Hindu population in Nepal has consistently been over 80 percent since the 
1950s. The second largest religion in Nepal is Buddhism; practiced by about 11 percent. The 
Muslim religion consists of about 4 percent and the rest are Christian, Jain and others. The 
following chart represents the population distribution by religion in the last 40 years. 
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Sources: Author’s own estimation from the data of Nepal Population Report 2001 
The social values that are present in the Nepalese society today are influenced, to a 
certain extent, by the Hindu religion; which dates back centuries in time. Nepal was, for a long 
period, the mixing grounds for migrating groups of people from the Indian plains in the south 
and the Tibetan plateau in the north. People from either region brought in and implemented their 
system of beliefs, culture, and technology in the various regions where they ultimately settled. 
The dominance, however, of one race over the other is evident in the social and religious values 
in today’s Nepal, which also reflects on the realm of present day politics and economics. The 
historical aspect is important in order to understand the current situation of wealth distribution 
among the religion of the family in Nepal. 
Table 3.10 shows the household wealth distribution for 1995 and 1996 within the 
religion groups. The top percentiles of the Hindu and Buddhist households have experienced a 
decrease in their share of wealth between 1995 and 1996. Similarly, the top 20 and 40 
percentiles of Muslim households have also decreased but the top 5 and 10 percentiles have 
experienced an increase of wealth share for the same period. The household wealth share of the 
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bottom 60 percent has increased. As a result the distribution of wealth has improved for all three 
groups of households. Hindu and Buddhist families have improved their wealth distribution by 
around 1 percent of the Gini index. Muslim families also experienced a small reduction 
according to the Gini index. The other measures used in this study clearly show a decrease in 
inequality of wealth for Muslim households. While the household wealth share of other religions 
has slightly increased for the top percentiles except for the top 40 percent and it has increased for 
the bottom 60 percent. Wealth distribution has worsened in Other (religion) households between 
1995 and 1996. The top 5 percent household wealth share is more concentrated for the Hindu 
families followed by Buddhist, Others and Muslim families but the top 10 percent household 
wealth share is more concentrated for Buddhist families. All other top percentile shares of 
wealth for Buddhist families are higher compared with the families of other religions (see Table 
3.10). Thus wealth distribution of the Buddhist families is more unequal; followed by the Hindu 
households. Wealth for the Muslim households is more equally distributed; this is not surprising 
since the concept of equality is stronger for them, and since their range of profession is rather 
limited. Islam also has special laws of inheritance. 
 
Table 3.10 Concentration of Wealth by Religion of Nepal (1996) 
(Percentage share of wealth and the inequality ratios) 
  Hindu Buddhist Muslim Others 
  1995   1996  1995  1996  1995  1996  1995   1996  
Top 5% 52.62  51.91  51.56 51.23  26.04 26.75  40.07  48.23  
Top 10% 67.25  66.49  70.38 69.47  43.17 43.57  59.65  64.27  
Top 20% 80.80  80.13  86.95 85.91  64.28 64.14  80.22  80.42  
Top 40% 92.03  91.62  95.89 95.41  85.55 85.30  91.91  91.74  
Bottom 60% 7.97  8.38  4.11 4.59  14.45 14.70  8.09  8.26  
               
Gini 0.735  0.728  0.776 0.770  0.603 0.602  0.704  0.712  
Atkinson ε=0.5 0.475  0.464  0.542 0.528  0.322 0.322  0.426  0.437  
Atkinson ε=1 0.753  0.733  0.824 0.805  0.623 0.625  0.688  0.687  
Theil 0.603   0.588  0.605  0.591  0.294  0.294  0.445   0.489  
Source: author’s own calculation from the NLSS (1996) data 
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3.13 The Household Wealth Structure of Religion Groups of Nepal 
Table 3.11 provides the households wealth structure according to religion for 1995 and 
1996. Wealth estimated for the household in this section is similar to rural and urban Nepal. The 
average net wealth for all religion families has increased between 1995 and 1996. Wealth is 
composed by higher part of the values of dwellings and landholdings. The average amount of 
other assets (including savings) is also high except for Muslim households. It seems that the 
Muslim households are the least income-earning group of Nepal and they have least savings. 
The average value for the Buddhist household wealth is much higher than others, suggesting that 
they are the wealthiest families of Nepal. It is noteworthy that all households are associated in 
farming. The entrepreneurship is relatively high for the Buddhist households compared with 
others. 
 
Table 3.11 Mean Wealth of for the Families Wealth by Religion in Nepal (1996) 
 In NC = Nepalese currency 1996 price (1$ =57NC 1996) 
  Hindu Buddhist Muslim Others 
  1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996 
Dwellings 195,571 195,571 471,733 471,733 72,890 72,890 55,035 55,035 
Landholdings 233,293 230,532 284,658 279,281 92,521 91,327 107,188 107,188 
Enterprises 19,278 21,079 37,614 44,525 7,651 9,087 9,698 10,419 
Farm Assets 1,548 1,610 384 396 3,117 3,069 206 218 
Inventory 6,912 21,986 20,092 50,083 1,542 7,274 6,422 19,330 
Livestock 10,687 11,465 7,434 8,115 4,992 5,150 6,286 7,010 
Lending 2,717 2,554 5,259 5,790 999 1,078 718 864 
Other Assets 72,493 80,608 181,145 181,257 28,208 29,110 97,895 114,226 
Borrowings 13,724 13,982 50,314 55,061 14,253 14,766 9,870 11,271 
Net Wealth 528,780 551,423 958,005 986,119 197,667 204,220 273,578 303,021 
Source: author’s own calculation from the NLSS (1996) data 
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We find that the household wealth distribution of the Buddhist and Hindu families is 
extremely unequal and that the Muslim wealth distribution is more egalitarian. The Buddhist 
families are wealthy; and their level of wealth is much higher than other religion families. The 
two main religions Hindu and Buddhist have intermingled to the extent of influencing each other 
not only in the past but also up to modern times in Nepal. They celebrate the same festivals, 
albeit these may have different meanings and connotations for each religion group. Thus, they 
show a similar pattern of social life. Both religion groups face a high inequality of the household 
wealth. 
The hierarchy in the Hindu social structure is based upon the axiom of purity in the 
caste. The caste system is an integral part of the Hindu society, which has highly influenced the 
economic activities of the families. Bramins, Chetris, Vaisyas and Sudras are four basic 
divisions of the people in this society. Bramins are scholars who belong to the top class. The 
second level is composed of Chetris, originally the caste of Kings, princes, rulers, warriors, etc. 
The Vaisyas are the traders, peasants, artisans, cattle breeders etc. The fourth class is Sudras who 
are the servants of the three upper groups. The concept of untouchables among various castes 
comes from this concept of purity and pollution, as interpreted and enforced by the Bramins. The 
Sudras, being the least pure, were not allowed to come in contact with members of the other 
caste. The dominance of the higher classes of the Hindu society over the lower classes is evident 
in the socio-economic and religious values in today’s Nepal. This is also reflected on the 
distribution of wealth. 
Muslims are found to be the least wealthy families with the least average household 
wealth in the sample and the distribution of their wealth is less unequal. The Muslim laws 
concerning the inheritance of wealth may have influenced the distribution of wealth in Nepal. 
Given that the Muslim families cannot inherit from the non-Muslim families, it is less probable 
than in other religion group that intergenerational transfer of wealth can cause a rise in inequality 
of wealth. Furthermore, the level of Muslim wealth is very low (compared with the household 
wealth of other religions); probably this is one of the reasons why the level of wealth inequality 
is also low. 
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Box 3.1: Islam’s laws of will and inheritance 
Islam has special laws of inheritance. The Qur'an and Sunnah have specified the relatives who may 
inherit and have also specified their shares in the inheritance. A person is free to give whomsoever 
he/she wills during his or her life but after death every thing has to be distributed according to the 
laws of Allah. One can consult books on Islamic laws of inheritance to learn more details, but 
basic principles are as follows: 
All outstanding loans or debts should be paid before the distribution of one's wealth. The will of the 
deceased should be followed very strictly unless it is against the laws of Allah. 
A person has a right to donate up to one third of his or her wealth to someone or some institution 
according to his/her  however a person cannot give more to someone who is supposed to inherit 
under the laws of inheritance. The rest of the inheritance must be distributed according to the rules 
of the Shari'ah. 
Only a Muslim can inherit a Muslim. Non-Muslim relatives cannot inherit from Muslims, nor inherit 
from their non-Muslim relatives. If a Muslim has a non-Muslim spouse or some other relatives 
and he wants to give something to that person then he must make a special will for that person and 
it should not be more than one third of his/her wealth. If a non-Muslim relative writes a Muslim's 
name among his/her heirs and leaves something for a Muslim, a Muslim may take it as a gift, but 
should not claim it as a right in inheritance. 
Only legitimate children can inherit from a person. Illegitimate or adopted children cannot inherit 
under the Islamic law of inheritance. 
A murderer or a person who was accessory to the murder of a person cannot be a beneficiary of 
person whom he/she murdered. 
Among the surviving relatives spouses, parents and children always inherit. If any of them is 
predeceased then other relatives receive their shares, but the rule is that the near relatives exclude 
those who are a step distant from them in their relation to the deceased. 
All shares must be according to the designated and specified percentage. 
Source: Will and Inheritance (133Hhttp://www.pakistanlink.com/religion/97/re02-28-97.html) 
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3.14 The Household Wealth Distribution of Ethnic Groups of Nepal 
Around 1200 A.D., during the rise of the Muslim invasion, there was an important 
arrival of the Hindu migrants in Nepal. These Hindus were mainly of the Indo-Aryan race that 
had achieved significant progress in their lifestyle. With their superior technology of production 
and art of war, they had dominated over the migrant dwellers from the north (of Tibeto-
Mongolian race). By the 14th century, they were able to establish petty feudal kingdoms through 
a gradual assimilation of tribal communities. The Aryans adopted the newcomers (non-Hindu) 
into their constitution as the Vaisya caste of their social hierarchy. The Kingdom of Nepal was 
instituted, circa 1800 A.D., through the process of unification of various tribal and ancient states 
scattered across Nepal. This dynasty followed the same Hindu aristocratic system. 
Nepal is a multiethnic and multilingual state and all Nepalese, irrespective of their 
religion, race, caste or tribe, collectively constitute the nation. The NLSS (1996) has 
distinguished fifteen ethnic groups in Nepal. They are Bramin, Chetry, Newar, Gurung, Rai, 
Magar, Limbu, Tamang, Tharu, Yadav/Ahir, Muslim, Sarki, Kami, Damai, Others. 
Table 3.12 presents the distribution of wealth for 1995 and 1996 within the specified 
ethnic groups of Nepal. We first compare the wealth by some percentile measurements and other 
inequality measurements for the household wealth. Then we provide and explain the structure 
and level of the household wealth for these groups in Table 3.13 for 1995 and 1996. 
With due precaution, we may say that Muslim household wealth share for the top 5 
percent and top 10 percent have increased but it has decreased for the top 20 percent and the top 
40 percent households between 1995 and 1996. However the bottom 60 percent of the family has 








Wealth share of the top 5%, 10% and 20% household have increased for Limbu caste 
between 1995 and 1996. The poorest 60 percent household have also gained their wealth share 
while the only loser is the second quintile household. Despite a small improvement in the poor 
household wealth share, the aggregate inequality of wealth distribution has increased due to 
higher transfer of wealth share from the second quintile to the top tail of the distribution. 
Tharu family wealth has decreased for the top 10%, and 20% households, while the 
second quintile share has increased. The lowest 60 percent households have gained their share of 
wealth. The top 5 percent household’s share of wealth for Tharu has remained almost constant 




Gurung and Rai have experienced a transfer of wealth share from poor to rich; while 
the rest have experienced on the contrary between 1995 and 1996. Limbu, Yadav/Ahir, Muslim 
and lower caste groups have low relative inequality of wealth distribution compared with other 
ethnic groups for both year 1995 and 1996. Gurung households, on the other hand, face the 
extreme wealth inequality followed by Chetri, Bramin, Tamang, Magar, Newar, etc. Later we 
draw some reasons why some groups exhibit a less unequal distribution and some groups exhibit 
an extreme unequal distribution of wealth. 
Table 3.13 provides the average net wealth and the components of wealth of Nepalese 
ethnic households for 1995 and 1996. The average net wealth has increased for all ethnic 
households between 1995 and 1996. Newar households are the wealthiest groups, with average 
wealth of Rs 1,545,347 followed by Bramin, Gurung, Chetri, and so on. The lower castes 
households (Kami, Damai and Sarki), Limbu, Muslim and Yadav/Ahir are found to be poor 
households in terms of wealth in Nepal. Wealth of Newar household is almost double their 
counterparts (Bramin second wealthier households) and it is more than 14 times higher 
compared with the poorest household wealth (Damai) in absolute value (average). As in the 
previous sections, we find that the values of landholding and dwellings include a higher part of 
the household wealth in Nepal. For Gurung, Newar, Tamang and Magar, the value of dwellings 
contains a higher value than the landholding value in their wealth, while for the rest of the 
households, landholding value exceeds the value of dwellings. It probably suggests that the more 
people become wealthy; they invest more in dwellings because the higher dwellings represent a 
higher status of living in the Nepalese society. However the landholding without doubt is an 
economic certainty for the household in an agrarian society like Nepal (with more than 80 








The lower caste groups, Limbu, Muslim, Yadav/Ahir are poor in terms of wealth as a 
consequence of their land scarcity. Given that these families hold less land, they have little 
chance to improve their situations. In fact other sectors (industry and services) of the economy 
offer less opportunity to these back-warded households, since these families possess less 
education and skills. The land redistribution may play an important role in the short run and the 
public policies in education may improve their situations in the long run. The value of other 
assets for Newar is higher; followed by Bramin, Gurung and so on, suggesting that the savings 
(included in other assets) increase as the family becomes wealthier. Our analysis concludes that 




The poor households do not have sufficient land to grow enough food; therefore these 
families tend to breed animals, although on a small scale, in order to survive as our data analysis 
envisages. Concerning the inventory (stock of durables), the Nepalese households tend to keep 
the basic necessary goods. As they become wealthier, they increase their stock. 
3.15 Ethnic Groups of Nepal and Causes of their Wealth Inequality 
3.15.1 The Nepalese 
They are the major ethnic group in Nepal, and speak Nepalese, the country’s official 
language. The Nepalese have many racial, cultural, and linguistic similarities with the people of 
northern India. Their domestic and religious practices are also patterned after the higher Hindu 
castes of India. Most of the Nepalese live in small villages in hilly terrain and are accustomed to 
travelling long distances on foot. Their population consists primarily of three castes, or social 
classes: the Bramin (priests and scholars), the Chetry (rulers and warriors), and the Sudras 
(labourers, servants, and untouchables) as discussed in Hindu religion households. The 1991 
census showed that a combined population of Bramin and Chetri make up about 37 percent of 
the total population, whereas they hold more than 81 percent of the leadership positions in 
several areas of governance, such as judiciary, executive, legislature, public administration etc, 
and political leaders. The untouchables perform the lowest level of work considered in the 
society, such as ironsmith (Kami), tailoring (Damai) and shoemakers (Sarki) who belong to the 
untouchable ethnic groups of Nepal. The untouchables are considered to be unclean and 
excluded from the ritual activities by other classes of Hindus. Most of the Nepalese are farmers. 
They live in small rural settlements. Houses are usually made of mud-brick with thatch or tin 
roofs. We have seen above that Bramin and Chetri households face a high inequality of wealth 
distribution, while the untouchables have the least inequality of wealth distribution. Bramin and 
Chetri are two of the wealthiest groups of Nepal and the major cause of their inequality of 
wealth is due to an uneven land distribution. Land distribution within each ethnic group was 
found to be extremely skewed, which has resulted the high inequality of their wealth 
distribution. On the other hand the untouchable groups are extremely poor in terms of wealth. 
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This was created to some extent by Hindu social structure, as they are the servants of other high 
caste households. This has impeded in the advancement of their economic activities and these 
families hold a small quantity of land. They are limited in their traditional labour activities with 
which they can hardly manage to survive. Furthermore, these families are facing bonded labour 
(Haliya, we refer to the section on rural and urban wealth distribution) in the sense that they are 
bound by debt to work for landlords. The majority of Haliya are untouchables who have less 
land and are obliged to work for the high caste Nepali landowners. As they have limited assets, 
the inequality of wealth distribution is also low. 
3.15.2 The Newar ethnic group and causes of their wealth inequality 
The Newar, one of the oldest ethnic groups in Nepal, are the country’s earliest 
inhabitants. Although the Newar are scattered throughout Nepal, they are primarily concentrated 
in the Kathmandu Valley. While most of the Newar are Hindu, there are also a significant 
number of Buddhists. Both of these religious groups have caste systems (social classes) based on 
occupations. The Kathmandu Valley was located at the centre of the India-Tibet trade route, and 
most of the Newar are skilful merchants and traders. Many others have government jobs, and 
some are farmers. Most Newar settlements are built on elevated ground surrounded by farmland. 
The settlements look like small cities. Rows of three-story brick buildings stand along narrow 
lanes. The settlements have many ornate Buddhist and Hindu temples, built in medieval age and 
suggesting that the Newar were wealthy in the past before the reunification of Nepal. 
Kathmandu Valley was a Newar’s nation before the reunification of present Nepal in the 
eighteenth century. These latter arrivals, the Shahs of Gorkha and other Chetry and Brahmans, 
dominated the valley in short order and set about to unify the country politically, while the 
Newar underwent a significant process of change. 
During the course of history, a considerable amount of cultural influence has been 
exerted on the Newar culture by various groups of immigrants. These immigrants were 
ultimately absorbed into the Newar community. The Mallas ruled from the thirteenth to the 
eighteenth century. They brought with them the influence of a Hindu socio-religious base in the 
Newar society. Scholars believe that the Newar were predominantly Buddhist in the early 
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period. Later, Brahmin immigrants from India brought Hinduism with them. Because of the 
business oriented identity, Newar have managed to remain lesser dominated by the ruling elite. 
They even managed to secure important positions in the administrative structure of Nepal. In 
addition, Kathmandu, the capital city of Nepal, is the base of the major Newar and they have 
greater access to the privileges that the modern world has provided. Newar outside the 
Kathmandu valley do not share the same privileges as their Kathmandu counterpart, but with 
their quality of being good traders, they have managed to remain less subdued by the higher 
caste. 
As we have seen from our data analysis that the Newar are the wealthier people of 
Nepal, but characterised by a high inequality of wealth distribution. Given that they are 
historically richer and having good skills in business they maintained their high level of wealth. 
However, the influence of the Hindu religion and its caste system has aggravated the unequal 
distribution of wealth. Furthermore, the families living outside the Kathmandu Valley are 
disadvantaged households in the Newar ethnic groups, which have created a large disparity 
pertaining wealth holdings. 
3.15.3 The Mongoloid ethnic groups and causes of their wealth inequality 
The Mongoloids category is a vast one, for this categorization provides a common 
racial bond for the numerous divergent ethnic groups of Nepal, all of whom trace their origin to 
the north. By now most of the ethnic groups relate to the Hindu religion. These people have had 
very little privilege in the occupation at the administrative level. These people reside in the 
remote Hills and Mountains of Nepal, where development has been very slow and the illiteracy 
rate is very high. 
3.15.3.1 Gurung 
Gurung are primarily to be found in Nepal’s middle Hills and some live on the higher 
slopes of the high Mountains. The majority of their villages are situated on the Mountain slopes 
at elevations between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. The origin of the Gurung is unknown, however, 
they are believed to have come from Tibet to settle in Nepal. Most of the Gurung are farmers. 
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Despite the fact that they are hard workers, most of them are very poor. Their main food sources 
are millet, maize, and some rice. In the northern part, the Gurung raise sheep and goats. Wool is 
used to make woven crafts, which are sold in tourist markets. The Gurung live in villages built 
high on the ridges. They are predominantly animists (they believe that non-human objects have 
spirits), and have been strongly influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism. Some families are in 
good positions in the Gorkha regiment in England and these families have high earnings and 
savings; while the rest of the families are very poor. The Gorkha soldiers have increased the 
mean wealth of Gurung, but the major part of the families is poor. This has resulted in the 
extreme inequality in wealth distribution. 
3.15.3.2 Rai 
Although the Rai are scattered all over Nepal, they are particularly concentrated in the 
eastern part of Nepal. They are primarily rice farmers, but the men do have a tradition of 
migrating to the cities in search of work. As farmers, they have been limited by insufficient 
knowledge of technology, causing a poor yield in crops. Farmers trade any surplus crops that 
they may have for needed items such as kerosene and salt. They supplement these needs they set 
up with incomes through craftwork, tailoring etc. Collectively, Rai are known as very 
courageous, daring, and fearless people. In recent history, they have won worldwide reputation 
for their bravery as Gurkhas in the Royal Nepalese Army. This means that they are considered to 
be among the finest soldiers in the world. Rai groups live in one or two-storied wooden or stone 
houses with thatched roofs. The majority of them are Hindu, but there are a number of 
Buddhists. As the Gurung, Rai also have engaged in British army who have fuelled to grow the 
mean wealth of their ethnic group but major part of the Rai families is poor. This has led to 
highly unequal distribution of wealth within this group. 
3.15.3.3 The Magar 
The Magar are one of the oldest known tribes in Nepal, has unclear origin. They are 
believed to be of Tibetan descent because their language and dances are similar to those within 
the Tibetan culture. Some of the Magar live in the plains where the Himalayan Hills begin. 
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Others occupy the lower Hills of the Mahabharat Lekh. A few inhabit the high altitude Mountain 
areas. They are found in both Eastern and Western parts of Nepal. Most of the Magar are 
artisans, although some who own their own land have become farmers. Ninety percent of the 
Magar practice ethnic religions, while about ten percent are practising Hindu52. The Magar 
families got a high prize (Birta) in the form of land from king Prithvi Narayan Shah and his 
descendents who fought for him to reunify the present Nepal. Furthermore, some families are in 
good positions in the Gorkha regiment in India and England and these families have high 
earnings and savings, while the rest of the families are poor. This is one of the reasons for which 
the distribution of wealth among the Magar families is more unequal. 
3.15.3.4 The Limbu 
The Limbu are also one of the largest tribal groups in Nepal. They live mainly in 
eastern Nepal. Tibeto Burman language is spoken. Agriculture is the main source of income for 
them but the landholding is well below average for this ethnic group. Economic hardship among 
the Limbu has made it worthwhile for many of the men to join the army, both in Nepal and in 
India. This earns them a degree of respect, especially for those who have earned a high rank. The 
Limbu are predominantly Buddhists, but participate in many popular Hindu festivals. They are 
poor in terms of land, but their employment is concentrated in agriculture, which has resulted in 
them being poor ethnic group of Nepal. As a consequence their wealth distribution is the most 
egalitarian in Nepal. 
3.15.3.5 The Tharu of Nepal 
The Tharu are clearly Mongoloid in their facial features. They live on the edge of the 
forests, farming and raising livestock on the plains. Traditional Tharu homes are usually single-
storied structures with straw roofs, their sizes depending upon the size of each family. They are 
traditionally animistic in their beliefs, worshipping various animals such as monkeys, snakes, 
and cows. Today these beliefs are overlaid with Hinduism. They are farmers and cattle breeders. 
                                                 
52 However, in NLSS (1996) they all are considered as Hindu families. 
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With a population of 1.19 million (6.5 per cent of the national population), the Tharu are one of 
the country’s largest ethnic groups. They are indigenous to the Terai region from east to west 
and are particularly numerous in the West and Farwestern regions, which are the poorest regions 
of Nepal (see the section on the development regions of Nepal). 
Until the 1950's, the Tharu endowed the lands and forest offered by nature in the Terai 
region because this region was neglected due to the risk of malarial. After the eradication of 
malaria, a new frontier was opened up for settlers from the Hills thereby paving the way for the 
marginalisation of the Tharu people. The new settlers would just take position of the cultivated 
land, for which the Tharu did not have legal ownership papers in their own names. The high 
castes settlers took advantage of the Tharu’s illiteracy. The Tharu gradually became landless and 
they were forced either to migrate or to work for the new landowners. The landowners did not 
give fair wages and the Tharu were forced to take loans from the high caste people and it 
continued to accumulate ultimately pushing them to the status of bonded labourers (Kamaiya see 
rural and urban wealth distribution). They were never able to pay back their debts to the 
landlords and for generations they worked for them in order to pay back interest on the loans. 
They were exploited economically and socially; thus they are poor in both income and wealth. 
These are the reasons why these families have a low level of wealth that has led to the lowest 
level of inequality in wealth distribution. 
3.15.3.6 Muslim 
Muslim households are relatively small in Nepal. Many Muslim refugees settled in 
Nepal after the Indo-Pakistan war that gave birth to Bangladesh. Most of the Muslim 
communities are found in western Terai. In rural areas most of the Muslims are farmers. In urban 
areas, they are mostly traders, shopkeepers, vegetable and fruit sellers, cobblers, tailors etc. We 
refer to the section on wealth distribution of religion households to understand their wealth and 
the causes of wealth inequality because the same Muslim ethnic group also refers to the Muslim 
religion in the sample, and hence, the results are the same for wealth distribution. 
 187
3.16 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the structure of household wealth and its inequality for 
Nepal on the basis of the household survey NLSS 1996. We extrapolated all possible 
information on the wealth of Nepalese families from the NLSS survey data. The main findings 
may be summarised as follows: 
 
• Wealth inequality is higher compared to most of industrial countries. 
• Wealth distribution of rural household is more egalitarian than wealth distribution of urban 
household. 
• When the Nepalese households are classified according to the development regions, we find 
that the family wealth of the Far-western region is more equally distributed than the family 
wealth of the other regions for both 1995 and 1996. 
• When the Nepalese households are classified by ecological regions of the country, we find 
that the household wealth of the Mountain region is more equally distributed than the 
household wealth of other regions. 
• When the Nepalese families are classified by the ethnic groups, we find that wealth of 
Limbu, Muslim, Yadav/Ahir, the lower castes families more equally distributed. 
• When the Nepalese families are classified by religion, then Muslim family wealth seems to 







We found that the distribution of wealth in Nepal is extremely unequal compared with 
the industrial countries. Of course, wealth distribution is not directly comparable because of the 
different compositions of wealth, different methods of valuation, different unit values, different 
periods etc. For example, the financial wealth in industrial countries captures a higher proportion 
of wealth (Wolff, 199853) while the values of dwellings and landholdings represent the main part 
of net wealth in Nepal. The inequality of Nepalese family wealth is to a large extent driven by 
the unequal distribution of land. Furthermore, social values and norms, as well as historical 
factors, have played an important role. 
                                                 




Decomposition of Income, Expenditure and 
Wealth Inequality by Population Class and 
Sources in Nepal 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter two we analysed the inequality of income distribution in Nepal and 
compared it to its neighbouring countries (SAARC). In chapter three we analysed the inequality 
of wealth distribution in Nepal. To better understand income or wealth or expenditure 
distribution in Nepal it is also necessary to assess the levels of inequality for different factor 
components and population subgroups, as this will help to identify those factors that are better or 
worse distributed. It will also help pinpoint those groups of the population that have played an 
important role in creating an unequal distribution of wealth, income, and expenditure. 
Herefore, in this chapter we analyse the decomposition of income (consumption) 
inequality for two periods (1996 and 2001) and of wealth inequality for 1996. The result should 
provide a comprehensive overview of income, expenditure, and wealth through time, across the 
regions of the country, and among the various ethnic groups of Nepal. We also analyse the 
decomposition of income and wealth by the sources of income and wealth for Nepalese families 
and individuals. First, we attempt to quantify the degree of inequality in the distribution of 
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income, expenditure, and wealth of all Nepalese ethnic groups and religion groups by examining 
the distributional issue as it applies to all the major ethnic groups in Nepal. Similarly, we attempt 
to quantify the degree of inequality in the distribution of wealth, income, and expenditure over 
the regional population of Nepal. Only in recent years have researchers been able to gain access 
to the micro-data sets of the Household Economic Surveys conducted by Statistics Office of 
Nepal. This access has enabled sophisticated methodologies to be applied to Nepalese data. The 
findings of the studies using such data are reliable, and of greater use to policymakers. 
Our study covers two periods, 1996 and 2001, using relevant data from two household 
surveys.  Extensive reform of the Nepalese economic policies took place during this period the 
broad object of which was to create conditions leading to more rapid growth with stable prices, 
so that the living standards of Nepalese could improve on a sustained basis. The details of the 
reforms are not the subject matter of this chapter, but interested readers may refer to chapter one 
for overview. A major aim of this chapter is to estimate the distributional issue concerning the 
way in which the national income, wealth, and consumption are spread out across groups in 
society. It is not only an aspect concerning the ethnic dimensions, since we shall also examine 
the regional dimensions of income, wealth, and expenditure distributions. The decomposition of 
inequality can be done in two ways: by population subgroups and by sources of income and 
wealth of the families or individuals. 
The first one deals with the influence of population subgroups such as those defined by 
age, sex, race etc to total inequality. We disaggregate the Nepalese population in this study by 
geographical regions54, by development regions55, by rural and urban families/individuals, by 
religions56 and by ethnicity or castes57. The latter deals with different sources of income and 
                                                 
54 Families/individuals are grouped by three ecological regions of Nepal: Hill, Mountain, and Terai. 
55 Development regions of Nepal are Central, Eastern, Western, Midwestern and Farwestern. 
56 Nepalese families are disaggregated by four religions: Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim and Others. 
57 The NLSS has recognised 15 groups: Bramin, Chetri, Damai, Gurung, Kami, Limbu, Magar, Muslim, 
Newar, Rai, Sarki, Tamang, Tharu, Yadav/Ahir and others (see Chapter 3 for the detail information on 
these groups). 
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wealth in total income and wealth. The impact of these sources or components on the total 
income or expenditures will be examined in this study. We disaggregate the total income of 
Nepalese households and individuals into seven sources58. Similarly we disaggregate the total 
wealth into nine sources and we finally evaluate the contribution of each component to the total 
inequality. 
4.2 Background Information on the NLSS (1996) and HCSRN (2001) Data  
This study is based on two household survey data of Nepal: the Nepal Living Standard 
Survey (NLSS, 1996) and the Household Consumption Survey of Rural Nepal (HCSRN 2001). 
The first sample is based on a national representative household survey, while the latter is based 
only on a survey of the rural area of the country. 
4.2.1 Income and expenditure data for 1996 from NLSS 
We have already discussed the NLSS (1996) in chapter 3 section 3.2 and, therefore, we 
refer readers to Chapter 3 for further details. Nor do we discuss data on wealth because it is dealt 
with extensively in the last chapter.  In this chapter we are interested solely in the decomposition 
of income, wealth and expenditure on consumption of goods and services. To do so, we examine 
total expenditure on consumption for various goods and services reported in the NLSS (1996) 
and total income from various sources. The total expenditure of Nepalese households is defined 
as the expenses in the last 12 months on consumption goods and services. The goods and 
services consumed by households are converted to Rupees (Nepalese currency), expressed 
annually. We have disaggregated total household expenditure into three different components of 
consumption goods and services. They are: 
 
                                                 
58 They are wage and salary, farm income, income from business, pension, remittance, income from home 
product, and others. 
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(i) Expenditure on food items: it is the sum of expenses on the various types of food consumed 
during the past 12 months (excluding tobacco and its products). The total amount also includes 
the values of the estimated home produced food and food received in kind (as salary or gift). The 
values of purchased food, home-produced food together with food received in-kind59 are 
aggregated to obtain the total value of food expenditure. 
 
(ii) Expenditure on non-food: The non-food items are expenses incurred on direct taxes, gifts and 
contributions, insurance premiums, remittances sent and expenditure on social ceremonies (such 
as  births, wedding, etc.) and litigation expenses. The values of other non-food items purchased 
or received in-kind by the household over the past 12 months are summed to derive the total 
expenditure on non-food. The data for non-food expenditure include frequent non-food, 
infrequent non-food and the non-food home production. The yearly depreciation of durable 
goods is used as a flow of expenditure and is included in the non-food expenditure. 
 
(iii) Expenditure on housing and services: This category of expenditure summarises the money 
spent on consumption of housing services, which is in turn based on data for the rental values of 
dwellings. Expenditure on utilities and amenities60 are also included. In cases of owner occupied 
dwellings, consumption of housing was taken to be the annual rent that they would have had to 
pay for their dwelling. 
                                                 
59 The food items include grains and cereals, pulses and lentils, egg and milk products, cooking oil, 
vegetables, fruits and nuts, fish and meat, spices and condiments, sweets and confectionery. Non-
alcoholic beverages, alcoholic beverages and miscellaneous food products that the households reported 
having consumed in the past 12 months were also collected (HCSRN reported). 
60 Under utilities and amenities data are collected on the household's expenditures on drinking water, 
garbage disposal, lighting, etc. The information on fuel for cooking, source of firewood and access to and 
expenses on the facilities were gathered. 
 193
Table 4.1 The average household expenditure on various components of consumption  
 of goods and services for 1996 (in Nepalese currency) 
Sample partitioned by Food expenditure 
Non food 
expenditure Housing utility Total 
All Nepal 25,140 14,211  9,702   49,053   
Rural 22,495 9,131  3,206   34,832   
Urban 34,955 33,062  33,808   101,825   
Development regions            
Central 28,619 19,054  16,389   64,062   
Eastern 24,517 12,162  3,517   40,196   
Farwestern 19,904 7,613  4,572   32,089   
Midwestern 18,287 7,300  3,663   29,250   
Western 25,400 14,028  9,044   48,472   
Ecological regions            
Hill 27,946 18,777  15,721   62,444   
Mountain 22,571 8,315  2,853   33,739   
Terai 22,008 9,689  3,435   35,131   
Religion groups            
Buddhist 30,049 21,144  20,872   72,065   
Hindu 24,810 13,748  9,035   47,593   
Muslim 20,553 9,465  3,149   33,166   
Others 30,171 15,996  4,042   50,208   
Ethnic groups            
Bramin 28,886 17,355  11,460   57,701   
Chetri  23,691 13,683  7,622   44,996   
Damai 20,445 6,875  3,411   30,731   
Gurung 30,268 21,189  20,283   71,740   
Kami 17,985 5,495  2,815   26,294   
Limbu 33,969 14,000  3,500   51,469   
Magar 22,005 9,027  6,608   37,641   
Muslim 20,701 9,485  3,162   33,347   
Newar 34,942 30,172  32,768   97,882   
Others 20,810 9,938  4,711   35,459   
Rai 25,285 12,635  3,150   41,070   
Sarki 19,856 5,725  2,321   27,902   
Tamang 24,755 12,131  5,966   42,853   
Tharu 22,304 7,881  2,911   33,096   
Yadav/Ahir 23,735 10,196  2,413   36,343   
Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) data 
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4.2.2 Income/expenditure data for 2001 from the HCSRN 
The data are derived from the Household Consumption Survey of Rural Nepal 
(HCSRN) 2001 by the Central Bureau Statistic (CBS). The HCSRN (2001) was undertaken over 
approximately six months and was completed in July 2001. This survey was carried out to 
ascertain the level of well being of the families. The NLSS (1996) covered both the rural and 
urban areas of the country. At the same time the Nepal Rastra Bank (Central Bank of Nepal) 
1995/96 conducted a similar survey in urban areas of the country. The urban areas of Nepal were 
therefore surveyed twice during this short period. This was probably the reason why CBS 
decided to cover only the rural part of the country in the NCSRN. Unfortunately, the urban 
survey has not been made available by NRB for 2001 and, which limits our study on expenditure 
distribution in rural areas of Nepal for this period. The NCSRN (2001) has adopted similar 
methodology for the NLSS (1996) limiting only the income and expenditure information. In 
both data, we use nominal prices as the data are tabulated by the CBS. Given that no price 
adjustment is made for this study, the data analysis may not exactly match the estimation 
reported in the CBS reports for the NLSS (1996) and the HCSRN (2001). 
The HCSRN survey reports in the NLSS that , ‘the price index ... had taken the rural 
Eastern Terai as the base case, i.e., all consumption expenditures were adjusted so as to make the 
purchasing power of one rupee in the respective region comparable to that of one rupee in rural 
East Terai’.   No such price index was constructed in the HCSRN. 
The HCSRN covered all rural areas of the country to create a sample at the national 
level. The survey examined general household  information, such as: expenditure on housing, 
utilities and amenities (ownership, rent, and expenditure on water, electricity, telephone, cooking 
fuel, etc), food expenses and home production, non-food expenditures and income. The survey 
covered a period of 12 months. The year was divided into two parts (seasons) to capture the 
consumer expenditure behaviour (seasonal expenditure patterns). The survey reported   that the 
consumption pattern is quite different in these two periods of the year. In the summer season, for 
example, there are fewer festivals and most of the people are busy in their agricultural activities. 
The autumn season, on the other hand, contains significant cultural festivals   like Dashain and 
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Tihar. The Autumn season, is more likely to record higher consumption expenditures on both 
food and non-food items as a result. 
We have grouped the expenditure data into three main components of household 
expenses for our aim as in the NLSS data: (i) expenditure on food items, (ii) expenditure on non-
food items and (iii) expenditure on housing. These three components are aggregated to estimate 
a measure of total annual household consumption. We have reported the household expenditure 
for the HCSRN and the NLSS in Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2 Comparison of rural household expenditure on various components of  
 consumption of goods and services between 1996 and 2001 (mean in NC) 
Sample partitioned by Food expenditure Non food expenditure Housing utility Total 
Year 1996 (only rural Nepal)     
Development regions     
Central 24,087 8,849 3,816 36,752 
Eastern 24,934 11,836 3,250 40,020 
Farwestern 17,975 6,297 3,498 27,770 
Midwestern 17,714 6,276 2,329 26,319 
Western 22,809 9,714 2,619 35,142 
Ecological regions     
Hill 23,368 9,306 3,561 36,235 
Mountain 22,571 8,315 2,853 33,739 
Terai 21,574 9,252 2,974 33,800 
Year 2001 (only rural Nepal)     
Development regions     
Central 38,831 20,089 4,853 63,773 
Eastern 45,122 24,902 3,526 73,550 
Farwestern 29,350 14,898 3,129 47,377 
Midwestern 41,798 14,204 3,332 59,334 
Western 40,813 23,086 5,518 69,417 
Ecological regions     
Hill 39,152 18,724 4,738 62,614 
Mountain 42,846 16,011 3,906 62,763 
Terai 41,095 23,734  4,007 68,836 
Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) and HCSRN (2001) data 
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The differences observed in household expenditure between these two surveys may be 
explained by price inflation over the 5-year period (only nominal values are reported in the 
Table). The results suggest that the nominal expenditure has increased between these two 
periods for families of all regions. The nominal consumption per household in rural Nepal has 
almost doubled over the past five years. Consumption expenditures on food-items absorbed the 
largest portion of the total consumption. The percentage of food consumption per household 
across the rural development regions ranged from 62 to 67 of total expenditure in 1996. The 
food consumption slightly decreased in four regions, while in the Midwestern region it increased 
by 3 percent between 1996 and 2001. In the rural ecological belts, the mean family consumption 
doubled in nominal terms in 2001 compared with 1996. The proportion of food expenses to the 
total expenditure remained almost constant except for the Terai region (see Table 4.3). An 
interesting result is to be found in comparing the three geographical belts of the country; the 
rural Hill region registered the highest consumption, while the Terai the lowest for the 1996. 
Similarly, the mountain region registered the highest mean consumption expenditure in 2001. 
This is mainly because of the high population concentration in the Terai and of the price factor 
in the Hill and Mountain regions. 
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Table 4.3 Percentage per capita household consumption on rural NLSS and rural HCSRN 
 by the development regions and ecological belts (in %) 
  Food Non food Housing Total 
Year 1996 (only rural Nepal)         
Development regions         
Central 66 24 10   100 
Eastern 62 29 8   100 
Farwestern 65 23 12   100 
Midwestern 67 24 8   100 
Western 65 27 7   100 
Ecological regions         
Hill 64 26 10   100 
Mountain 67 25 8   100 
Terai 64 27 9   100 
Year 2001 (only rural Nepal)         
Development regions         
Central 61 31 8   100 
Eastern 61 34 5   100 
Farwestern 62 31 7   100 
Midwestern 70 24 6   100 
Western 59 33 8   100 
Ecological regions         
Hill 62 30 8   100 
Mountain 68 26 6   100 
Terai 60 34 6   100 
Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) and HCSRN (2001) data 
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4.3 A Review of Income and Consumption Inequality in Nepal 
In chapter two we have found that income inequality in Nepal has worsened between 
1984/5 and 1996. In this section we focus on the statistical measures of inequality of household 
income and expenditure for individual regions, individual ethnic groups and caste groups, 
religion groups, etc. The Gini index, two Atkinson’s indexes and two Theil indexes are used to 
measure the level of inequality. These indexes are already described in chapter two. The 
inequality indexes are calculated for each segment depending on the disaggregation criteria. 
We begin with the statistical measures of regional disparity, as well as various 
caste/ethnic groups and religion groups of income and expenditure distribution for 1996 and 
2001 (rural). The results for 1996 reported on Table 4.4 show that all inequality indexes are 
greater for the distribution of income than for the distribution of consumption. The inequality 
measurements follow the same pattern for each of the disaggregated population sub groups; i.e. 
income distribution is more unequal than consumption distribution.  
This result is not surprising and is to be found in most studies of this kind, simply 
because, in its simplest form C=C*+cY, where C* is positive and 0<c<1. In other terms there is 
a lower limit for consumption; moreover consumption in general, increases less than 
proportionately as income rises.61 
The inequality is greater in urban area than in rural areas for both income and 
expenditure distributions. For example the urban Gini indexes for income and expenditure 
distribution are higher by 4% and 7% points than rural Gini index respectively. The household 
mean income and consumption both are around three times greater for the urban region than for 
the rural region. It seems that as the level of household income and consumption increases, the 
inequality also rises in rural and urban areas (see the results in Table 4.5). 
                                                 




When we analyse the inequality in the development regions of Nepal, we find that the 
Farwestern region has recorded the highest levels of inequality in income distribution, followed 
by the Central, Western, Eastern, and Midwestern regions. Inequality of household expenditure 
is higher in the Central region followed by the Western, Farwestern, Midwestern, and Eastern 
regions. Inequality of income distribution in the Farwestern region is extremely high, but the 
level of the household income is relatively low. For example the Gini coefficient recorded 0.58 
point and the mean level of income is only RS 51,636 per year, which is slightly higher 
compared with the Eastern and Midwestern regions. It is one of the poorest regions of Nepal 
because the level of income is low; additionally the level of income inequality is very high. As a 
result, the major part of the families has a low level of income and their expenditure on 
consumption goods is also low. Provided that few rich families save and that many families are 
poor in this region, inequality of consumption is not high. Although the Midwestern families 
have the lowest level of consumption, many families in the Farwestern region are poorer than the 
Midwestern families because the distribution of family consumption is worse in this region. The 
family income and family consumption both in the Central region are almost double compared 
with the families of Midwestern region. 
Households’ income in the Hill and Terai regions is very unequally distributed. The 
Gini coefficient is above 0.50 for both regions. The level of income per household is almost 
double for the Terai region compared with the Mountain region. The disparity of mean income 
between the Hill and Mountain regions is even higher.  
We saw above a higher regional disparity of family income than family consumption, 
similarly in each of the ethnic groups, households’ income inequality is also higher than 
households’ consumption based inequality. The Gini index ranges from 0.32 to 0.63 for income 
distribution; while it ranges from 0.28 to 0.51 for consumption distribution. As we saw in 
chapter three, wealth distribution is more equally distributed in the untouchable ethnic groups62, 
but we have also found that their distribution of income and expenditure to be less concentrated. 
They are not only a lower caste in society, but they are also poor in terms of wealth and their 
                                                 
62 The untouchable castes are Damai, Sarki and Kami. 
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mean income and mean consumption are very low. Similarly the Muslim, Tharu, Yadav/Ahir are 
found to have somewhat equal levels of consumption, and their level of consumption is similarly 
low. Nevertheless, income is relatively highly concentrated in these ethnic groups. Newar, 
Bramin, Chetri, and Gurung seem to have high level of income and they tend to consume 
according to their income level. We also found in the last chapter that their household wealth is 
high; thus they are economically better off than other ethnic groups in Nepal. 
The same results are valid for the religious groups of Nepal with respect to the 
distribution of household income and expenditure. The level of inequality for household income 
is higher than the household consumption based inequality. The Gini coefficient of income 
distribution for the Buddhist families accounts for 0.61; which is the highest score among the 
religion groups. . The mean level of income for the Buddhist families tends to be high but this 
disparity does not seem so high between the families of various religion groups. We will 
examine in next section whether this is really true by analysing the inequality decomposition in 
terms of population sub groups. Family consumption is relatively better distributed than family 
income. The level of consumption for the Muslims measured as a religious group exactly 
matches the level of consumption of Muslims measured as an ethnic group. This is because 
Muslim ethnicity corresponds exactly with the Muslim religious group in the sample. Though 
Muslims have a relatively high-income level, they consume less and the inequality of 
consumption is low. The data indicates Muslim families are high savers. 
We have also examined income and consumption distribution in rural Nepal for 1996 
and 2001. The information is available for the HCSRN (2001) in development and ecological 
regions of rural Nepal; therefore, we have disaggregated rural Nepal into two areas: the 
development regions and the ecological regions. We have estimated the inequality and the level 
of income and consumption. Because of the different measurements, income inequality is not 
directly comparable between 2001 and 1996 for rural Nepal. Our analysis therefore focuses on 
household consumption distribution. The inequality of the household expenditure distribution 
has increased between these two periods for all regions. The level of consumption has increased 
in absolute values for the families between 1996 and 2001 but we have not adjusted for inflation 
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between these two periods so the quantity is not directly comparable. However, the distribution 
in all ecological regions and development regions has worsened. 
4.4 The Decomposition of Inequality by Population Subgroups 
So far we have examined the differences in household expenditure between the 
population subgroups (section 4.3). We have found that particular social, demographic, and 
regional characteristics may explain part of the inequality at an average level of expenditure as 
well as in the structure of household expenditure. We have also compared the inequality among 
different population subgroups by using the Gini, Theil and Atkinson indexes. This does not say 
much about the extent to which inequality contributes to overall inequality. From a policy point 
of view, it is interesting to note that overall inequality is attributable to inequality between 
population subgroups as well as to the inequality within them. To investigate these issues we use 
the methods of inequality decomposition by population subgroups. A number of authors have 
extensively presented the methods of decomposition of inequality by population subgroups63. 
For our analysis we use three indexes, i.e., the Gini index and two Theil indexes. We have 
chosen a decomposition methodology for the Gini index proposed by Yao (1999) and the two 
Theil indexes by Shorrocks (1980). 
4.4.1 Decomposition of the Gini coefficient 
The Gini coefficient may be decomposed into three components if the population is 
divided into a finite number of classes. For example, the population can be divided into rural and 
urban sub-groups. Of course, a population can be divided into as many classes as possible by any 
other social or geographical or economic criteria. Even each sub-population can be divided into 
a number of smaller population classes by household characteristics. 
                                                 
63 See Rao (1969), Pyatt (1976) Bourguignon (1979), Cowell (1980), Shorrocks (1980 and 1984), and 
Yao (1999). 
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4.4.2 The models for the Gini decomposition 
Let G be the Gini coefficient for the entire population taken into consideration. It can 
be decomposed into three components – within class or group, between class or group and 
overlapped as shown in the following equation. 
 




within g g g
g
G p y G
=
= ∑  (4.2) 
There are three components on the right hand side of the equation 4.1. The term Gini 
within (Gwithin) is the weighted sum of within population group – Gini coefficient for the gth 
group is Gg and the weight is given by the product of the population share in total population 
denoted by pg and income share in total income denoted by yg for the gth group. 
pg = Pg/P < 1, where Pg is the number of population in gth group and P is the overall 
population.  
yg = Yg/Y < 1, where Yg is income of gth group and Y is the overall income. 
Since pg and yg both are less than 1, their product will be smaller; thus the weights 
assigned to Gg will be small. The inequality between groups is shown in the equation below. 
( )
1 1
2      with  
K K
between g g g g g
g g
G P Q y Q y
= =
= − =∑ ∑  (4.3) 
K denotes the number of population subgroups, pg, and yg are respectively the 
population share in total population and income share in total income for the gth term 
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(g=1,2,...,K). The explanation for equation 4.3 is akin to that of the equation to derive the Gini 
(see appendix 2A). The only difference here is the definitions of Pg and Yg. To derive Gbetween all 
the elements in the equation 4.3 must be sorted in ascending order of group mean incomes μg, 
such as μ1 < μ2 < ....< μK. 
The third component is the overlapped component, which is a residual. The value of 
the overlapped component is zero if the poorest person of the richer group has higher income 
than the richest person of the poorer group. In other words Goverlapped is a component of G when 
the richest person in any low-income group is not better off than the poorest person in richest 
group; then the overlapped value is zero. 
   overlapped within betweenG G G G= − −  (4.4) 
4.4.3 The decomposition of the Theil indexes 
The Theil index is additively decomposable because it can also be written as a 
weighted sum of the group inequality indices plus a between-group inequality term based on 
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  (4.5) 
where pg is the ratio of the population sub-group to total population; and mg is the ratio of the 
mean income of the population sub-group to mean aggregate income. 
The derivation of equation 4.5 is presented in appendix 4A at the end of this chapter. 
Equation 4.5 indicates that, apart from the value of inequality within sub-groups Tg, inequality 
depends on the mean income levels and population sizes. The generalised entropy family, 
particularly the Theil index T, satisfies the axioms of symmetry, population replication 
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(population homogeneity, replication invariance), mean independence (invariance to relative 
changes, scale invariance, homogeneity), the Dalton-Pigou principle of transfers (strong 
principle of transfers) and additive decomposability. The last property implies that an overall 
inequality measure may be additively decomposed into its subgroups' distinct inequality 
measures as it has been shown in equation 4.5 above. 
Indices other than those belonging to the Theil family do not satisfy what Cowell 
(1998) labels the ‘accountant’s approach’ to decomposition, meaning that the weighted within-
group inequality term together with the "between-group" inequality term add to unity; a very 
useful property in our context. 
Instead of calculating the T1 index, an alternative would be to calculate the T0 index, 
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  (4.6) 
The derivation of equation 4.6 is given in appendix 4A. 
4.5 Main Finding of the Decomposition by Population Subgroups 
4.5.1 The decomposition analysis for the inequality of expenditure, income and wealth in 
1996 
We have analysed the inequality decomposition for 1996 by disaggregating the 
Nepalese population by five methods. We disaggregate the total population by (i) development 
regions of the country, (ii) ecological regions of the country, (iii) urban and rural population, (iv) 
ethnic population groups and (v) religion groups for this study. T0, T1 and the Gini coefficients 
are used to analyse the decomposition of inequality; but the difficulties relative to the 
interpretation of the overlapped or residual component of the Gini coefficient is irreparable. We 
cannot give any meaningful economic sense for this component. Therefore we focus our 
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interpretation of the decomposition results only on T0 and T1, which do not produce the 
overlapped component. 
We begin with decomposition of family expenditure for 1996. We also analyse the per 
capita expenditure as it stands better measure and understands the well-being of the people 
rather than household expenditure. This is because the size of household expenditure behaviour 
depends also on the number of people resides. Saying a family is better off than another on the 
basis of high expenditure may be erroneous, because the families may differ in their size and 
composition. In fact, large families consume more than small families. Thus although the small 
family is better off than the large one, the total expenditure may be less than that of the large 
family. Therefore we cannot compare two families directly without considering the number of 
people living in them. The comparisons of our result will be primarily based on the inequality 
calculated from per capita expenditure. The results are shown in Table 4.5 for the inequality 
decomposition of expenditure. 
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Table 4.4 The inequality decomposition of consumption  
Theil Index  (1) Theil Index  (0) Gini Index Decomposed by 
(R. = Regions) Total Within Between Total Within Between Within Between Residual Total
 Household based consumption 
Development R. 0.401 0.363 0.038 0.357 0.317 0.040 0.149 0.125 0.171 0.445
 100 90.60 9.40 100 88.92 11.08 33.45 28.12 38.43 100
Ecological R. 0.401 0.361 0.041 0.357 0.315 0.042 0.140 0.197 0.108 0.445
 100 89.89 10.11 100 88.23 11.77 31.44 44.18 24.39 100
Ethnic groups 0.401 0.329 0.072 0.357 0.289 0.067 0.200 0.050 0.191 0.441
 100 81.96 18.04 100 81.15 18.85 45.29 11.42 43.29 100
Religion groups 0.401 0.391 0.010 0.357 0.347 0.010 0.048 0.327 0.070 0.445
 100 97.41 2.59 100 97.26 2.74 10.70 73.54 15.76 100
Urban rural 0.401 0.271 0.130 0.357 0.242 0.115 0.229 0.193 0.022 0.445
 100 67.51 32.49 100 67.85 32.15 51.50 43.45 5.05 100
 Per capita based consumption 
Development R. 0.416 0.364 0.052 0.355 0.298 0.057 0.173 0.127 0.149 0.449
 100 87.46 12.54 100 83.96 16.04 38.47 28.35 33.17 100
Ecological R. 0.416 0.358 0.058 0.355 0.294 0.061 0.169 0.196 0.083 0.449
 100 86.03 13.97 100 82.76 17.24 37.72 43.70 18.58 100
Ethnic groups 0.416 0.333 0.083 0.355 0.275 0.080 0.220 0.050 0.176 0.447
 100 80.06 19.94 100 77.56 22.44 49.35 11.30 39.36 100
Religion groups 0.416 0.399 0.018 0.355 0.338 0.017 0.063 0.327 0.060 0.450
 100 95.73 4.27 100 95.14 4.86 13.99 72.70 13.31 100
Urban rural 0.416 0.261 0.155 0.355 0.219 0.136 0.252 0.182 0.016 0.449
  100 62.70 37.30 100 61.61 38.39 56.01 40.43 3.56 100
Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) data 
The results are interesting. The within groups index dominates the between group on 
whichever partition criteria is used for T0 and T1. The within group index for household 
distribution is slightly higher than per capita distribution in terms of size inequality. The 
between inequality term ranges from 3 percent to 32 percent of total expenditure inequality 
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relative to the undertaken partitions in this study. The results do not vary for either T(0) and 
T(1). It ranges from 5 percent to 38 percent of total inequality when we use the per capita 
expenditure. Thus the between term does not exceed more than two fifths of the aggregate 
inequality. When the households/individuals are partitioned by religion groups, inequality 
between them is very low. The results are consistent for both measures T0 and T1. The between 
term for the decomposition of urban and rural expenditure explains a high value as we expect 
since the urban expenditure are almost three times higher. The between inequality for the 
religious groups has very small weight. Considering the level of mean expenditure for four 
religion groups, we note that the differences are very high. For example the Muslims are the 
poorest among the religion groups and have a low level of expenditure. Buddhist families’ 
expenditure is twice higher than Muslim families. From the standpoints of mean differences the 
between term should have accounted for a high inequality. The mean of each group assigns a 
weight to population proportion in order to calculate the between term. Given that Hindu 
population covers 87 percent of the sample, the value of between inequalities is highly 
influenced by their large population share. This is the reason why the between term for religion 
groups is very small. 
The results of the inequality decomposition for development regions, ecological belts 
and ethnic groups are very interesting. The between inequality term accounts for 11 percent and 
12 percent in the aggregate inequality for development regions and ecological belts respectively, 
when we use the household expenditure. It is even higher for the individual expenditure.  
The distributional issue in the Nepalese ethnic/caste groups has a very important 
aspect. We saw in the last chapter that some of the ethnic groups (especially lower castes) are 
among the least fortunate people of Nepal. This is because they are not only lower by caste but 
also by wealth holdings; although it may be argued that the two elements are inter-linked. 
Furthermore, their expenditures on consumption (food, non-food, housing etc) are very low. The 
decomposition analysis however reveals a very original and exciting result concerning the 
inequality of ethnic and caste groups of Nepal. The between term explains around 18-19 percent 
of total inequality for household expenditure. It explains more than 22 percent of it when we use 
 209
per capita expenditure data for T0. This inequality is due to the higher difference of the mean 
consumption between these groups. 
In Chapter Three, we examined the inequality of wealth distribution for all possible 
disaggregations of the Nepalese family. Here we further examine it by decomposing wealth 
inequality. Table 4.6 displays the results, which reveal that particular regional characteristics, 
religion and ethnicity may in particular, explain part of the differences and inequalities in wealth 
holdings. 
Table 4.5 The inequality decomposition of wealth by population subgroups for Nepal (1996) 
  Theil Index(0) Theil Index(1) 
1995 Within Between Total  Within Between Total  
Development regions 1.57 0.17 1.74 1.26 0.15 1.41 
  90.47 9.53 100.00 89.55 10.45 100.00 
Ecological regions 1.57 0.17 1.74 1.27 0.14 1.41 
  90.24 9.76 100.00 89.85 10.15 100.00 
Urban rural Nepal 1.45 0.29 1.74 1.08 0.33 1.41 
  83.13 16.87 100.00 76.52 23.48 100.00 
Religion 1.71 0.03 1.74 1.38 0.03 1.41 
  98.11 1.89 100.00 97.76 2.24 100.00 
Caste/Ethnicity 1.51 0.23 1.74 1.19 0.22 1.41 
  86.59 13.41 100.00 84.48 15.52 100.00 
1996 Within Between Total Within Between Total 
Development regions 1.44 0.16 1.60 1.23 0.14 1.38 
  89.86 10.14 100.00 89.51 10.49 100.00 
Ecological regions 1.42 0.17 1.60 1.23 0.15 1.38 
  89.09 10.91 100.00 89.25 10.75 100.00 
Urban rural Nepal 1.30 0.30 1.60 1.04 0.34 1.38 
  81.41 18.59 100.00 75.63 24.37 100.00 
Religion 1.57 0.03 1.60 1.35 0.03 1.38 
  98.01 1.99 100.00 97.80 2.20 100.00 
Caste/Ethnicity 1.36 0.24 1.60 1.15 0.22 1.38 
  85.27 14.73 100.00 83.87 16.13 100.00 
Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) data 
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Although we compared the inequality in wealth distribution between the population 
subgroups in chapter three, we could not say how much of each groups’ inequality contributes to 
overall inequality of wealth. This issue will be investigated in this section. Table 4.6 shows that 
the 'between inequality' term contributes only a small to wealth distribution as compared to the 
within term.  
We have analysed the decomposition of wealth inequality for 1995 and 1996. the 
between component consists of around 2 percent in total inequality when we decompose the 
population by religion. For other decomposition method, this component varies from 9.53 
percent to around 17 percent of the Theil index (0) and it varies from 10 percent to 23.48 percent 
of the Theil index (1). Thus the Theil index (1) records higher percentage of between inequality 
term than the Theil index (0). The total inequality has decreased in 1996 compared with previous 
year. The reduction of inequality is solely due to within term. The between term remained 
almost constant and hence its percentage share in total inequality has increased. The absolute 
values of wealth inequality vary for T(1) and T(0), the relative values (the percentage) of wealth 
inequality are consistent for all decomposition methods. As in the analysis of expenditure, we 
find that the between term is higher for the ethnic decomposition as well as the urban/rural 
decomposition. The between inequality term for the development and ecological regions is 
relatively high. The between inequality term accounts for around 2 percent when population is 
decomposed by religion. This suggests that wealth inequality can be reduced among the religion 
groups only by reducing inequality in each group. 
We have also examined the decomposition of income inequality and we provide the 









Table 4.6 The inequality decomposition of income by population subgroups for Nepal (1996) 
  Theil Index  (1) Theil Index  (0) Gini Index 
Decomposed by Total Within Between Total Within Between Within Between Residual Total
 Household based income 
Development R. 0.812 0.783 0.029 0.670 0.640 0.029 0.129 0.151 0.268 0.548
 100 96.42 3.58 100 95.63 4.37 23.58 27.60 48.82 100
Ecological R. 0.812 0.786 0.026 0.670 0.639 0.030 0.102 0.242 0.204 0.548
 100 96.80 3.20 100 95.48 4.52 18.67 44.15 37.18 100
Ethnic groups 0.812 0.737 0.074 0.670 0.597 0.073 0.201 0.066 0.278 0.545
 100 90.83 9.17 100 89.16 10.84 36.94 12.06 51.00 100
Religion groups 0.812 0.805 0.006 0.670 0.664 0.006 0.036 0.408 0.104 0.549
 100 99.20 0.80 100 99.09 0.91 6.61 74.45 18.94 100
Urban rural 0.812 0.690 0.121 0.670 0.563 0.107 0.221 0.266 0.061 0.548
 100 85.04 14.96 100 84.02 15.98 40.30 48.53 11.16 100
 Per capita based income 
Development R. 0.820 0.783 0.037 0.645 0.606 0.038 0.146 0.152 0.250 0.548
 100 95.52 4.48 100 94.04 5.96 26.69 27.69 45.63 100
Ecological R. 0.820 0.781 0.038 0.645 0.602 0.043 0.135 0.244 0.168 0.548
 100 95.33 4.67 100 93.39 6.61 24.71 44.57 30.72 100
Ethnic groups 0.820 0.737 0.082 0.645 0.563 0.082 0.217 0.065 0.263 0.545
 100 89.95 10.05 100 87.33 12.67 39.88 11.94 48.18 100
Religion groups 0.820 0.804 0.015 0.645 0.630 0.015 0.060 0.399 0.089 0.548
 100 98.12 1.88 100 97.72 2.28 10.89 72.83 16.29 100
Urban rural 0.820 0.678 0.141 0.645 0.520 0.124 0.240 0.254 0.054 0.548
 100 82.74 17.26 100 80.72 19.28 43.72 46.44 9.83 100
Development R. 1.342 1.200 0.142 1.359 1.199 0.159 0.280 0.226 0.220 0.727
  100 89.42 10.58 100 88.26 11.74 38.56 31.16 30.29 100
Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) data 
The results of income inequality decomposition show that the bulk of inequality is due 
to the differences within the population groups rather than to disparities among groups. The 
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exceptions to this pattern emerge when population is grouped according to ethnicity as well as 
rural and urban residences. Around 10 percent of the aggregate inequality is accounted by the 
between term when the population is disaggregated by the ethnicity of the country. Similarly 
around 15 percent of the aggregate inequality is accounted by this term for T(1) index when we 
use urban and rural population. It is higher by 2 percent points for per capita based inequality. 
Thus we saw above that the within and between inequality of income, wealth and 
consumption distributions follow the same pattern according to the decomposition method of the 
Nepalese population, i.e., the between inequality index for ethnic groups decomposition and 
urban rural decomposition is remarkably high; while the decomposition by religion is almost 
insignificant. From the policy perspective it is important to know the inequality within and 
between components. For example, the between component of the inequality index of 10 percent 
for the decomposition of the development region suggests that any regional policy can reduce 
the inequality up to 10 percent maximum of the aggregate inequality. In other words if the 
regional inequality is eliminated by equalising the mean income for all regions, overall income 
inequality will be reduced by 10 percent. If the between inequality is zero, any policy not 
targeted at reducing inequality within each region would not be effective. If the policy 
perspective were concerned at reducing the inequality of Nepal, the distribution over ethnic 
groups would be the most interesting target. A sustainable policy to upgrade the least fortunate 
ethnic groups of the country would be an important instrument for reducing overall inequality in 
the country. 
4.5.2 The decomposition analysis of the inequality for rural Nepal 1996 and 2001 
Table 4.8 shows the results of the inequality decomposition of rural Nepal. We have 
analysed the inequality by two types of data: household and individual. In Table 4.8 “rural 
households” indicate the decomposition based on household data; and “individual” is for the 
decomposition based on per capita data. The household-based analysis shows an increase in 
inequality between 1996 and 2001; while the per capita based shows a decrease in inequality 
between these two periods. The decomposition of inequality for rural Nepal shows that only a 
small part of overall inequality is attributable to inequality between regions. The overall 
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inequality has decreased between 1996 and 2001 for the rural Nepal by 1.73 basis point (b.p.64) 
for T0 and 0.93 b.p. for T1 (see Table 4.8). When we decomposed the inequality by development 
regions, the within components were 0.17 and 0.19 respectively for T0 and T1. The total decrease 
for T0 comes from the reduction of within component by 1.02 b.p. and of between component by 
0.71 b.p. Although it seems that the larger decrease is due to within component, in percentage 
terms the within component has decreased only by 6 percent against a 34 percent decrease of 
between component. Similarly, we observe the same trend for T1, which means that a higher 
percentage of inequality is due to the reduction of between components. Thus, an improvement 
of expenditure distribution in rural Nepal between 1996 and 2001 is primarily due to the 
improvements of between development region inequalities. Similarly, when we decompose the 
rural household by ecological belt, the between inequality term seems to be almost eliminated. 
The reduction of inequality is completely due to the within components of regional inequality. 
By these experiences we may conclude that the inequality of expenditure between the regions 
(both by development regions and ecological belts) has improved between 1996 and 2001. In the 
last five years, it seems the rural regional policies have been quite effective. However, in our 
analysis of the inequality decomposition, only a small part of overall inequality could be 
attributed to the overall inequality between regions. 
                                                 





So far as the contribution of the between groups inequality is concerned, the relevant 
estimates range from 2.16 percent to 10.69 percent of total inequality in 1996 and from 0.02 to 
7.69 in 2001 with respect to the overall inequality for the decomposition of development regions. 
The estimates are also low for the decomposition of ecological regions (see Table 3.8). Almost 
all inequality is attributable to within inequality. Hence the policy implications are clear, i.e., 
they must be targeted at within each group. Although the regional inequality may eventually be 
eliminated (by redistribution processes from the richer regions to the poor regions), the 
aggregate inequality will not change to a great extent. This means the regional policy would 
have little to do.  
4.6 Decomposition by Income Components 
Income can be decomposed by its various sources; and their influence on the inequality 
index can be studied. Shorrocks (1982) investigates the theoretical feasibility of a decomposition 
in K income factors of the form: 
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I S I= ∑Y , where Sk is the fraction of the inequality index referred to the income factor k. 
For example, let ( )1,..., ny y=Y  be the individual income of the population of size n. Let us 
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⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  is called the pseudo-Theil index, an index related to the 
source k; and we speak of the natural factor decomposition for the Theil index because it has 
been made directly from its definition. Such decompositions can be made for all the indices we 
have used in this study, and for a single index there are still a number of different 
decompositions. We can divide Sk by the index in order to get the rate sk of the inequality index, 
relative to source k, i.e. ( )kk
Ss
I Y



















For the purpose of our study it is not necessary to go through all the theoretical details 
of the decomposition; however we will highlight the most important results and implications. 
The following assumptions, the first concerning the index I(Y) and the others 
concerning the fraction Sk allow to establish a first important result. 
Assumption 1 
I(Y) is continuous and symmetric and I(Y) = 0 if and only if ( ), ,Y μ μ′ = " , where μ is 
the average income. This last condition states that the index has zero value when every 
individual has the same income. 
Assumption 2 
( )YSk  is continuous in Yk and if we apply any permutation of the vector ( )1, , KY Y" , 
the fraction Sk, referred to the income source k before permutation, does not change in value if 
we calculate it after permutation of Y. 
Assumption 3 
Sk doesn’t change if we aggregate or divide the other sources of income. 
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With these assumptions Shorrocks proves that the fraction Sk can be written as a 
weighted sum of the individual incomes from source k. That means 
( ) ( )k k i ik
i
S w w y= ⋅ = ⋅∑Y Y Y , where w(Y) has to satisfy the condition:  ( ) ( ) YYwY ⋅=I . In 
the example presented above for the natural decomposition of the Theil index, the weight for the 




⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑Y . 
With the assumptions expounded above the vector of weights w is not unique. 
Moreover kS  has a functional form such that the ratio ( )kk
Ss
I Y
=  is independent of the index 
chosen and is valid for any inequality index that satisfies assumption 1. The sk are indicated in 
the literature ‘decomposition rules’; we shall use the same terminology when we refer to them. 
At this point Shorrocks tries to find more restriction on Sk in order to find a unique 
decomposition. 
Assumption 4 
If we change the order of the individual incomes, i.e. we make a permutation of the 
vector Y and then we calculate Sk, we find the same value similar to the original vector Y. If there 
is an income source with the property ( ), ,k k kY μ μ′ = " , which means that every individual has 
the same income source, and the fraction Sk  must be equal to zero. 
Assumption 5 
The last assumption shows that if total income is made up of only two sources, the first 
being the permutation of the other, then the fractions S of both income sources must be equal. 
There exists only one decomposition that satisfies these two last restrictions, and it is: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )2
cov ,
k kS I s Iσ= =
kY Y Y Y
Y
, i.e. the natural decomposition of the variance. 
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Note that sk is unique and independent of the index that we have chosen for calculating 
the inequality. Independence is a very important property, since we don’t have to make any 
further assumption on the method used to calculate the inequality of the aggregate income. 
In a further study, Shorrocks (1983) compares different decompositions on an 
empirical basis, and concludes that the decomposition based on the covariance is acceptable for 
discussing the influence of each factor on the inequality index. He compares this decomposition 
with the factor share of every source of income, which is given by kμμ , the mean income from 
factor k divided by the mean aggregate income. The idea behind this comparison is that if the 
rule sk is much higher than the corresponding factor share, then that source of income contributes 
in a large proportion to the inequality of distribution. Therefore we use these two ratios for 
exploring the effect of the various income sources on the inequality indices reported in this 
study. 
4.7 The Decomposition of Inequality by Income Sources and Components of 
Expenditure 
Here we analyse the decomposition of inequality by factor components for income and 
wealth sources in Nepal. Following Shorrocks (1982) we have calculated the decomposition 
according to: (a) the Theil Decomposition (T/D) rule, (b) the Variance Decomposition (V/D) 
rule and (c) the Factor Share (F/S) rule.65 The F/S rule is the share of the kth component of 
(average) wealth or income to (average) total wealth or income. The measure does not show any 
effect on the inequality measurement. We will use it later to compare with the T/D and V/D rules 
of every component of income or wealth. The T/D rule and V/D rule show how each component 
of income or wealth behaves in total inequality. Any component with negative value indicates 
that the component contributes a negative inequality in the Theil index or Variance. This means 
the component tends to reduce total inequality. 
                                                 
65 The theoretical methods on these rules are discussed in the previous section of this chapter. 
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We begin with the factor decomposition of wealth in Nepal for 1996.66 In Table 4.9 we 
have reported the results on the decomposition of wealth by its sources for 1995 and 1996 in 
Nepal. We have analysed the whole Nepal, Rural Nepal and Urban Nepal. 
 
Table 4.7 Factor contribution as percentage total wealth inequality in Nepal for 1995 and 1996 
 All 1995 Rural 1995 Urban 1995 
 F/S rule V/D rule T/D rule F/S rule V/D rule T/D rule F/S rule V/D rule T/D rule
Dwelling 38.41  34.58  40.19 19.85 10.58 10.48 51.69  38.43  39.78
Landholding 42.02  39.45  33.72 65.87 66.72 65.96 25.28  34.53  31.05
Enterprise 3.68  2.56  3.47 2.34 2.01 2.61 4.63  2.40  2.38
Farm Assets 0.27  0.07  0.09 0.61 0.35 0.58 0.04  0.01  -0.02
Inventory 1.41  1.05  1.32 0.50 0.63 0.52 2.06  1.01  0.78
Livestock 1.85  -0.03  -1.28 4.29 0.19 -1.45 0.14  0.01  -0.10
Lending 0.52  0.32  0.30 0.66 0.28 0.38 0.42  0.32  0.29
Other Assets 14.53  22.56  21.29 9.69 19.85 18.43 18.00  23.65  20.79
Borrowings -2.74  -0.56  1.43 -3.90 -0.60 3.62 -2.44  -0.32  7.56
Total wealth 100.00  100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00
 All 1996 Rural 1996 Urban 1996 
 F/S rule V/D rule T/D rule F/S rule V/D rule T/D rule F/S rule V/D rule T/D rule
Dwelling 36.89  34.41  39.52 19.19  10.60  10.26  49.43  38.10  39.46
Landholding 39.85  37.25  31.83 63.57  65.70  64.63  23.40  32.39  29.33
Enterprise 3.90  2.96  3.90 2.34  2.48  2.95  5.02  2.74  2.29
Farm Assets 0.27  0.07  0.09 0.61  0.38  0.60  0.03  0.01  -0.02
Inventory 4.12  2.02  1.87 3.50  1.13  0.77  4.59  1.89  0.02
Livestock 1.91  -0.03  -1.38 4.43  0.20  -1.64  0.16  0.01  -0.12
Lending 0.48  0.32  0.28 0.65  0.32  0.40  0.36  0.33  0.28
Other Assets 15.25  23.61  22.77 9.54  19.67  18.56  19.26  24.98  22.91
Borrowings -2.72  -0.60  1.67 -3.96  -0.47  4.82  -2.38  -0.40  7.72
Total wealth 100.00  100.00  100.00 100.00   100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) data 
                                                 
66 The sources of wealth are described in detail in chapter 3. 
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In Nepal the dwelling, landholding and other assets represent a higher proportion of the 
aggregate household wealth; and the dominant positive influences on inequality relate to the 
same components. For example, the dwelling accounts for around 40 percent of the Theil index 
and 35 percent of the Variance. The T/D rule shows that the highest part of inequality is due to 
dwelling; while the V/D rule shows that it is due to land holding, that contributes more that 37 
percent of the variance. We find that all the components of wealth (except for the value of 
livestock) have a positive impact on total inequality. On the contrary livestock has negatively 
contributed to total inequality for both T/D and V/D. 
In the rural wealth decomposition analysis, we find that landholding covers more than 
60 percent of total wealth. It is a fair estimate since the Nepalese rural economy is an agrarian-
based society; and land is the most important capital. More than 65 percent for V/D rule and 
around 60 percent for T/D rule of total inequality is caused by this component of wealth. 
Dwelling and other assets have relatively high shares in total wealth; they also contribute to the 
higher factor share in total inequality of rural Nepal. Only the livestock contributes to a 
‘negatively’ in total inequality for the T/D rule; while for the V/D rule it has an insignificant 
positive value. 
In the urban wealth distribution, dwellings are the main component of wealth followed 
by landholdings, other assets etc. Farm assets and livestock have a negative value for the T/D 
rule; while for the V/D rule they are almost irrelevant. The remaining of the components of 
wealth in urban Nepal have a positive effect in total inequality. Livestock seems to reduce 
wealth inequality in Nepalese wealth distribution, reflecting the fact that the livestock is 
negatively correlated to total wealth. It reduces more than one percent point the Theil index (for 
wealth distribution in Nepal). As for wealth, this study identifies seven different sources of 
income in Nepal for 1996 (both urban and rural) and 2001 (only rural). Using the decomposition 




Table 4.8  Percentage factor contributions to the inequality index of income in Nepal (1996) 




















Housing 13.22 13.12 8.79 6.67 2.08 1.55 21.83 14.25 12.09
Enterprise 17.71 29.68 24.50 8.77 12.09 8.61 29.45 39.39 34.31
Property rent 2.89 9.28 11.69 0.42 0.91 0.49 6.14 17.67 19.77
Remittances 7.23 10.37 11.26 7.13 7.07 3.53 7.36 15.64 17.00
Other income 2.73 2.70 1.49 1.76 0.80 0.25 4.00 3.19 2.05
Wage income 19.75 0.17 2.25 18.28 -4.57 0.81 21.68 -4.61 1.49
Farm income 36.46 34.69 40.02 56.96 81.61 84.76 9.54 14.46 13.30
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) data 
The highest share in income of Nepal for 1996 comes from farm income. Wage 
income, rent of owner occupied house (Housing) and income from firms (Enterprise) contribute 
above 10 percent of total income. We find that all components have a positive impact on total 
inequality for both T/D and V/D. In the rural income distribution, the farm income share is 
almost 57 percent; and more than 80 percent of the aggregate inequality measure is explained by 
this component. Wage income has a negative impact on the rural inequality of income 
distribution; while the remaining part of the components has a positive value. In the urban 
income distribution, the share of farm income accounts for only around 10 percent. Enterprise 
income, wage income and owner occupied house rent, have a share above 20 percent each in 
total income. The highest share of the total inequality comes from the earnings from enterprises. 
As in the rural income distribution, only wage income has a negative impact in the total 
inequality of income. This is why in most societies wage-income is the least concentrated of all 
other kinds of income. 
We have shown, through, the V/D and T/D rules, how the income obtained from 
various sources influences individually the inequality indexes. We focus now on the ratios 
between the V/D rule and the F/S, and between the T/D rule and the F/S, which will provide an 
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idea of which sources have an increasing or a reducing behaviour on the overall inequality of 
income and wealth. A ratio above one indicates that the component has a big impact on income 
or wealth distribution, causing an increase in inequality higher than we could expect if we only 
knew the factor share. For example, if the factor share for farm income is 10 percent and a V/D 
or T/D rule is 15 percent, this will generate a ratio 1.5. In this case, if farm income increases by 
one unit, then inequality index will increase by 1.5 units suggesting that a higher share of the 
increased farm income goes to the upper class of income groups. On the contrary a ratio below 
unity suggests that the higher proportion of changes in any component accrues to the poor 
income groups. Needless to say, a negative ratio of any component would imply a gain for the 
poor income groups so reducing total inequality. Using this method we have estimated the ratio 
for all sources of income and wealth. The results are sketched in the following graphs (Figg. 4.1 
– 4.4). 
In Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2 we have presented the results, i.e. the ratios of the variation 
decomposition rule and the Theil decomposition rule respectively over the factor share of 
income distribution. A positive inequality ratio higher than one shows that the higher part of the 
income accrues to the rich income groups; and hence elevates total inequality. The line below 
unity shows that the higher share of the variation in income accrues to the low income groups. 
Hence the level of inequality decreases in relative terms as the share of a particular component 
rises. 
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Figure 4.1 Graphical representation of the ratio of variance decomposition rule over factor 









































Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) data 
Figure 4.2 Graphical representation of the ratio of Theil decomposition rule over factor share 









































Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) data 
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From the above figures it is clear that property has a big impact on the overall income 
distribution. Property rent goes mostly to the high-income groups because properties are 
normally accumulated by the wealthiest members of society with the means to accumulate 
capital. Remittances are also a disequilibrating factor in Nepal. Remittances represent income 
sent by the migrant back home.  Remittances received in rural areas reduce total inequality, 
suggesting that it contributes to the rural poor income groups. Thus the impact of remittances 
upon income inequality for rural households is favourable. In urban Nepal it is an unfavourable 
factor of income distribution. It is reasonable to expect that urban migrant’s remittances increase 
total inequality because urban people who migrate to foreign countries are basically well 
educated and can compete in the international labour market. The low-income groups have 
limited access to higher education; and hence the urban remittances accrue mainly to the higher 
income groups. Income from enterprise in rural and urban Nepal slightly increases total 
inequality according to the ratio between the T/D and F/S; but it is almost constant in rural Nepal 
according to the ratio between V/D and F/S. Farm income also raises income inequality both in 
rural and urban Nepal. It implies that households of upper income classes primarily receive a 
higher income from farming. Wage income, housing and other income benefit the lower income 
groups of both rural and urban sectors. Both methods support this result. 
Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4 plot the ratios of the variation decomposition rule and the Theil 
decomposition rule respectively for the factor share for wealth distribution in Nepal. 
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Figure 4.3 Graphical representation of the ratio of variance decomposition rule over factor 











































Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) data 
Figure 4.4 Graphical representation of the ratio of Theil decomposition rule over factor share 












































Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) data 
 226
Fig. 4.3 shows that ‘other assets’67 have a strong influence on wealth inequality. This is 
consistent also with Fig. 4.4. It is understandable and reasonable since rich people can possess 
the extra assets; and an increase of this component favours naturally the upper class wealth 
holders. These results are consistent for both rural and urban sectors. Landholding in rural Nepal 
seems to contribute to a higher inequality than in the case of urban Nepal. It is not surprising, 
since the rural economy is agriculturally based and land is the most important capital for 
production. Naturally, wealthier families hold more land and an increase in land value favours 
the wealthier families. Thus it raises the inequality of wealth distribution. An increase in the 
value of enterprises boosts wealth inequality in rural Nepal; while the opposite is true in urban 
Nepal. In rural Nepal, only rich families  are entrepreneurs; thus the value of the enterprise 
favours these upper classes; and aggregate wealth inequality in rural Nepal. The rest of the 
components of wealth tends to reduce aggregate wealth inequality. Borrowing is negatively 
correlated with total inequality.  
4.8 Conclusion 
The analysis of inequality by population subgroups is considered an important tool for 
understanding and explaining wealth, income and expenditure distributions in Nepal. This type 
of analysis has a very important role for policy decisions because it can help to evaluate and 
implement efficient policy interventions in dealing with regional inequality. It is further 
important for policy interventions dealing with socio-economic groups in a country like Nepal, 
where the caste system and religion have a complicated structure. Expenditure inequalities of 
various population subgroups of Nepal were looked first. Afterwards, we investigated income 
and wealth inequality. Subgroups were partitioned by various characteristics of Nepalese 
society. Although in several instances the differences in mean consumption expenditure, income 
and wealth of the subgroups are considerable, the results of the decomposition analysis show 
that the bulk of inequality is due to the differences within population subgroups, rather than to 
                                                 
67 See Chapter three for the definition of ‘other wealth’. 
 227
disparities between groups. Hence it would be preferable for policy makers (in order to reduce 
aggregate inequality) to rely on general policies such as taxation, transfer payments and so on; 
rather than applying regional policies. Exceptions to this pattern emerge when the population is 
grouped by caste and ethnicity. In this case, a remarkable proportion of aggregate inequality has 
been explained through between groups component. A sound policy regarding ethnic groups, as 
well as rural and urban areas, would help to establish a less unequal society in Nepal. This 
information may prove quite important for understanding and explaining certain differences 
between population subgroups. Therefore policy makers may be helped in identifying priorities 
and in designing the intervention strategy pertaining to the regional and socio-cultural aspects. 
Applying the methodology proposed by Shorrocks (1983), we have analysed the 
inequality decomposition by sources for wealth and income. First of all we have shown that 
dwelling, landholding, and other assets have a very significant impact on overall inequality of 
wealth in Nepal. Landholding for rural Nepal contributes to more than 50 percent of total wealth 
inequality; while dwelling contributes to large part of wealth inequality for urban Nepal. 
Similarly the empirical results for the decomposition by income sources have demonstrated that 
incomes from farm, enterprises, and wage were the major elements of total income inequality. In 
rural Nepal, farm income has generated four-fifths of total inequality; but the share of this 
component is less than 60 percent. This suggests that any increase in farm income would enrich 
the upper class of rural society. This would also be the consequence of higher inequality in land 
distribution. We have also proven that several sources of income and wealth have a negative 
impact on overall inequality, which means that they have a redistributing effect. However, their 
equalising influence is relatively small due to their low share in total income. It is noteworthy 
that wage income has a negative impact on total inequality in both rural and urban Nepal. 
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Appendix 4A 
The Theil indexes are defined as:68 
( ) ( )1 01 1  and  i i i
i i
y y yT T y;n Log T T y;n Log
n μ μ n μ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= = = =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  
Where ( )1, , ny y y= "  is an income vector and μ is the mean income of y. We divide y 
into G subgroups and hence the gth subgroup has ng individuals. The vector y is now 








Let us define i ii
y ya Logμ μ
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  for T1 and respectively i i
a Log
y
μ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  for T0, then 
( ) 1; i
i
T y n a
n
= ∑ . 
We divide the vector ( )naaa ,,1 "=  in subgroups as we have done with y. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 1 11 1 1 1, , ,..., ,..., ,..., ,..., ,..., ,..., GgG g g G Gn n nna a a a a a a a a a a⎡ ⎤= = = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦" . 
The Theil index may be written as: 





1 1 1 1 1









i i i i
i i i g i
T y n a a a a a a a
n n
a a a a
n n= = = = =
⎡ ⎤= = + + + + + + + + + + =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= + + + + =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑
 
                                                 
68 See the appendix 2B of chapter 2. 
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For the Theil index T1: 
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Income Inequality and Economic Development 
5.1 Introduction 
Inequality is profoundly influenced by institutional factors such as social norms and 
attitudes, broad economic changes, governmental activities and so on. Economists have long 
been interested in the relationship between the distribution of income and the rate of economic 
growth. Two propositions on this theme have dominated the literature. The first, associated with 
the work of Simon Kuznets, asserts that the degree of inequality varies systematically with the 
level of income per head. He puts forward a model in which inequality is initially rising as 
incomes begin to rise and then, beyond some point, decreasing as income per head continues to 
grow (Kuznets, 1955). The second proposition, associated with Arthur Okun, is interpreted as a 
trade off between equality and efficiency. Income redistribution is a costly effort to reduce 
inequality because the policies required to accomplish it generally produce a misallocation of 
resources. Policy interventions intended to reduce inequality in income distribution may have a 
high cost in terms of a lower average income (Okun, 1975). Thus, Kuznets identifies, in the long 
run, that policy interventions are unnecessary, while the Okun proposition indicates that in the 
short run, the redistribution policies are harmful. Brought together, these two propositions have 
been used to argue against public policies intended to create a less unequal society. 
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The belief in a trade-off between equity and growth, in both developed and developing 
economies, is widely accepted. Recent evidence,69 however, indicates not only that the two are 
compatible but that they are mutually reinforcing. Traditional analyses of the relationship 
between inequality in income distribution and growth have focused on the relationship between 
income inequality and the growth of GNP. In this chapter we will examine the relationship 
between inequality in income distribution and GDP per capita, including the arguments 
discussed in Kuznets (1955). 
5.2 Growth and Inequality – A Brief History of the Theories of Growth and 
Distribution 
In this section we examine the empirical evidence that has been gathered to date on the 
relationship between growth and inequality. We begin with a review of the evidence on income 
inequality and economic growth. The macro-economic distribution of income was central to the 
thinking of classical economists such as David Ricardo and Karl Marx. ‘The participants in the 
process of production are grouped by Ricardo into three classes: landlords who provide land, 
capitalists who provide capital and workers who provide labour’ (Pasinetti 1974, chapter 1). 
Atkinson70 quotes Ricardo as arguing that political economy should be an enquiry into the laws 
that determine the division of industrial income amongst the classes who concur in its formation. 
The Harrod-Domar model developed in the l930s and 1940s attempted to analyze the 
relation between investment, employment, and growth. Harrod in particular recognized the 
dynamic effect of a higher employment rate on capital, using income and savings as the crucial 
link between the two. There is a direct relationship between the capital stock and output; and 
investment is the engine for the economic growth. Any new capital stock as a form of 
investment brings about corresponding growth in the economy. Let k and s be the capital output 
                                                 
69 For example, see Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994). 
70 Atkinson (1997) 
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ratio (K/Y) and saving output ratio (S/Y) respectively. In this model the saving rate is fixed and 
total investment is determined by entrepreneurs’ expectations. Now we can write: 
S = sY      (I) 
I = ΔK     (II) where K is the level of capital stock. 
k = K/Y or ΔK/ΔY    (III), capital output ratio is fixed. 
From equations II and III we derive, 
I = ΔK = k ΔY    (IV) 
In equilibrium, total saving is equal to total investment I = S, which follows with a 
manipulation of equation I and IV: 
sY =k ΔY 
→ΔY/Y (growth rate) = s/k   (V) 
The growth of economy (ΔY/Y) is a simplified version of the Harrod-Domar growth 
theory, which states that growth is linked to the national saving ratio and the capital output ratio 
k. In this model it is clear that the growth rate (if considered endogenous) is positively related to 
the saving ratio71 and inversely related to the capital output ratio. The Harrod-Domar growth 
model is very simple and the logic behind the model is that in order to grow, economies must 
save and invest. 
The growth theory of the 1950’s saw distribution as playing a crucial role. The capital-
labour ratio in Kaldor (1956, 1957) was driven to its steady state equilibrium value by different 
saving rates of different socio-economic groups (capitalists and workers). If K/L rises above its 
equilibrium value, the wage-to-profits ratio should also rise. With savings from wages assumed 
to be lower than that of profits, this would lead to a decline in the rate of capital accumulation, 
driving total savings and K/L back down towards full employment equilibrium. 
One possible answer to the Harrod-Domar, i.e. the assumption of a flexible aggregate 
saving ratio, was primarily adopted by the neo-Keynesian or Cambridge school. Of course there 
are many ways in which one can give flexibility to s; but the one which has played the major 
role is the hypothesis of a two-class society (namely workers and capitalists), each with different 
                                                 
71 A higher saving rate leads to a higher growth rate of the model, if the capital/output ratio is constant. 
 234
constant marginal propensity to save. In this way there always exists a distribution of income 
between the two classes, which produces precisely that saving ratio that will equal the value 
g(K/Y), so satisfying the Harrod-Domar equilibrium condition. 
The motivations for this approach are to be found in the following considerations 
which have emerged with the elaboration of successive ‘generations’ of post-Keynesian models 
of profit determination and income distribution: 
• The assumption of a uniform rate of saving for the whole economic system ignores all 
possible differences in saving- and consumption- behaviour among different classes of 
income-receivers, or categories of income, or even different sectors of the economy. 
• The problem of aggregating savings might give rise to particular and unknown 
difficulties, so that it may be safer to consider it in a disaggregate way, as the post-
Keynesian model precisely does. 
• Thirdly, this assumption also receives empirical support from the observed high rates of 
saving out of corporate profits and lower rates out of labour income; see, for instance, 
Burmeister and Taubman (1969), Kaldor (1966), and Murfin (1980).72 
• The nature itself of the savings differs from class to class: for instance Kregel (1973, ch. 
11) justifies the distinction not so much on considerations of class position in this sense, but 
                                                 
72 By using UK quarterly data for the period 1963-76, Murfin (1980,p. 21) concludes that ‘the suggestion 
appears to be that “workers” marginal propensity to consume is circa 0.85, while that of “capitalists” 
around a quarter. This later estimate is almost exactly that obtained by Kalecki for the USA 1929-40 by a 
very different methodology.’ Note that Murfin defines workers as wage-income recipients, and capitalists 
as non-wage-income recipients, and acknowledges that there might be some overlapping. Kaldor (1966, 
pp. 312-14) notes that national income accounting procedures typically include in personal saving the 
saving of unincorporated business enterprises; and when allowance is made for investment by these 
enterprises, together with personal investment in housing, to obtain a measure of personal saving 
available for lending to other sectors, the figures show that the latter is about one per cent of personal 
disposable income, i.e. of workers’ income. On the other hand, always for Kaldor, corporate gross saving 
out of after-tax profits is estimated at some 70 per cent, so that the assumption sc > sw, crucial for the 
post-Keynesian model, turns out to be reasonable. 
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on a difference between the form of income as such, that is, between ‘quasi-contractual 
incomes’ (like wages, fixed interest, and rent) and ‘residual incomes’ (like corporate profits). 
It is worth noting that for Kaldor (1961, pp. 194-5) residual incomes are much more 
uncertain than contractual incomes and subject to fluctuations. 
• Finally, it may be argued (as Kaldor, 1961, pp. 194-5 has done) that the need to generate 
internal finance in order to carry out active investment dictates a high saving propensity 
from profits. This requirement will be even stronger in a life-cycle model on a steady-state 
growth path, where the capitalist's saving ratio has to allow for (a) life-cycle wealth 
accumulation and (b) gradual accumulation of inter-generational assets in order to let the 
capitalists’ wealth stock grow at the same rate as that of the population. It has been 
repeatedly pointed out that without this condition (i.e. that the capitalist's propensity to save 
is higher than that of the worker) the system would not be stable at full employment or near 
full employment. This does not, of course, directly support the validity of the hypothesis of a 
differentiated (and constant) saving propensity; but it is an important part of the mechanism 
through which, in the post-Keynesian model, total saving is brought into line with the 
exogenously given investment. 
As Kaldor (1956, p. 95) points out, the condition that the capitalists’ propensity to save 
is higher than that of the other class(es) is necessary but not sufficient for the stability of the 
model. Another necessary condition for its stability is that the effect of the change in profit 
margins on saving exceeds the corresponding effect on investment, otherwise equilibrium would 
be unstable even if the capitalists’ propensity to save were higher than that of the other class(es). 
This latter condition does not arise in the context of the traditional Kaldor-Pasinetti model, 
where investment is assumed to be completely autonomous, i.e. of full-employment level; it is 
however important in all of Kaldor’s and Joan Robinson’s models, at least where P/Y exerts a 
positive influence on the level of aggregate demand and hence on investment. Later on it has 
become more common to restate the requirement as (see e.g. Pasinetti, 1962): sw < I/Y and sc > 
I/Y. the first condition ensures that the dynamic equilibrium will not have a null or negative 
share of profits; while the second one excludes the case of a dynamic equilibrium with a null or 
negative share of wages. As Pasinetti (1962, p. 269) points out, if the first condition were not 
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satisfied, the system would enter a situation of chronic inflation. ‘As a matter of fact the latter 
limit becomes operative much before sc even approaches the value I/Y, because there is a 
minimum level below which the wage-rate cannot be compressed’ (Pasinetti, 1962, p. 269). 
By commenting upon the properties of his own model Pasinetti (1962, p. 277) 
concludes that ‘in a system where full employment investments are actually carried out, and 
prices are flexible with respect to wages, the only condition for stability is sc > 0, a condition 
which is certainly and abundantly satisfied even outside the limits in which the mathematical 
model has an economic meaning’. 
In the late 1950s and early 1970s by considering a full-employment long-run 
equilibrium growth model with a capitalists’ class (whose income is derived entirely from 
capital) and a workers’ class (whose income is derived from wages and accumulated savings), 
both with constant marginal propensities to save, the Cambridge economists were in a position 
to (a) provide a solution to the Harrod-Domar dilemma (by specifying an aggregate saving ratio 
s which equals g(K/Y), where g and K/Y are both exogenously given), (b) determine the long-run 
equilibrium value of the rate of profits, the distribution of income between profits and wages, 
and the distribution of disposable income between the two classes, (c) allow the existence of an 
income residual, namely wages, consistent with the assumption of a relationship between the 
savings of that class of individuals (the capitalists) who are in the position to control the process 
of production and the patterns of capital accumulation, and (d) give some insight into the process 
of accumulation of capital by specifying the equilibrium capital shares of the two classes. 
There was yet another strand of growth or development theories in 1950’s in which 
distribution played an important role. This was based on the path-breaking works of Arthur 
Lewis (1954) and Simon Kuznets (1955). Lewis’s model of growth with unlimited supplies of 
labour was fundamentally different from Kaldor’s and Solow's, in that it was driven by a 
movement of a factor of production (labour) from low productivity sectors to a higher 
productivity one. Kuznets’s (1955) contribution owed much to the observation that if inequality 
rose between these two sectors in a more substantial way than that within each sector, then 
inequality would first rise – as people moved across – and then fall, as most of them found 
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themselves in the new sectors, until the economy reached a point where factor movement was 
equalised across sectors. This is the stylised Kuznets ‘inverted-U’ curve. 
But growth theory branched out in the neoclassical direction, thanks to another paper 
written in 1956 by Robert Solow. Unlike Kaldor’s, Solow’s model did not require a 
distributional mechanism to generate a stable growth path. Instead, it relied on a production 
function f(K, L) with a completely flexible K/Y ratio, implying perfect substitutability of the 
factors of production. That displayed constant returns to scale and had diminishing returns to 
each factor. It was therefore concave with respect to the capital-labour ratio. Given the 
assumption of a constant and exogenous population growth rate, and certain conditions on f(k), 
this led to a unique capital-labour ratio, which was universally stable (in the sense that the 
system converges to it from any other ratio). Because it relies on a neo-classical production 
function, this seminal model became known as the neo-classical growth theory (Solow/Swan 
model). It generated an important literature in the 1960’s, which sought to address two perceived 
shortcomings of Solow’s basic model. Arrow (1962), Uzawa (1965) and others tried to bring 
technical progress and new ideas into the picture, and to explain their links to growth. Cass 
(1965), building on earlier work by Ramsey (1928), replaced Solow’s exogenous, arbitrary 
savings rate with an inter-temporal consumption, a path chosen so as to fully optimise explicit 
inter-temporal preferences.  
These are interesting and often complex theoretical issues. Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988) developed the models of the 1960’s; in their models positive steady-state growth per 
capita income is driven by ‘endogenous’ technical progress or by human capital accumulation, 
this had become something of an established tradition. But for a critique of the ‘endogenous’ 
theories of growth see Pasinetti (2000). 
5.2.1 The effect of growth on distribution 
Despite the reliance of modern growth theory on ‘representative’ agents, societies are 
patently not homogeneous, whether in incomes, wealth, or many other dimensions. When we say 
that incomes for a certain population grow by x%, we are in fact referring to the growth rate of 
the mean of income distribution across that population. Aggregate growth statistics, however 
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useful, refer only to the evolution of the distribution’s first moment, ignoring changes in the rest 
of the distribution. 
The well-established view on linkages between growth and income distribution is often 
referred as to the Kuznets’ hypothesis. This postulates that growth (from the low-income levels 
associated with predominantly agrarian societies) would first lead to an increase, then a 
‘plateau’, and then to a decrease in income inequality. This is captured diagrammatically in the 
Fig. 5.1 below. 
Figure 5.1: The Stylised Kuznets Curve 
 
Income per capita
Level of inequality 
 
Author’s own estimate 
The empirical evidence for this came from Kuznets’s investigation of a time-series of 
inequality indicators for England, West Germany, and the United States. In the 1950’s, these 
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were basically the only countries for which sufficiently long-time series was available and by 
that time inequality was indeed falling in all three countries, after having risen earlier. Given the 
data available at that time, it was impossible to reject this hypothesis. In fact, the Kuznets curve 
became one of the stylised facts of the study of income distribution. Only recently tests of the 
hypothesis based on much larger data sets (both across countries and over time for individual 
countries) have often contested it. 
5.2.2 Empirical evidence: Kuznets’ hypothesis 
The Kuznets’ inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality and the level 
of income influenced the economic theory for four decades. In the early 1990s, however, 
economists began to doubt the concept of relationship between the level of income per capita 
and the degree of inequality. Several studies in the early 1990s have claimed that there was no 
inverse relationship between growth and income equality during the intial stages of 
development. On the contrary, initial inequality in the distribution of income was harmful to 
growth. Simon Kuznets’ conclusion was reached by examining the historical experience of 
developed countries and a very small sample of developing countries for which data were 
available. Several empirical works are done with large and cross-sectional data to test the 
Kuznets’ proposition regarding the relationship between growth and income equality. Felix 
Paukert (1973), using cross-sectional data for 56 countries concluded that the data support the 
hypothesis “with economic development income inequality tends to increase, then becomes 
stable and then decrease” (page 120). 
Another well-known empirical study is by Ahluwalia (1976), who used cross-country 
data for 60 countries. He chose the income shares of various percentile groups as dependent 
variables to test the relationship against the level of GNP. He found that, when per capita 
income increases, the share in national income for the lower income groups first declines and 
then rises, while the opposite is true for the richest groups. His results are statistically 
significant; and he was convinced enough by the data of the existence of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between inequality of income and level of per capita GNP. In his empirical test, 
Ahluwalia was convinced to call the Kuznets’ proposition as it a “stylised fact”. 
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These studies, in the 1970s and 1980s, relied on a small quantity and poor quality data 
set. Deininger and Squire (1996a) have specified three basic criteria for high quality data as we 
have already discussed in chapter two: 
• the data must come from nationally representative household surveys; 
• all sources of income (or uses of expenditure) must be included (and not, for example, wage 
income only); 
• the survey must be representative of the country’s entire population and results must not be 
based on extrapolations from information gathered only from specific subgroups (e.g., it 
should not be a survey of the urban population only). 
5.2.3 The recent empirical studies 
The recent economic reform in transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia may have changed the nature of Kuznets’ law. Looking at a sample of 64 changes in mean 
income and inequality, or ‘spells’ between 1981 and 1994,73 Ravallion and Chen find a 
significant negative correlation between economic growth and change in inequality. In other 
words, the sample suggests that growth reduces inequality, rather than increasing it. It may be 
reasonable to conclude that the negative link between growth and inequality detected in this 
study was brought about by the rather specific circumstances of transition in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, where negative growth and increasing inequality have both prevailed since 1990. 
In the 1990s, the classical view that distribution (one aspect of which is measured by 
inequality indices) is not only an outcome, but in fact plays a central role in determining other 
aspects of the economic performance. Recently, the proposition that initial inequality seemed to 
be associated with lower growth rates was put forward by Person and Tabellini (1994) and 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Using the data sets available to them, both studies found that 
inequality variables had significantly negative coefficients in growth regressions. Deninger and 
Squire (1998) also found that the negative coefficient on initial income inequality in their growth 
                                                 
73 Ravallion and Chen (1997). 
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regressions becomes insignificant only when a variable for asset inequality (the Gini coefficient 
for land ownership) is introduced. 
Person and Tabellini (1994) were probably the first to find the econometric evidence 
on the negative relationship between initial income inequality and the economic growth. They 
used historical data for nine developed countries and cross-sectional data for 56 countries. They 
focus on the median voter and conclude that a strong negative relation between income 
inequality at the start of the period and growth in the subsequent period for both samples (Person 
and Tabellini, 1994). That is, high ex-ante inequality is associated with ex-post slow growth of 
output and incomes. A similar type of econometric models is tested by Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994) for two periods, specifically, 1960-85 and 1970-85. The results indicate that income 
inequality is negatively correlated with subsequent growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, p. 481). 
George Clark runs similar regressions using various income inequality measures and then 
performs a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the negative relationship between income 
inequality and growth. His results confirm a robust and negative relationship between inequality 
and growth (Clark, 1995, p. 422). 
Thus, the recent studies using better data come to a different conclusion regarding the 
relationship between inequality and income growth compared to studies done in the past. 
However, even the data used in most recent studies are still far from perfect. Deininger and 
Squire doubt about the quality of income distribution data used by Person and Tabellini. 
Indeed they proved that Person and Tabellini (1994) result, on the negative relation 
between growth and income inequality, does not hold when only the high quality data 
are used. Deininger and Squire are also critical of the data used in Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994). 
Deininger and Squire (1996) use a new data set on income distribution to re-examine 
the relationship between growth and inequality. They collected as many observations of income 
distribution as they could from both primary and reliable secondary sources and obtained a total 
of 2,600. After applying their criteria for quality data outlined above, they were left with 682 
high quality observations, which is substantially more than those contained in the data sets used 
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in previous studies. Not only do they have more cross-sectional observations; they also have a 
significantly greater number of time series observations for each country. This is crucial because 
the empirical testing of the Kuznets hypothesis in the past used cross-sectional data to try to 
draw conclusions about what is, in reality, a longitudinal relationship. According to Deininger 
and Squire (1996b), our data indeed provide little support for an inverted-U relationship between 
levels of income and inequality when tested on a country-by-country basis, with no support for 
the existence of a Kuznets curve in about 90 per cent of the countries investigated. 
When they run the standard growth regression used in the past but with their high 
quality data, Deininger and Squire’s results appear, at first, to corroborate those of Persson and 
Tabellini, Alesina and Rodrik, and Perotti, in showing that initial inequality has a negative effect 
on future growth. This effect, however, is no longer significant when regional dummies are 
introduced into the regression. Although their results do not confirm that there is an inverse 
relationship between initial income inequality and growth, they do confirm that initial income 
inequality is not positively correlated with growth. Thus the idea that income redistribution is 
incompatible with growth receives no support from the cross-section evidence; and the view that 
inequality is a precondition for growth is increasingly untenable. 
5.3 A Case Study of Income Distribution and Development from the Low Income 
Countries 
We have collected data for 27 low and middle income countries and we categorise 
them into four groups based on the level of GDP (PPP) per capita74. In the first group, the 
poorest countries have a GDP per capita of $0-600. We assume that countries that have passed 
the first phase of development have GDP per capita of $601-1200. We also suppose that 
countries that have GDP per capita of $1201-1500 and above $1500 have passed the second and 
third phases of development respectively (see Table 5.1). 
                                                 
74 From here onward, we write only GDP per capita to indicate GDP per capita in Purchasing Power 
Parity (dollars) term in this section. 
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Table 5.1 Percentage quintile shares of income in selected low-income countries for 1980-98 














0-600 7.26  11.24  15.31  21.15  45.04   472  
601-1200 6.58  10.63  14.98  21.47  46.35   887  
1201-1500 6.70  10.92  15.29  21.57  45.52   1,370  
Above 1500 7.27  11.13  15.24  21.27  45.10   2,170  
Mean 6.79  10.79  15.08  21.32  46.04   --   
Standard Deviation 2.15  2.36  1.99  1.45  7.05   --   
Max Value 10.11  14.29  20.10  24.57  63.44   --   
Min Value 1.07  2.03  9.80  17.32  30.89   --   
Source: Author’s own estimates from the World Bank and Deninger & Squire data 
In Table 5.1 we give the summary statistics of a sample for 27 less developed 
countries, including 68 observations. We have gathered only the high quality data from the 
Deininger and Squire (1996) database for these countries. The average share of the first poorest 
quintile is 6.79 percent. Sierra Leone has the lowest quintile share with 1.07 percent of national 
income in 1989/90 and the Kyrgyz Republic has the highest share of the lowest quintile. On the 
other hand, the richest quintile has the mean share of total income, i.e. 46.04 percent. Sierra 
Leone has the highest share for the richest quintile; while the Yemen Republic has the lowest 
income share for the richest quintile in 1998. 
In the sample of the families that include the lowest 20 percent – the bottom quintile – 
countries with up to $600 per capita earn an average of 7.26 percent of national income. As 
income rises, the share of the lowest quintile decreases, up to a certain threshold, according to 
the Kuznets’ hypothesis. In our sample, countries that advance to the first level of development 
enter into the income level of $601-1200. The share of the poorest twenty quintile at this stage 
decreases from 7.26 percent to 6.58 percent. As income rises above $1200, entering the second 
phase of development, the poorest quintile begins to gain from the growth of income. It is clear 
that growth, in terms of level of GDP per capita, occurs in the model through a trickle down 
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process, which reduces the inequality of income distribution; or in other words, the share of the 
poor groups increases. The trickle down effect in our sample is noted after some growth of 
income. For example, the poorest quintile share of any country increases as soon it passes the 
first phase of development. 
Similarly in our sample, the second and third quintiles decrease at first and then 
increases in the process of development. As GDP per capita rises above $600 up to $1200, the 
share of the second and third quintile in national income decreases from 11.24 per cent to 10.63 
per cent and from 15.31 per cent to 14.98 per cent respectively. In the later stage of 
development, as income goes up, the income share of the third and forth quintiles rises. 
Surprisingly the income share of the two richest quintiles increases at the initial phase 
of development. The countries with GDP per capita of $600-1200 have higher shares of income 
for rich families. In another stage of development, when income rises above $1200, the fourth 
quintile share of income increases still, while the share of the richest quintile begins to fall. 
Moreover, further development leads to a decrease in the income share for fourth quintile and an 
increase for the fifth quintile in the income share. This implies that the richest families, with a 
level of income above $1200, end up earning a lower share of GDP. 
The statistical decline of the poorest three quintiles in the beginning phase of 
development did not occur in absolute GDP per capita term. In our sample, the countries with 
income range of $0-600 GDP per capita show a higher average income share in the poorest three 
quintiles than the countries with an income range of $601-1200. But in terms of dollar income 
(absolute value), countries with an income range of $601-1200 and higher have a greater level of 
income than the countries with an income range of $0-600 GDP per capita referring to the 





Table 5.2: Average per capita money income of quintiles in the national income for low 
 income countries (US $ in PPP terms) 
Income range 1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 
Mean income (0-600) 171 266 362 500 1064 
Mean income(601-1200) 292 471 665 953 2056 
Mean income (1201-1500) 459 748 1047 1477 3118 
Mean income (above 1500) 789 1207 1653 2307 4892 
Author’s own estimates from the World Bank, PTW and Deninger & Squire data 
Thus, as the countries with the lowest GDP per capita move towards the level of 
income to $601-1200, the share of the lowest three quintiles declines, but these quintile shares 
however do not lose in absolute term. The first three quintiles with the level $ 0-600 in GDP per 
capita have a mean income of $ 171, $ 266, and $ 362 respectively. During the progression of 
the income level (i.e. from $0-600 to $601-1200) their average amount of income increases 
despite the decrease in the share of income of the poorest three quintiles.75 These quintiles have a 
higher average income than the first three quintiles of the countries with an income range of only 
$0-600. In this respect, we may say that although income of the poor in absolute terms has 
increased, its distribution worsens in this phase with respect to the income share of the poor. The 
richest two quintiles experienced an increase in terms of dollars and in terms of income share. In 
the income level of $601-1,200, these two wealthy quintiles have income shares of 21.47% and 
46.35% with a mean income of $953 and $2,056 respectively. Thus, in the initial development 
process, the wealthiest two quintiles have gained in terms of both income share and in absolute 
(dollar) terms. We may conclude that in the first phase of development (given that the shares of 
income of the poorest quintile have decreased) the distribution of income does worsen. 
                                                 
75 That is, the shares of lowest three quintiles move from 7.26%, 11.24% and 15.31% to 6.58%, 10.63% 
and 14.98% of total income respectively. 
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In the second phase of development,76 the mean incomes of the first three quintiles are 
likewise gaining somewhat in their quintile share of income (see Table 5.1). In this stage, the 
fourth quintile has also marginally increased its share of income from 21.47% to 21.57%. Only 
the share of the richest quintile has declined. Despite the reduction in the share of income, the 
mean income has grown from $ 2,056 to $3,118. Consequently, all four lower quintiles gain 
their shares of income at the expense of the richest quintile share, which indicates that the 
income distribution has slightly improved. 
In addition, the third stage of development (i.e. the last phase in our sample) with mean 
income above $1,500, only the two poorest quintile shares have experienced further gains in 
income share. They increased both their share of total income and the level of income (see 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2). The losers are the three richer quintiles: although all mean income levels 
have raised, they experienced a decline in their share of income. It is obvious that an increase in 
income share of the poor quintiles and a decrease in income share of the rich quintiles will 
improve the distribution of income. Hence, income inequality has further declined in the process 
of development. 
A number of conclusions may be drawn from the analyses above. Perhaps the most 
obvious is that, in general, all income groups rise and fall together. When upper-income groups 
prosper, so do middle-income and lower-income groups. Conversely, when high incomes 
stagnate or decline, so do income-earners of all other categories. Critics of income inequality 
often state or imply that the prosperity of upper-income groups takes place at the expense of 
other groups and vice-versa. This leads us to tentatively conclude that the Kuznets’ hypothesis is 
valid for certain countries. . In the next section we will test this relation with statistical tools.  
5.4 Testing Kuznets’ Hypothesis 
The myth of the Kuznets’ inverted U-curve hypothesis persisted for long time, mainly 
because it seems to be rational and, at a more intuitive level, seems to satisfy our natural desire 
                                                 
76 When income level reaches $1200-1500. 
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for social justice. We shall test the Kuznet's hypothesis using a cross-sectional approach. The 
cross sectional approach relies on two very strong assumptions. First, a complete homogeneity 
across countries - all countries in the sample behave in the same way; at least as far as income 
inequality is concerned in its relation to GDP per capita. Secondly, dynamics are ignore in the 
sense that the above relationship is assumed to be unaffected by business cycles, or any other 
time dependent factors. Most of the empirical studies have tested Kuznets’ hypothesis by 
estimating a simple non-linear regression model of the form 
 
2
1 2 ( )
k k k k k k k
it it it itI Y Yα β β ε= + + +  (5.1) 
Where α is the constant term of the model and β1 and β2 are the slopes of the parameters, β1 and 
β2 might be expected to carry positive and negative signs respectively. kitI  is a measure of 
income inequality for a given ith country and tth year in the sample.77 The superscript k denotes 
the number of inequality indexes used in this study. Yit is the per capita GDP in Purchasing 
Power Parity term (PPP) as a proxy of the level of development for tth year in ith country. To 
capture the U-shape, we have added the square term of kitY  in the equation. 
k
itε  is the usual 
disturbance term. 
If the beta parameters turned out to be significant with the right signs, the U-curve 
hypothesis would be confirmed by the data. For simplicity of our analysis we omit the subscripts 
and the superscript in equation 5.1 and, hence, we can rewrite it as follows: 
2
1 2I Y Yα β β ε= + + +  (5.2) 
                                                 
77 i = 1,2,…,N are the number of countries and t = 1,2,… are the number of years in the sample. The t=1 
denotes that the observation belongs to the initial year of ith country. Similarly, t=2 denotes for the second 
observation (the years may not be consecutive depending on the available income distribution data) and 
so on. 
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Since the equation above is a second-degree polynomial function, it captures the 
Kuznets’ hypothesis, i.e., the graph of the relationship between I and Y is U-shaped (parabola). 
The parabola opens either upward or downward, depending on whether the sign of β2 is positive 
or negative. 
Given that the Kuznets’ hypothesis is an inverted U-curve, we discuss only the case of 
β2<0. We can find the maximum level of the inequality that could occur in the equation 5.2 by 












⎛ ⎞∴ = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (5.3) 
Equation 5.3 shows that the maximum of I occurs at Y*. The second derivative of the 
equation 5.2 guarantees that the inequality is a minimum or maximum, depending on the sign of 
the second derivative. If β2 is greater than zero (β2 > 0), the second derivative of equation 5.2 is 
positive. It guarantees that I reaches its minimum at Y* in the equation 5.3. On the contrary, if β2 
is smaller than zero (β2 < 0), the second derivative is negative, which guarantees that I reaches 
its maximum at Y* in equation 5.3. This is the case of Kuznets’ hypothesis that we consider in 
our study. Given that our hypothesis β2 is smaller than zero, the equation 5.2 can generate two 
possible phenomena depending on the sign of β1. First, if β1 is smaller than zero (given that β2 is 
smaller than zero), the maximum of I occurs at Y∗ = -(β1/2 β2) < 0. Hence the given condition 
generates the negative Y when the level of inequality reaches the highest level. This occurs when 
the coefficients both β1 and β2 are negative. In our study it is not realistic that the level of 
development (GDP=Y) becomes negative. Second, if β1 is greater than zero (given that β2 is 
smaller than zero), the maximum of I occurs at Y∗= -(β1/2 β2) >0. In second case, we see all the 
conditions are satisfied for Kuznets’ hypothesis. Thus the Kuznets’ hypothesis takes (β1 > 0) and 
(β2 < 0). 
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Then we also examine the Kuznets curve further by incorporating the mechanisms 
discussed in Kuznets (1955). Our model takes the following functional form: 
2
1 2 ( )
k k k k k k k k k
it it it it itI Y Y Xα β β λ μ= + + + +  (5.4) 
where kλ  is a row vector of coefficients and kitX  is a column vector for variables of our interest. 
These variables are the proxies of mechanisms discussed in the Kuznets (1955). We describe 
these mechanisms below: 
5.4.1 A trade-off between income inequality and growth 
A higher growth rate is likely to be associated with more unequal distribution because 
people or families with a high income save at a higher rate and accumulate more capital and, 
thus, receive a higher proportion of wealth income. Hence, a higher growth rate brings a higher 
income inequality. In terms of the Kuznets’ paradigm and of an associated dualistic economy 
framework, a higher growth rate implies a faster movement along the income trajectory. Thus, 
we expect that the higher growth rate is positively associated with income inequality. 
5.4.2 A trade-off between income inequality and the demographic transition 
A rapid population growth produces a larger cohort of young and typically low paid 
workers. This variable is expected to increase inequality because the growth of the population 
causes a higher supply of labourers and in turn lowers the level of income. We particularly 
expect that this variable will increase inequality by inflating the bottom income groups. Thus, 
there will be a positive association between inequality and population growth in the model. 
5.4.3 A trade off between income inequality and education 
Economists believe that the spread of education is associated with a reduction in 
inequality. An increase in the number of people with advanced educational credentials should 
increase the competition for positions and in turn reduce wage inequality between the educated 
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and uneducated (Timbergen, 1975). Ahluwalia (1976) and many others have found that the 
spread of education has a strong negative effect on income inequality. Maddison (1982) 
recognised that an economy experiencing economic growth has a shift in its employment 
characteristics with a move from a large agricultural sector into a more industrialised pattern and 
then into the services oriented sectors. This experiment can only be carried out when the 
population has a basic level of education. It attempts to measure the effects of the level of 
schooling (for working age people) on income distribution. 
5.4.4 A trade off between income inequality and labour force shift 
Kuznets (1955) focuses on the movement of persons from agriculture and rural sectors 
to industrial and urban sectors, respectively, during the process of economic development. The 
persons who shift from agriculture to industry and rural to urban areas experience a rise in per 
capita income. Thus, this shift raises the economy’s overall degree of inequality. Barro (2000, 
pp.8-9) argues that the dominant effect initially is the expansion in size of small and relatively 
rich group of persons in the industrial and urban sectors. Consequently, at the early stages of 
development, the relation between the level of the per capita product and the extent of inequality 
tends to be positive. He further argues that as the size of the agricultural sector diminishes, the 
main effect on inequality from the continuing urbanisation is that many of the poor agricultural 
workers are enabled to join the relatively rich industrial sector. The decrease in size of the labour 
force tends to increase the relative wage in this sector. 
Additionally, Kuznets (1955) argues that income inequality in a developing society is 
typically higher in urban centres (with the diversity of social conditions ranging from the 
destitute to wealthy industrialists) than in rural areas. His assumption, the rural/urban contrast, 
predicts a positive association between income inequality and urbanisation. The main 
explanation of the U-shape relationship between inequality and development stresses the effects 
of labour force shifts between the traditional agricultural and modern sectors. His main argument 
is the impact of rural to urban migration flow on the distribution of incomes during the 
development process. These two effects of labour shifts are captured in the inequality model by 
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the population growth rate, urbanisation population percentage, and the percentage of agriculture 
value added in GDP. 
As the industrialisation and urbanisation processes occur, and the economy develops, 
many technological innovations initially tend to raise inequality. The dominant force here is that 
this sector requires highly educated people78. Very few people take advantage in this sector in 
less developed economies initially. Thus, few become richer and the distribution of income 
becomes more unequal. In developed countries more people move into this favoured sector and 
more people take advantage of high technology. What we would like to argue in this respect is 
that the higher the level of education a country has, the more people enter into modern sectors 
where income is higher than elsewhere.79 Thus, as a result, the inequality of income distribution 
tends to fall in developed countries. 
5.5 Our Empirical Results 
The Quadratic Model of income inequality is specified in equation 5.1. The relative 
strengths of support for the inverted U-curve hypothesis may be gauged by examining the sign 
and significance of the estimated parameters in equations 5.1. There is strong support for the U-
curve hypothesis if the estimated coefficients of the quadratic terms in the transformed 
development indicator are significant, and opposite in sign. In the case of the inequality indexes, 
the coefficients of the linear term (Y) should be positive and that of the quadratic term (Y2), 
                                                 
78 We intend that highly-educated people have a high level of education. 
79 In less developed countries, given the lower education level, few people take advantage of 
technological change. Hence inequality in these countries is higher compared with developed countries. 
For example in our full sample, the mean education level for the countries with GDP (PPP) per capita 
above $ 10,000 has an average schooling (measure of average years of secondary schooling for people 
over 25 years) of 3.13 years. For other countries it is 1.16 years. The average level of income inequality 
(measured by the Gini index) is 32.44 percent for the high-income countries; while for the less income 
countries is 44.25 percent. We find in 1993 evidence (through sample data) that the developed countries 
have a high level of education and a low inequality. 
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negative. If the sign conditions are satisfied, but the estimated coefficients are insignificant, the 
support for the U-curve is considered to be weak. 
5.5.1 The results from the case study of Nepal 
We have collected data for 72 districts across five geographical areas and estimated the 
inequality measurements for these districts. The data for the inequality measurements are 
estimated from the NLSS (1996). The independent variables are also based at district level. The 
average literacy rate is used as a proxy for the education. The data is taken from the ‘Human 
Development Report (HDR) 1998’ for Nepal. The demographic data – the population growth 
rate and the rate of urban population as a proxy for urbanisation are estimated from the ‘Nepal 
Population Report 2002’ chapter 9. The remaining variables are estimated from the NLSS survey 
(1996). We have used three inequality indexes as the dependent variables. The estimation of 















Table 5.3: Income inequality and economic development 
 (Sample of 72 districts in Nepal for 1996) 
Variables Coefficient Std Error t R2 N 
Dependent variable: Gini Index         
(Constant) 0.1532* 0.0385 3.98  0.54  72 
GDP Per capita 0.0022* 0.0004 6.23      
GDP Per capita square -2.66E-06* 6.28E-07 -4.23      
Dependent variable: Theil Index         
          
(Constant) -0.3440* 0.1271 -2.71  0.47  72 
GDP Per capita 0.0064* 0.0012 5.37      
GDP Per capita square -7.51E-06* 2.07E-06 -3.62      
Dependent variable: Atkinson Index         
(Constant) -0.0599 0.0367 -1.63  0.50  72 
GDP Per capita 0.0019* 0.0003 5.58      
GDP Per capita square -2.23E-06*  5.99E-07  -3.72         
Author’s own estimates from NLSS (1996) and HDR (1998) data 
Notes: Students t-ratios are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
As expected, we obtain the same sign and significant t-statistics. The estimated 
coefficients are significant at 99% confidence level for all inequality measures. Having found a 
significant confirmation of Kuznets’s hypothesis above, we now analyse the combined effects of 
variables as we described in equation 5.4. The estimations are reported in Table 5.4 below. 
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Table 5.4: The sample regressions for Nepal 
(Dependent variables: Gini Index, Atkinson Index, and Theil Index) 
Variables Gini Index Theil Index Atkinson Index 
Constant -0.0310 -0.7456* -0.2033* 
 (-0.39) (-3.33) (-2.94) 
GDP per capita 0.0014* 0.0032* 0.0010* 
 (3.47) (2.74) (2.73) 
Square of GDP per capita -1.39E-06** -1.51E-06 -6.95E-07 
 (-2.15) (-0.82) (-1.23) 
Personal saving 0.0013* 0.0046* 0.0014* 
 (2.79) (3.39) (3.36) 
Consumption income ratio 0.0016** 0.0043** 0.0014** 
 (2.23) (2.13) (2.31) 
Growth rate of population 0.0207*** 0.0604*** 0.0191*** 
 (1.77) (1.82) (1.86) 
No of urban population -4.53E-07** -1.11E-06*** -4.26E-07** 
 (-2.26) (-1.95) (-2.42) 
Adult literacy rate 0.0026** 0.0077** 0.0023** 
 (2.02) (2.06) (2.01) 
Initial level of personal wealth -2.30E-05*** -1.44E-04* -2.89E-05** 
 (-1.69) (-3.74) (-2.43) 
R2 0.70 0.74 0.72 
N 72 72 72 
Author’s estimates from NLSS (1996), Nepal Population Report (2002) and HDR (1998) data 
Notes: Students t-ratios are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 
The inverted U-curve seems to be consistent – taking all other variables as constant. 
The GDP per capita and its square have positive and negative significant signs respectively. 
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When we use the Theil and Atkinson indexes as dependent variables, the quadratic relationship 
of inequality over per capita income becomes insignificant while the Gini index is consistent 
with the hypothesis. As expected, the urbanisation and population growth have significant 
negative and positive significant signs respectively. This suggests that as urbanisation increases, 
inequality in Nepal decreases. On the other hand, the population growth rate has an increasing 
impact on income inequality. The literacy rate has a positive effect on income inequality, 
suggesting that higher literacy rate worsens income distribution. We also tested the equation, 
adding the square of adult literacy. The coefficient is negative and significant. It seems that the 
literacy rate increases at the beginning income inequality, but later it tends to diminish it. 
We have depicted the results of equation 5.1 in Fig. 5.2, providing a graphical 
representation of the Kuznets’ curve. The vertical axis shows the level of inequality and the 
horizontal axis plots the level of development in terms of GDP (PPP) per capita. The estimated 
curves are the inequality measurements against the GDP (PPP) per capita and its square. All 
curves confirm Kuznets’ hypothesis. 
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5.5.2 The results from the case study of the South Asian nations 
We have presented the results of the equation 5.1 for the South Asian nations in Table 
5.5 below. We have used the available data for the 1980s and the 1990s in five South Asian 
nations.80 Instead of using only one inequality index, we have applied five measures to examine 
Kuznets’s hypothesis. The first three indexes explain the variation of the whole distribution of 
income,81 while the rest are the poorest 60 percent and the richest 20 percent shares of income 
                                                 
80 The countries are Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
81 They are the Gini index, the Theil index and Atkinson indexes with ε = 0.5. 
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groups. We later analyse two groups of the distribution in order to see how they are affected by 
the given variables in the Kuznets’ hypothesis. The shares of the poorer income groups, for 
example, are expected to decrease at the initial stage of development. In the later stage they 
regain their share of income according to Kuznets. This hypothesis is based on the assumption 
that if the poor classes lose their share of income, the distribution of income will worsen. Thus 
β1 and β2 are expected to be negative and positive respectively. On the contrary, the share of the 
top quintile is expected to initially increase; and later it decreases. Thus, β1 and β2 are expected 
to be positive and negative respectively. Table 5.5 summarises these arguments for the case 
study of five South Asian nations. 
 
Table 5.5: Income inequality and economic development (Sample of the South Asian nations) 
Dependent variables Constant Log GDP (PPP)  per capita 
Sq. of log GDP (PPP)
per capita R
2 F- test N 
Log Gini -3.45***   3.13*   -0.49**   52.62 11.66   24 
  (-1.97)   (2.691)   (-2.56)           
Log Theil -10.35**   7.10*   -1.12**   51.30 11.06   24 
  (-2.57)   (2.66)   (-2.53)           
Atkinson ε=0.5 -9.37**   6.50*   -1.02**   51.76 11.27   24 
  (-2.54)   (2.66)   (-2.53)           
Poorest 60% 4.26*   -1.70**   0.27**   47.62 9.55   24 
  (3.94)   (-2.36)   (2.24)           
Richest 20% -1.70   2.10**   -0.33**   50.40 10.67   24 
  (-1.42)   (2.64)   (-2.52)           
Author’s own estimates 
Notes: Students t-ratios are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 
We find Kuznets’ hypothesis strongly significant. The t-ratios show that β1 and β2 are 
significant at less than three percent levels for all dependent variables. The coefficients β1 and β2 
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for the poorest 60 percent among the income groups are negative and positive respectively. This 
means that in the initial stage of the development, poor people lose their income share of 
national income. On the contrary, β1 and β2 are positive and negative for the richest 20 percent. 
The t-ratios are significant at less than 3 percent. 
We now return to the results obtained with the complete specifications of the model in 
equation 5.5. The estimated results are presented in Table 5.6. Income inequality largely depends 
on income per capita with the inverted U-shaped curve. It also depends positively on economic 
growth, population growth, and the log of percentage of agriculture in GDP and negatively on 
the log of average years of schooling and the log of urbanization82. Evidence from the South 
Asian nations shows little relation between income inequality and the rates of GDP growth, the 
agricultural value added, and the level of secondary education. We dropped two variables from 
the model, the agriculture growth rate and growth rate of the economy, because the estimated 
coefficients of these variables are not significant statistically, though the expected signs are true. 
The results obtained by dropping these two variables improved. 
The Kuznets curve is strongly significant (significant at less than two percent 
probability level). The variable population growth is positively significant while the urbanisation 
is negatively significant at 5 percent probability level both. This suggests that a higher 
population growth worsens income distribution; whereas the higher rate of urbanisation 
improves it. 
Thus, in the context of the South Asian nations, we have found the elements that may 
explain country differences in income distribution; i.e. the three variables – the GDP per capita 
and its square, the population growth rate, and the percentage of urbanisation of the country. 
These three variables are significant in all regression equations. The effect of GDP per capita 
variables (representing the inverted U-curve) on income inequality is quite substantial and is not 
different from that obtained with equation 5.1. The explaining power of the model falls when the 
GDP growth rate, secondary schooling, and the agriculture share of GDP are included in the 
model. 
                                                 
82 Urbanisation is measured by the percentage of urban people. 
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Notes: Students t-ratios are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Dependent variables: Log Atkinson Index, Log Gini Index and Log Theil Index, Log of the poorest three 
quintiles share and the richest quintile share 
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5.5.3 The results from the case study of the world (ca 1988 and 1993) 
We have tested Kuznets’ hypothesis for a worldwide study using the Milanovic data 
set on income distribution.83 Milanovic (1999) confined his research to the issues of income 
distribution. We use his data to test, in an original way, Kuznets’ hypothesis. For this reason, we 
have classified our sample into three different groups according to the available data on income 
distribution. In the first group we examine Kuznets’ hypothesis circa 1988 by using three 
inequality measurements as dependent variables. All tests support Kuznets’ hypothesis (β1 
positive and β2 negative). The t-ratios, F-ratios, and R2 are relatively high. For example, all t-
statistics are significant at 1 percent probability level except for the intercept (see Table 5.7). In 
the second groups we examine the inverted U-curve for circa 1993. The hypothesis is consistent. 
Finally we examine both periods together. Not surprisingly, the test statistics are significant. 
Since the inequality measurements are calculated from two different types of data, i.e., some 
data are based on income and others are based on expenditure, we have introduced a dummy 
variable for income and expenditure. A dummy variable will be equal to one if the inequality 
measurements are calculated from income data, and to zero if the inequality measurements are 
calculated from expenditure data. We do so because the distribution of income is generally more 
unequal than the distribution of expenditure for various economic reasons.84 Including the 
dummy variable, the results slightly improve and the dummy variable is statistically significant. 




                                                 
83 We refer to the data appendix for detailed information on data. 
84 For example, the rich save more than the poor. Also, the poor may borrow for expenditure purposes. 
Thus, expenditure of the poor may be higher than their income and expenditure of rich may be lower than 
their income. This leads to the inequality of income higher than the inequality of expenditure. This aspect 
may also be explained through Keynes’s “psychological law”, where Ct = C* + c Yt. 
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Table 5.7: Estimate of cross-country income inequality (log) regression  
 Quadratic models in log GDP (PPP) per capita. 
Dependent variables C LY (LY)2 I/E R2 F N 
World Sample (ca 1988) 
Log Gini -0.76 1.48* -0.22* -- 42.16 18.59 54 
  (-0.79) (2.75) (-3.05)     
Log Theil -3.95*** 3.14* -0.48* -- 42.59 18.92 54 
  (-1.92) (2.74) (-3.04)     
Atkinson e=0,5 -3.68*** 2.99* -0.46* -- 40.19 17.14 54 
  (-1.81) (2.65) (-2.93)     
World Sample (ca 1993) 
Log Gini 0.51 0.71** -0.11** -- 0.22 11.79 87 
  (0.81) (1.99) (-2.27)     
Log Theil -1.16 1.46*** -0.23** -- 0.22 12.11 87 
  (-0.85) (1.92) (-2.21)     
Atkinson e=0,5 -1.07 1.41*** -0.22** -- 0.21 11.10 87 
  (-0.82) (1.94) (-2.21)     
World Sample (ca 1988 and 1993) 
Log Gini 0.17 0.92* -0.14* -- 28.72 27.80 141 
  (0.33) (3.10) (-3.51)     
Log Theil -1.90*** 1.92* -0.30* -- 29.16 28.40 141 
  (-1.67) (3.03) (-3.45)     
Atkinson ε=0,5 -1.77 1.85* -0.29* -- 27.39 26.03 141 
  (-1.61) (3.02) (-3.41)     
World Sample with dummy (ca 1988 and 1993) 
Log Gini 0.51 0.76* -0.13* 0.07 32.81 22.30 141 
  (0.96) (2.59) (-3.21) (2.89)     
Log Theil -1.16 1.57* -0.27* 0.15 33.49 22.99 141 
  (-1.02) (2.50) (-3.13) (2.98)     
Atkinson ε=0,5 -1.06 1.51* -0.26* 0.15 31.78 21.27 141 
  (-0.97) (2.49) (-3.10) (2.97)     
Author’s own estimates from Milanosevic (1999), PWT, and Barro-Lee data sets 
Notes: Students t-ratios are in parentheses. ***, ** , and *  indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels    LY= log of GDP (PPP) and I/E = Income expenditure dummy 
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It is apparent from these results that all equations satisfy their respective sign 
conditions for an inverted U-curve hypothesis. Focusing on the results for the full sample, it may 
be seen that the inequality equations provide strong support. The results for the inequality 
indexes corresponding to the sub-sample of South Asian nations are similar to those based on the 
full sample. We have depicted these results in Fig. 5.3. 
 






















Theil Index Gini Index Atkinson Index
 
Author’s own estimates 
We examined equation 5.4 further for the full sample of the world for circa 1988 and 
1993. Similar to the cases of Nepal and the South Asian nations, the GDP per capita and its 
square are significant with the signs required by the hypothesis. We found that the shift of 
population from the low-income rural sector to the high-income urban sector is negatively 
correlated with the inequality of income. It is negatively significant in the experiment of Nepal 
and the South Asian nations. We also found that changes in education inversely affect income 
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inequality, like in the case of the South Asian nations. This implies that an increase in secondary 
schooling has an equalising effect on income distribution. Evidence from the full sample also 
shows little relationship between income inequality and the rate of GDP growth. The Kuznets’ 
inverted U-curve – whereby inequality first rises and later decreases during the process of 
economic development – has a clear empirical regularity. The results do not change if we 
include various other variables; they are reported in Table 5.8 below. 
Table 5.8: Full sample regression from the world (ca 1988 and 1993) 
Variable Log Atkinson Index Log Gini Index Log Theil Index 
  1 2 1 2 1 2 
C -2.21E+00*** -2.22E+00*** -8.16E-02 -9.72E-02 -2.40E+00*** -2.44E+00***
  (-1.72) (-1.75) (-0.13) (-0.16) (-1.82) (-1.86)
Log GDP (PPP) 1.57E+00** 1.57E+00** 7.97E-01** 8.10E-01** 1.66E+00** 1.68E+00**
  (2.17) (2.21) (2.31) (2.39) (2.22) (2.30)
Log GDP (PPP)2 -2.27E-01** -2.28E-01** -1.15E-01* -1.17E-01* -2.41E-01** -2.45E-01*
  (-2.35) (-2.41) (-2.50) (-2.59) (-2.42) (-2.51)
Population growth 9.91E-02* 9.91E-02* 4.98E-02* 5.00E-02* 1.05E-01* 1.06E-01*
  (4.05) (4.08) (4.28) (4.32) (4.18) (4.22)
Log of schooling -2.06E-01** -2.04E-01** -1.03E-01** -9.98E-02** -2.10E-01** -2.04E-01**
  (-1.89) (-1.93) (-1.98) (-1.98) (-1.87) (-1.88)
Log Urbanisation 3.09E-01** 3.08E-01** 1.45E-01** 1.42E-01** 3.06E-01** 3.00E-01**
  (2.36) (2.41) (2.33) (2.35) (2.27) (2.28)
GROWTH 2.31E-04 -- 5.21E-04 -- 1.13E-03 --
  (0.05) -- (0.23) -- (0.24) --
R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.44
S.E. of regression 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.18
F-statistic 15.03 18.2 16.38 19.81 16.19 19.58
Prob (F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 117 117 117 117 117 117
Author’s own estimates from Milanosevic (1999), PWT, and Barro-Lee data sets 
Notes: Students t-ratios are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. Dependent variables: Log Atkinson Index, Log Gini Index, and Log Theil Index. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter an exploratory examination has been made of the relationship between 
economic development and inequality of income distribution in five South Asian nations during 
the last two decades; with an additional worldwide study on 54 countries in 1988 and 87 
countries in 1993. 
The variables have a significant effect on income inequality predicted by the model. 
The result of all equations guarantees the validity of the inverted U-curve. The GDP growth rate 
is positively correlated with income inequality; but it is insignificant in both experiments (the 
South Asian nations and the full sample). 
We have found that the Kuznets pattern is valid for the inequality of income in the 
process of development. There is a strong confirmation of a statistically significant relationship 
between income inequality and GDP per capita (and its square). This relationship generates the 
famous inverted U-shaped pattern – the inequality first rises and then decreases while GDP per 
capita increases. The agriculture value added on GDP has a positive effect but is not significant. 
This is observed in the five South Asian nations experiment. There is strong case for the 
implications of the demographic pressure on income inequality. A high growth rate of 
population is likely to generate greater inequality. This suggests that initially at least a large 
proportion of the work force growth remains in low-income employment. The average 
secondary schooling is negatively correlated. It is not significant in the experiment with regard 
to the South Asian nations (perhaps because the short-run and long-rung effects are different) but 





6.1 Methodology used in this study and future perspectives 
This final chapter contains a summarised version of the main topics covered by this 
study. To begin with, we examine the underlying intellectual foundations that sustain the 
legitimacy of this study and that motivated this entire thesis. Secondly, we look at the 
methodologies used to obtain such results, by trying to describe as briefly as possible the 
technical tools that helped us achieve a quantitative resolution to our questions. Thereafter we 
offer a somewhat more qualitative insight into the problem, and posit some economic 
explanations about the results yielded by our calculations. Finally, we will suggest some 
possibilities for further research. 
Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world and among those with the lowest per 
capita income. Poverty can be a motivating factor for policy makers, inciting them to try new 
ways of improving the living standard of the Nepalese people. Even though there is widespread 
agreement that something should be done, the problem lies in finding the most effective 
solutions to Nepal’s problems and in the ability to measure the impact of those solutions, thereby 
assessing the efficacy of future actions. A valid approach should pay close attention to the 
income and wealth allocated among the population. After all, tensions and confrontations do 
arise in a society where there are few rich people, and in which a large part of the population 
lives below the poverty line. 
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This research has intended to review the methods for measuring income, wealth, or 
expenditure inequality, and to apply these measures specifically to data from Nepal; and then 
compare these new results to those achieved by applying the same measures to other South 
Asian nations. South Asian nations tend to be more directly comparable to Nepal because of 
their geographical proximity to our country, and their similarity in economic, political and social 
features. To the best of the author’s knowledge, such an extensive study has never been 
undertaken for Nepal. The research programme for this study has been carried out in the 
following way: 
An analysis of the income distribution in Nepal was compared with four other 
countries of South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The main source of data 
from 1980 to 1994 is the Deninger and Squire study (1996); and after 1994 the main source of 
data is the World Development Report, 1998 (World Bank). Data on personal or household 
income and consumption are drawn from nationally representative household surveys and they 
are assembled in quintiles, i.e. the bottom 20% of the population has the lowest income, the 
second lowest 20% share has the second lowest income and so on. With the sample extracted in 
this way we can draw a Lorenz curve, which becomes the primary indicator of inequality in our 
study. Based on the Lorenz curve, a list of inequality indices (the Gini coefficient, Kuznets 
index, Theil index, Champernowne index, Atkinson indexes and Variance of Logarithms) have 
been used to deepen our insight into the data.  For a more detailed explanation of these indices, 
we refer the reader to Chapter Two. 
The index values summarised above have been calculated for Nepal and the other 
South Asian nations; then collected and analysed in comparison with each other in order to 
supplement the picture of income inequality in Nepal in comparison to its neighbours. 
An analysis of the wealth distribution in Nepal was conducted at household level. The 
purpose of this analysis was to uncover the least fortunate groups of the population and to see in 
overview how the wealth of Nepalese families is structured, with a view to finding some 
exhaustive reasons for Nepalese poverty. The sample was extracted from data collected in the 
NLSS (Nepal Living Standard Survey, 1996). It consists of different components of wealth; 
dwellings, land-holdings, enterprises, farming assets, durable goods, inventory, livestock, 
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lending, and other assets. The latter component comprises fixed assets such as land, building, 
and other real assets; which are not generally reported in the landholdings and dwellings 
surveys. This section also includes the values of saving accounts, fixed deposits, treasury bills, 
stocks, shares, employee providence fund, pension and so on. Wealth is therefore defined as the 
total assets of a household, identified by the various elements stated above, minus borrowings. 
The population has been divided according to different criteria such as  
Urban/rural areas 
1. Ecological regions: Terai, rural Hill, urban Hill, Mountain 
2. Development regions: Eastern, Central, Western, and Far-western 
3. Religion groups: Hindu, Buddhists, Muslims, Others 
4. Ethnic groups or Castes: Bramin, Chetry, Newar, Gurung, Rai, Magar, Limbu, Tamang, 
Tharu, Yadav/Ahir, Muslim, Sarki, Kami, Damai, and Others. 
The concentration of wealth for the population subgroups given above was studied by 
using different percentiles - top 5%, top 10%, top 20%, top 40%, bottom 60% etc. Additionally 
the concentration indexes refined in Chapter Two (the Gini coefficient, Theil index and Atkinson 
index) have also been used to expand the analysis. The results were examined by paying full 
attention to the most important criterion. This was done so that the potential policy interventions 
suggested by the data as being necessary to fight the worst of Nepal’s poverty issues could be 
better understood. 
The decomposition of income or wealth by population subgroups and by source of 
income and wealth allows us to present a realistic estimate of the regional or social dimensions 
of the distribution of resources in Nepal. It also allows us to examine the influence of every 
single source of income and wealth in total inequality. This study was based on data extracted 
from two household surveys of Nepal: the Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS, 1996) and the 
Household Consumption Survey of Rural Nepal (HCSRN 2001). The first sample was based on 
a national representative household survey, while the latter was based only on a survey of the 
rural area. The extracted data was divided into two categories: income and wealth. Each of these 
categories was divided further by its sources. 
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The first step was to calculate the Gini coefficient, Theil index, and Atkinson index of 
income, expenditure, and wealth for each group of the population in order to evaluate the overall 
situation. Using this method, we found that particular social, demographic, and regional 
characteristics may explain part of the inequality observed in the data; but do not tell us much 
about the extent to which particular population groups contribute to overall inequality. To go 
deeper into this issue, we extended our analysis using a decomposition method for population 
sub-groups in order to identify those groups of the population playing an important role in 
improving or worsening the distribution of wealth, income, and expenditure. The Gini 
coefficient and Theil index are used in an innovative way to explore this issue. To explain, we 
made the same divisions in the population (between geographical and social, as before) and we 
decomposed these indices into two parts: the ‘within-groups’, and the ‘between-groups’. Finally, 
we examined the inequality of income and wealth by decomposing each at their source. 
Following the methods described by Shorrocks (1982), we used the Theil Decomposition rule 
and the Variance Decomposition rule. We compared them with the factor share of each income 
source - which is the average income for a specific source - and divided it by the average of total 
income. 
The validity of the Kuznets U-shaped relationship between inequality and GDP and 
other macroeconomic factors is tested first with data from Nepal, then from South Asian 
countries and lastly from the entire world. The first sample was tested for Nepal across 72 
districts in 1996. We extended our examination of the above hypothesis by using the cross-
country data for the sample of the SAARC nations and for the world. Explanations of the 
Kuznets process relate to the nature of structural change. Early growth of income inequality may 
be concentrated in the modern industrial sector because employment in the urban modern sector 
is limited; but wages and productivity are high - as in the Lewis two sector theory of 
development. In this regard, Kuznets (1955) has discussed some mechanisms in which economic 
development often focuses on the rapid evolution of industrialisation. The economic measures of 
development have been often supplemented by literacy, schooling, health, urbanization, etc. We 
also examine the Kuznets curve further by incorporating these mechanisms into the simple 
quadratic equation in order to capture 
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(5) a trade-off between income inequality and growth, 
(6) a trade-off between income inequality and the demographic transition, 
(7) a trade off between income inequality and education, and 
(8) a trade-off between income inequality and labour force shift. 
To a large extent, the findings of this study are quite informative and provide a very 
clear picture of change in the levels of income and wealth inequality in the last two decades. The 
findings of this study provide empirical evidence that policy-oriented indicators should be 
accompanied in the analysis to target useful interventions towards the reduction of the level of 
economic inequality. However, researcher should make further efforts to understand the causes 
of income and wealth inequality. More explicit theoretical frameworks should guide the analysis 
of future studies. To accomplish this goal these frameworks should incorporate the concepts and 
the underlying assumptions of other more rigorous disciplines. Although this future research 
programme was somewhat addressed in this study, much remains to be done. For instance the 
inclusive results of the political factors influencing social inequality need to be empirically 
further explored. 
This thesis focuses on detailed analysis of income and wealth inequality in Nepal. The 
lack of more comparable overtime data has limited the study of the dynamic patterns. We have 
incorporated the analysis of wealth inequality for 1995 and 1996 from living standard survey 
data. The Statistical Bureau of Nepal has collected the data for 2003/4 recently. The new data 
may extend this study to explore some dynamic implications of wealth inequality. 
The choice of the objectives depends on political judgements about views on fairness 
and equality of economic opportunities. Further work might look more closely at different 
aspects of income and wealth inequalities, and on the factors affecting the economically as well 
as socially less fortunate groups of Nepalese society. 
6.2 On some empirical results obtained 
From the comparison of Nepalese income inequality with other SAARC countries we 
conclude that in the 1980s income was more equally distributed in Nepal compared with other 
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SAARC countries. The pattern of income distribution has rapidly approached the highest level of 
the inequality in Nepal during the 1990s. Though some countries experienced a worsening 
inequality and others experienced an improvement in income distribution, in general income 
inequality seems somewhat to converge across SAARC countries between the 1980s and 1990s. 
It may be the result of the progressive abolition of old-fashion frontiers; or it may be due to other 
factors. However, SAARC “revolution” does not provide a precise notion in terms of income 
distribution. 
The analysis of wealth distribution leads us to draw following conclusions. 
(a) Wealth inequality in Nepal is higher compared to most industrial countries. Of course, 
wealth distribution is not directly comparable, because of the different compositions of 
wealth, different methods of valuation, different unit values, different periods etc. The 
inequality of Nepalese family wealth is to a large extent driven by the unequal 
distribution of land. Furthermore, social values and norms, as well as historical factors, 
have played an important role. 
(b) Wealth distribution of urban household is more egalitarian than of rural household. 
(c) When the Nepalese households are classified according to the development regions, we 
find that the family wealth of the Far-western region was more equally distributed than 
the family wealth of the other regions for both 1995 and 1996. 
(d) When the Nepalese households are classified by ecological regions of the country, we 
find that the household wealth of the Mountain region is more equally distributed than 
the household wealth of other regions. 
(e) When the Nepalese families are classified by the ethnic groups, we find that wealth of 
Limbu, Muslim, Yadav/Ahir, and lower castes families are poor in terms of wealth 
holdings and their distribution of wealth is more equally distributed. 
(f) When the Nepalese families are classified by religion, the Muslim household wealth is 
found to be distributed equally than other religion groups. 
In the decomposition analysis, first of all we have shown that dwelling, landholding, 
and other assets have a very significant impact on overall inequality of wealth in Nepal. 
Landholding for rural Nepal contributes to more than a half of total wealth inequality; while 
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dwelling contributes to a large part of wealth inequality for urban Nepal. Similarly the empirical 
decomposition by income sources demonstrates that incomes from farm, enterprises, and wage 
are the major elements of total income inequality. In rural Nepal, farm income has generated 
four fifth of total inequality; but the share of this component is less than 60 percent. This 
suggests that any increase in farm income will enrich the upper class of rural society. This is in 
fact the consequence of higher inequality in land distribution. We have also proven that several 
sources of income and wealth have a negative impact on overall inequality, which means that 
they have a sort of redistributive effect. 
From our model of Kuznets’ hypotheses we obtained the following results. The result 
of all equations guarantees the validity of the inverted U-curve. The GDP growth rate is 
positively correlated with income inequality; but it is insignificant in both experiments (the 
South Asian nations and the full sample). There is a strong confirmation of a statistically 
significant relationship between income inequality and GDP per capita and its square. The 
agriculture value added on GDP has a positive effect. High growth rate of population is likely to 
generate greater inequality of income; while the education is negatively correlated in our 
empirical experiment. 
6.3 Epilogue 
This study on the causes and consequences of economic inequalities in Nepal has 
shown that a large number of variables are at stake. We would like to point out that historical, 
social, and institutional constraints are bound to make such a research programme much more 
complicated than a similar one concerning a so-called advanced country. We trust that this is the 
most important message that our painstaking task has managed to convey. 
 272
References 
ABEYRATNE, S. ‘Economic Roots of Political Conflict: The Case of Sri Lanka’, Unpublished. 
ACEMOGLU, D. (1997) ‘Matching, Heterogeneity, and the Evolution of Income Distribution’, Journal of 
Economic Growth, 2(1), pp. 61-92. 
ADELMAN, I. (1975) ‘Development Economics - A Reassessment of Goals’, The American Economic 
Review, 65(2), pp. 302-9. 
— and MORRIS, C. T. (1971) Society, Politics, and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach 
(Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore). 
— — (1973) Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Stanford University Press, 
Stanford). 
— and ROBINSON, S. (1989) ‘Income Distribution and Development’, in H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan 
(eds), Handbook of Development Economics (Elsevier Science Publishers, North-Holland), 2, pp. 949-
1003. 
ADHIKARI, R. (2002) Nepalese Society and Culture (Biddhyarthi Pustak Bhandar, Nepal). 
AGHION, P., CAROLI, E., and GARCIA-PENALOSA, C. (1999) ‘Inequality and Economic Growth: The 
Perspective of the New Growth Theories’, Journal of Economic Literature, 37(4), pp. 1615-60. 
— and HOWITT, P. (1998) Endogenous Growth Theory (MIT Press, Cambridge). 
AHLUWALIA, M. S. (1974) ‘Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem’, Finance and 
Development, 11(3), pp. 3-8. 
— (1976a) ‘Inequality, Poverty and Development’, Journal of Development Economics, 3(4), pp. 307-42. 
— (1976b) ‘Income Distribution and Development: Some Stylized Facts’, The American Economic 
Review, 66(2), pp. 128-35. 
ALESINA, A., DI TELLA, R., and MACCULLOCH, R. (2004) ‘Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans 
and Americans Different?’, Journal of Public Economics, 88(9-10), pp. 2009-42. 
— and PEROTTI, R. (1994) ‘The Political Economy of Growth: a Critical Survey of the Literature’, The 
World Bank Economic Review, 8(3), pp. 351-71. 
— — (1995) ‘Taxation and Redistribution in an Open Economy’, European Economic Review, 39(5), pp. 
961-79. 
 273
— — (1996) ‘Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment’ European Economic Review, 
40(6), pp. 1203-28.  
— and RODRIK, D. (1994) ‘Distributive Politics and Economic Growth’, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 109(2), pp. 465-90. 
ALI, A. A., and ELBADEWI, I. A. (1999) ‘Inequality and the Dynamics of Poverty and Growth’, Working 
Paper No. 32 (Center for International Development, Harvard University). 
ALLISON, P. D. (1978) ‘Measures of Inequality’, American Sociological Review, 43(6), pp. 865-80. 
ANAND, S., and KANBUR, S. M. R. (1993a) ‘The Kuznets Process and the Inequality-Development 
Relationship’, Journal of Development Economics, 40(1), pp. 25-52. 
— — (1993b) ‘Inequality and Development: A Critique’, Journal of Development Economics, 41(1), pp. 
19-43. 
ANDERSON, A. S., and NIELSEN, F. (2002) ‘Globalization and the Great U-Turn: Income Inequality 
Trends in 16 OECD Countries’, The American Journal of Sociology, 107(5), pp. 1244-99. 
ARROW, K. J. (1962) ‘The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing’, Review of Economic Studies, 
29(3), pp. 155-73. 
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (2003) Country Strategy and Program Update 2004-2006 Nepal 
ATKINSON, A. B. (1970) ‘On the Measurement of Inequality’, Journal of Economic Theory, 2(3), pp. 
244-63. 
— (1975) The Economics of Inequality (Clarendon Press, Oxford). 
— (1980) ‘Horizontal Equity and the Distribution of the Tax Burden’, in H. J. Aaron and M. J. Boskin 
(eds), The Economics of Taxation (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC), pp. 244-63. 
— (1997) ‘Bringing Income Distribution in From the Cold’, The Economic Journal, 107(441), pp. 297-
321. 
— and BOURGUIGNON, F. (1982) ‘The Comparison of Multi-Dimensioned Distributions of Economic 
Status’, The Review of Economic Studies, 49(2), pp. 183-201. 
— — (1990) ‘The Design of Direct Taxation and Family Benefits’, Journal of Public Economics, 41(1), 
pp. 3-29. 
— — (2000) ‘Income Distribution and Economics’, in A. B. Atkinson, and F. Bourguignon (eds), 
Handbook of Income Distribution (North-Holland, Amsterdam), 1, pp. 1-58. 
—, CANTILLON, B., MARLIER, E., and NOLAN, B. (2002) Social Indicators. The EU and Social 
Inclusion (Oxford University Press, Oxford). 
 274
—, and MICKLEWRIGHT, J. (1992) Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Distribution of 
Income (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). 
—, RAINWATER, L., and SMEEDING, T. M. (1995a) Income Distribution in OECD Countries: Evidence 
from the Luxembourg Income Study (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Paris). 
— — — (1995b) ‘Income Distribution in European Countries’, Working Paper No 121 (Working Paper 
Series, Luxembourg Income Study). 
BACHA, E. L. (1977) ‘The Kuznets Curve and Beyond: Growth and Changes in Inequalities’, 
Development Discussion Paper no.29 (Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard 
University, Cambridge). 
BANERJEE, A. V., and DUFLO E. (2000a) ‘Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say?’, Working 
Paper no. 7793 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Boston). 
BANGLADESH ECONOMIC RELATIONS DIVISION (2003) Bangladesh: A National Strategy for 
Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction and Social Department (Bangladesh Ministry of Finance). 
BANKS, J., BLUNDELL, R., and SMITH, J. P. (2000) ‘Wealth Inequality in the United States and Great 
Britain’, Working Paper No. 00/20 (The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London). 
BALESTRA, P., and BARANZINI, M. (1971) ‘Some Optimal Aspects in a Two Class Growth Model 
with a Differentiated Interest Rate’, Kyklos, pp. 240-56. 
BARANZINI, M. (1975) ‘The Pasinetti and Anti-Pasinetti Theorems: A Reconciliation’, Oxford Economic 
Papers, 27(3), pp. 470-3. 
— (1978) ‘Long-Run Accumulation of Capital and Distribution of Wealth in a Stochastic World’, 
Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 134(3), pp. 503-11. 
— (1982a) Advances in Economic Theory (Basil Blackwell, Oxford). 
— (1982b) ‘Income Distribution in the Pasinetti Model: Comment on Woodfield and McDonald’, 
Australian Economic Papers, 21, pp. 200-6. 
— (1991a) ‘The Pasinetti and Anti-Pasinetti Theorems: A Reply to K. Miyazaki and P. A. Samuelson’, 
Oxford Economic Papers, 43(2), pp. 195-8. 
— (1991b) A Theory of Wealth Distribution and Accumulation (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New 
York). 
— (1994) Economia politica, Macro e Microeconomia (Camera di Commercio, Cantone Ticino). 
 275
BARRO, R. J. (1990) ‘Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth’, The Journal of 
Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 103-25. 
— (1991) ‘Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
106(2), pp. 407-43. 
— (1999) ‘Inequality, Growth and Investment’, Working Paper no. 7038 (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Boston). 
— (2000) ‘Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries’, Journal of Economic Growth, 5(1), pp. 5-32. 
— and LEE, J. W. (1994) ‘Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries’, mimeo (Harvard University, 
Cambridge). 
— — (1996) ‘International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling Quality’, The American Economic 
Review, 86(2), pp. 218-23. 
BÉNABOU, R., (1996) ‘Inequality and Growth’, in B. Bernanke and J. Rotemberg (eds), NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 1996 (MIT Press, Cambridge), pp. 11-74. 
— (2000) ‘Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract’, The American Economic 
Review, 90(1), pp. 96-129. 
BHATTACHARYA, N., and MAHALANOBIS, B. (1967) ‘Regional Disparities in Household 
Consumption in India’, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 62(1), pp. 143-61. 
BIEWEN, M. (2002) ‘Bootstrap Inference for Inequality, Mobility and Poverty Measurement’, Journal of 
Econometrics, 108(2), pp. 317-42. 
BISHOP, J. A., CHOW, V., and FORMBY, J. B. (1995) ‘The Redistributive Effect of Direct Taxes: An 
International Comparison of Six LIS Countries’, Journal of Income Distribution, 5(1), pp. 65-90. 
— FORMBY, J., and SMITH, J. (1991) ‘International Comparisons of Income Inequality: Tests for Lorenz 
Dominance Across Nine Countries’, Economica, 58(232), pp. 461-77. 
BORTIS, H. (1976) ‘On the Determination of the Level of Employment in a Growing Economy’, Revue 
Suisse d’Economie Politique et de Statistique, pp. 67-93. 
— (1982) ‘Dr. Wood on Profits and Growth: A Note’, in M. BARANZINI, (cur.) Advances in Economic 
Theory, op. cit., pp. 262-70. 
— (1984) ‘Employment in a Capitalist Economy’, Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, pp. 590-604. 
— (1990) ‘Structure and Change Within the Circular Theory of Production’, in M. BARANZINI, and R. 
SCAZZIERI (cur.) The Economic Theory of Structure and Change, pp. 64-92. 
— (1993) ‘Notes on the Cambridge Equation’, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 16(1), pp. 105-26. 
 276
— (1996) Institutions, Behaviour and Economic Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). 
— (2002) ‘Review Article: Piero Sraffa and the Revival of Classical Political Economy’, Journal of 
Economic Studies, 29(1), pp. 74-89. 
— (2003) ‘Marshall, the Keynesian Revolution and Sraffa's Significance’, Journal of Economic Studies, 
30(1), pp. 77-97. 
— (2000) ‘Some Considerations on Structure and Change’, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 
11(1-2), pp. 185-95. 
BOURGUIGNON, F. (1979) ‘Decomposable Income Inequality Measures’, Econometrica, 47(4), pp. 901-
20. 
— FOURNIER, M., and GURGAND, M. (2001) ‘Fast Development with a Stable Income Distribution: 
Taiwan, 1979-94’, The Review of Income and Wealth, 47(2), pp. 139-63. 
— and MORRISSON, C. (1990) ‘Income Distribution, Development and Foreign Trade: A Cross-Sectional 
Analysis’, European Economic Review, 34(6), pp. 1113-32. 
BRAULKE, M. (1983) ‘A Note on Kuznets’ U’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65(1), pp. 135-
39. 
BROWNLEE, W. E. (2000), ‘Historical Perspective on U. S. Tax Policy toward the Rich’, in J. Slemrod, 
(ed.), Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich (Russell Sage Foundation, 
New York, and Harvard University Press, Cambridge), pp. 29-73. 
BUHMANN, B., RAINWATER, L., SCHMAUS, G., and SMEEDING, T. M. (1988) ‘Equivalence Scales, 
Well-Being, Inequality, and Poverty: Sensitivity Estimates Across Ten Countries Using the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database’, The Review of Income and Wealth, 34(2), pp. 115-42. 
BURKHAUSER, R. V., and POUPORE, J. (1997) ‘A Cross-National Comparison of Permanent Inequality 
in the United States and Germany’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(1), pp. 10-17. 
BURMEISTER, E., and TAUBMANN, T. (1969) ‘Labour and Non-Labour Income Saving Propensities’, 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2(1), pp. 78-89. 
CANCIAN, M., and REED, D. (1998) ‘Assessing the Effects of Wives’ Earnings on Family Income 
Inequality’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(1), pp. 73-9. 
CARTTER, A. M. (1954) ‘Income Shares of Upper Income Groups in Great Britain and the United States’, 
The American Economic Review, 44(5), pp. 875- 83. 
CASS, D. (1965) ‘Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation’, Review of 
Economic Studies, 32(3), pp. 233-40. 
 277
CHAMPERNOWNE, D. G., and COWELL, F. A. (1998) Economic Inequality and Income Distribution 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). 
CHANG, J. Y., and RAM, R. (2000) ‘Level of Development, Rate of Economic Growth, and Income 
Inequality’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 48(4), pp. 787-99. 
CHEN, H. (2003) ‘Educational Systems, Growth and Income Distribution: A Quantitative Study’, Paper 
No. 13 (Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 Paper Series, Society for Computational 
Economics). 
CHENERY, H., AHLUWALIA, M. S., BELL, C. G., DULOY, J., and JOLLY, R. (1974) Redistribution 
with Growth (Oxford University Press, New York). 
— and SYRQUIN, M. (1975) Patterns of Development, 1950-1970 (Oxford University Press, London). 
— — and ELKINGTON, H. (1975) Patterns of Development 1950-1970 (Oxford University Press, New 
York). 
CHIANG, A. C. (1973) ‘A Simple Generalization of the Kaldor-Pasinetti Theory of Profit Rate and Income 
Distribution’, Economica, 40(159), pp. 311-13. 
CLINE, W. (1975) ‘Distribution and Development: A Survey of Literature’, Journal of Development 
Economics, 1(4), pp. 359-400. 
CLARKE, G. R. G. (1995) ‘More Evidence on Income Distribution and Growth’, Journal of Development 
Economics, 47(2), pp. 403-28. 
CONCEIÇÃO, P., and GALBRAITH, J. K. (1998) ‘Constructing Long and Dense Time-Series of 
Inequality Using the Theil Index’, Working Paper No. 1 (University of Texas Inequality Project, 
Austin). 
— FERREIRA, P., and GALBRAITH, J. K. (1999) ‘Inequality and Unemployment in Europe: The 
American Cure’, Working Paper No. 11 (University of Texas Inequality Project, Austin). 
COTTON, J. (1988) ‘On the Decomposition of Wage Differentials’, The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 70(2), pp. 236-43. 
COWELL, F. A. (1977) Measuring Inequality (Philip Allan, Oxford). 
— (1980) ‘On the Structure of Additive Inequality Measures’, The Review of Economic Studies, 47(3), pp. 
521-31. 
— (1985) ‘Measures of Distributional Change: An Axiomatic Approach’, The Review of Economic Studies, 
52(1), pp. 135-51.  
 278
— (1989) ‘Sampling Variance and Decomposable Inequality Measures’ Journal of Econometrics, 42(1), 
27-41. 
— (1995) Measuring Inequality (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead). 
— (1999) ‘Estimation of inequality indices’ in Silber, J. (ed.) Handbook on Income Inequality 
Measurement, Kluwer, Dewenter. 
— (2000) ‘Measurement of Inequality’ in A. B. Atkinson, and F. Bourguignon (eds), Handbook of Income 
Distribution (North-Holland, Amsterdam), 1, pp. 87-166. 
— and JENKINS, S. P. (1995) ‘How Much Inequality Can We Explain? A Methodology and an 
Application to the United States’, The Economic Journal, 105(429), pp. 421-30. 
DAGUM, C. (1990) ‘On the Relationship between Income Inequality Measures and Social Welfare 
Functions’, Journal of Econometrics, 43(1-2), pp. 91-102. 
DAHAL, D. V., UPRETY, H., and SUBBA, P. (2001) Good Governance and Decentralisation in Nepal 
(Center for Governance and Development Studies, Kathmandu). 
DALTON, H. (1920) ‘The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes’, The Economic Journal, 30(119), 
pp. 348-61. 
DANZIGER, S., and GOTTSCHALK, P. (1987) ‘Earnings Inequality, the Spatial Concentration of 
Poverty, and the Underclass’, The American Economic Review, 77(2), pp. 211-15. 
DATT, G., and RAVALLION, M. (1992) ‘Growth and Redistribution Components of Changes in Poverty 
Measures: A Decomposition with Applications to Brazil and India in the 1980s’, Journal of 
Development Economics, 38(2), pp. 275-95. 
DAVIDSON, R., and MACKINNON, J. (1981) ‘Several Tests for Model Specification in the Presence of 
Alternative Hypotheses’, Econometrica, 49(3), pp. 781-93. 
DAVIES, J. B. (1979) ‘On the Size Distribution of Wealth in Canada’, The Review of Income and Wealth, 
25(3), pp. 237-59. 
DE MELLO, L., TIONGSON, E. R. (2003) ‘Income Inequality and Redistributive Government Spending’, 
Working Paper No. 03/14 (International Monetary Fund, Washington DC). 
DEATON, A. (1997) The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric Approach to Development 
Policy (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore). 
— (2003) ‘Health, Inequality, and Economic Development’, Journal of Economic Literature, 41(1), pp. 
113-58. 
 279
— and DRÈZE, J. (2002) ‘Poverty and Inequality in India: a Reexamination’, Economic and Political 
Weekly, September 7th, pp. 3729–48. 
DEININGER, K., and OLINTO, P. (2000) ‘Asset Distribution, Inequality, and Growth’, Working Paper 
No. 2375 (Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, Washington DC). 
DEININGER, K., and SQUIRE, L. (1996) ‘A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality’, The World 
Bank Economic Review, 10(3), pp. 565-91. 
— — (1998) ‘New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality and Growth’, Journal of Development 
Economics, 57(2), pp. 259-87. 
DINARDO, J., FORTIN, N. M., and LEMIEUX, T. (1996) ‘Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution 
of Wages, 1973-1993: A Semi-Parametric Approach’, Econometrica, 64(5), pp. 1001-44. 
DOLLAR, D., KRAAY, A. (2000) ‘Growth Is Good for the Poor’, Working Paper (Development Research 
Group, The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
DOMEIJ, D., and KLEIN, P. (2000) ‘Accounting for Swedish Wealth Inequality’, Working Paper No. 
0883 (Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers). 
— — (2002) ‘Public Pensions: To What Extent Do They Account for Swedish Wealth Inequality?’, Review 
of Economic Dynamics, 5(3), pp. 503-34. 
DONALDSON, D., and WEYMARK, J. A. (1980) ‘A Single-Parameter Generalization of the Gini Indices 
of Inequality’, Journal of Economic Theory, 22(1), pp. 67-86. 
DU PIN CALMON, P., CONCEIÇAO, P., GALBRAITH, J. K., GARZA CANTÙ, V., and HIBERT, A. 
(1999) ‘The Evolution of Industrial Earnings Inequality in Mexico and Brazil’, Working Paper No. 5 
(University of Texas Inequality Project, Austin). 
EASTERLY, W. (1993) ‘How Much Do Distortions Affect Growth?’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
32(2), pp. 187-212. 
EASTWOOD, R., and LIPRON, M. (2000) ‘Rural-Urban Dimensions of Inequality Change’, Working 
Paper No. 200 (UNU/WIDER Publications, Helsinki). 
EKSTRÖM, E. (1998) ‘Income Distribution and Labour Market Discrimination: A Case Study of 
Namibia’, Working Paper No. 502 (IUI Working Paper Series, The Research Institute of Industrial 
Economics, Stockholm). 
FIELDS, G. S. (1975) ‘Higher Education and Income Distribution in a Less Developed Country’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, New Series, 27(2), pp. 245-59. 
— (1978) ‘On Inequality Comparisons’, Econometrica, 46(2), pp. 303-16. 
 280
— (1979a) ‘Decomposing LDC Inequality’, Oxford Economic Papers, 31(3), pp. 437-59. 
— (1979b) ‘A Welfare Economic Approach to Growth and Distribution in the Dual Economy’, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93(3), pp. 325-53. 
— (1980) ‘Regional Inequality and Other Sources of Income Variation in Columbia’, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 28(3), pp. 447-67. 
— (1981) ‘Poverty, Inequality and Development: A Distributional Approach’, Journal of Policy Modeling, 
3(3), pp. 295-315. 
— (1984) ‘Employment, Income Distribution and Economic Growth in Seven Small Open Economies’, 
The Economic Journal, 94(373), pp. 74-83. 
— (1993) ‘Inequality in Dual Economy Models’, The Economic Journal, 103(420), pp. 1228-35. 
— (1994) ‘Growth with Equity’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 47(4), pp. 722-4. 
— and OK, E. A. (1999) ‘Measuring Movement of Incomes’, Economica, 66(264), pp. 455-71. 
— and YOO, G. (2000) ‘Falling Labour Income Inequality in Korea’s Economic Growth: Patterns and 
Underlying Causes’, The Review of Income and Wealth, 46(2), pp. 139-59. 
FORBES, K. (2000) ‘A Reassessment of the Relationship between Inequality and Growth’, The American 
Economic Review, 90(4), pp. 869-87. 
FOSTER, J., GREER, J., and THORBECKE, E. (1984) ‘A Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures’, 
Econometrica, 52(3), pp. 761-6. 
FRANKLIN, S. D., and SMITH, J. D. (1977) ‘Black-White Differences in Income and Wealth’, The 
American Economic Review, 67(1), pp. 405-9. 
GALBRAITH, J. K. (1998) ‘The Distribution of Income’, Working Paper No. 2 (University of Texas 
Inequality Project, Austin). 
— (2002) ‘A Perfect Crime: Inequality in the Age of Globalization’, Daedalus, 131(1), pp. 11-25. 
— and DARITY, W. A. Jr. (1999) ‘Measuring the Evolution of Inequality in the Global Economy’, 
Working Paper No. 7 (University of Texas Inequality Project, Austin). 
— and GARZA CANTÙ, V. (1999) ‘Inequality in American Manufacturing Wages, 1920-1998: A Revised 
Estimate’, Working Paper No. 8 (University of Texas Inequality Project, Austin). 
— and JIAQING, L. (1999) ‘Inequality and Financial Crises: Some Early Findings’, Working Paper No. 9 
(University of Texas Inequality Project, Austin). 
— and KUM, H. (2004) ‘Estimating the Inequality of Household Incomes: A Statistical Approach to the 
Creation of a Dense and Consistent Global Data Set’, Working Paper No. 22 (University of Texas 
Inequality Project, Austin). 
 281
— and PURCELL, G. (1999) ‘Inequality and State Violence: A Preliminary Report’, Working Paper No. 4 
(University of Texas Inequality Project, Austin). 
GALOR, O., and ZEIRA, J. (1993) ‘Income Distribution and Macroeconomics’, The Review of Economic 
Studies, 60(1), pp. 35-52. 
GARCIA-PENALOSA, C. (1995) ‘The Paradox of Education or the Good Side of Inequality’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 47(2), pp. 265-85. 
GINI, C., (1912) Variabilità e Mutabilità (Bologna), reprinted in E. Pizetti and T. Salvemini (1955) 
Memorie di metodologica statistica (Libreria Eredi Virgilio Veschi, Roma). 
GITTLEMAN, M., and WOLFF, E. N. (2000) ‘Racial Wealth Disparities: Is The Gap Closing?’, Working 
Paper No. 311 (Jerome Levy Economics Institute). 
GOLDSMITH, S., JASZI, G., KAITZ, H., and LIEBENBERG, M. (1954) ‘Size Distribution of Income 
Since the Mid-Thirties’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 36(1), pp. 1-32. 
GOOLSBEE, A. (2000) ‘What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive 
Compensation’, The Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), pp. 352-78. 
GOTTSCHALK, P. (1993) ‘Changes in Inequality of Family Income in Seven Industrialised Countries’, 
The American Economic Review, 83(2), pp. 136-42. 
— and SMEEDING, T. M. (1997) ‘Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 35(2), pp. 633-87. 
GOUVEIA, M., and MASIA, N. A. (1998) ‘Does the Median Voter Model Explain the Size of 
Government? Evidence from the United States’, Public Choice, 97(1-2), pp. 159-77. 
GREENE, W. H. (2000) Econometric Analysis (Fourth Edition, Prentice Hall). 
GRIFFIN, K., and KHAN, A. R. (1972) Growth and Inequality in Pakistan (Macmillan, London). 
GRILICHES Z., KRELLE, H., KRUPP, J., and KYN, O. (1978) Income Distribution and Economic 
Equality (Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, and Wiley & Sons, New York-Toronto-Chichester). 
GROSSMANN, V. (2003) ‘Income Inequality, Voting Over the Size of Public Consumption, and Growth’, 
European Journal of Political Economy, 19(2), pp. 265-87. 
GURUNG, H. (1980) Vignettes of Nepal (Sahayogi Press, Nepal). 
HAQ, R., and BHATTI, M. A. (2001) ‘Estimating Poverty in Pakistan: The Non-food Consumption Share 
Approach’, Report No. 183 (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad). 
HARROD, R. F. (1939) ‘An Essay in Dynamic Theory’, The Economic Journal, 49(193), pp. 14-33. 
 282
— (1960) ‘Second Essay in Dynamic Theory’, The Economic Journal, 70(278), pp. 277-93. 
HESTON, A., SUMMERS, R., and ATEN, B. (2001) Penn World Table Version 6.0 (Center for 
International Comparisons, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia). 
HOSSAIN, A. (2000) ‘Convergence of Per Capita Output Levels Across Regions of Bangladesh, 1982-97’, 
Working Paper No. 00/121 (International Monetary Found, Washington DC). 
HUGGETT, M. (1996) ‘Wealth Distribution in Life-Cycle Economies’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
38(3), pp. 469-94. 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2000) ‘Nepal: Recent Economic Developments’, IMF Staff 
Country Report No 00/47 (International Monetary Fund, Washington). 
— (2004) Nepal: Country Report No.04/329 (IMF, Washington DC). 
IQBAL, Z., and SIDDIQUI, R. (1999) ‘Distributional Impact of Structural Adjustment on Income 
Inequality in Pakistan: A SAM-based Analysis’, Working Paper No.2 (Mimap Technical Paper Series, 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad). 
JANTTI, M. (1997) ‘Inequality in Five Countries in the 1980s: The Role of Demographic Shifts, Markets 
and Government Policies’, Economica, 64(255), pp. 415-40. 
JAPPELLI, T. (1999) ‘The Age-Wealth Profile and the Life-Cycle Hypothesis: A Cohort Analysis with a 
Time Series of Cross-Sections of Italian Households’, The Review of Income and Wealth, 45(1), pp. 
57-75. 
JENKINS, S. P. (1991) ‘The Measurement of Income Inequality’, in L. Osberg (ed.), Economic Inequality 
and Poverty: International Perspectives (Sharp Publishers, Armonk, NY), pp. 3-38. 
— (1995) ‘Accounting for Inequality Trends: Decomposition Analyses for the UK, 1971-86’, Economica, 
62(245), pp. 29-63. 
JHA, S. K. (1996) ‘The Kuznets Curve: A Reassessment’, World Development, 24(4), pp. 773-80. 
JOHNSON, P., and WEBB, S. (1993) ‘Explaining the Growth in UK Income Inequality: 1979-1988’, The 
Economic Journal, 103(417), pp. 429-35. 
JUSTER, F. T., SMITH, J. P., and STAFFORD, F. (1999) ‘The Measurement and Structure of Household 
Wealth’, Labour Economics, 6(2), pp. 253-75. 
KALDOR, N. (1956) ‘Alternative Theories of Distribution’, The Review of Economic Studies, 23(2), pp. 
83-100. 
— (1957) ‘A Model of Economic Growth’, Economic Journal, 67(268), pp. 591-624. 
 283
— (1961) ‘Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth’, in F. A. Lutz and D. C. Hague (eds.), The Theory 
of capital (Macmillan, London), pp. 177-222. 
— (1966) ‘Marginal Productivity and the Macro-Economic Theories of Distribution’, Review of Economic 
Studies, 33(4), pp. 309-19. 
— (1978) ‘Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth’, in N. Kaldor (ed.), Further Essays on Economic 
Theory (Holmes and Meier, New York). 
KATZ, L. F., and MURPHY, K. M. (1992) ‘Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand 
Factors’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1), pp. 35-78. 
KEISTER, L. A. (2000) Wealth in America: Trends in Wealth Inequality (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge). 
KEITH, G., and AMY, I. (1997) ‘The Distribution of Wealth and the Pace of Development’, Working 
Paper No 3 (United Nations Development Programs). 
KHAREL, Y. (1998) ‘Impact of Grameen Bikas Bank on Poverty Alleviation among the Women of the 
Farwestern Development Region’, A Dissertation of Master in Sociology. 
KIM K. S. (1997) ‘Income Distribution and Poverty: An Interregional Comparison’, World Development, 
25(11), pp. 1909-24. 
KIM, H. Y. (2000) ‘Alternative Specifications of consumer Inter-temporal Budget Constraint and 
Measures of Wealth and Saving’, Applied Economics Letters, 7(3), pp. 203-5. 
KREGEL, J. A. (1973) The Reconstruction of Political Economy: An Introduction to Post-Keynesian 
Economics (Macmillan, London). 
KUZNETS, S. (1955) ‘Economic Growth and Economic Inequality’, The American Economic Review, 
45(1), pp. 1-28. 
— (1956) ‘Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: I. Levels and Variability of Rates of 
Growth’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 5(1), pp. 5-94. 
— (1957) ‘Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: II. Industrial Distribution of National 
Product and Labour Force’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 5(4), Supplement, pp. 1-
111. 
— (1963) ‘Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: VIII. Distribution of Income by 
Size’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 11(2, Part 2), pp. 1-80. 
— (1966) Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread (Yale University Press, New Haven). 
 284
LECAILLON, J., PAUKERT, F., MORRISSON, C., and GERMIDIS, D. (1984) Income Distribution and 
Economic Development: an Analytical Survey (International Labor Office, Geneva). 
LERMAN, R. I., and YITZHAKI, S. (1984) ‘A Note on the Calculation and Interpretation of the Gini 
Index’, Economics Letters, 15, pp. 363-8. 
— — (1985) ‘Income Inequality Effects by Income Source: A New Approach and Applications to the 
United States’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(1), pp. 151-6. 
— — (1989) ‘Improving the Accuracy of Estimates of Gini Coefficients’, Journal of Econometrics, 42(1), 
pp. 43-7. 
— — (1994) ‘Effect of Marginal Changes in Income Sources on U.S. Income Inequality’, Public Finance 
Quarterly, 22(4), pp. 403-17. 
LEUNG, C. K. Y. (1995) ‘Educated Guesses and Income Distribution’, Economic Letters, 48(2), pp. 173-
7. 
LEVY, F., and MURNANE, R. J. (1992) ‘U.S. Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review of 
Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations’, Journal of Economic Literature, 30(3), pp. 1333-81. 
LEWIS, W. A. (1954) ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor’, The Manchester 
School, 22, pp. 139-91. 
LI, H., SQUIRE, L., and ZOU, H. (1998) ‘Explaining International and Intertemporal Variations in Income 
Inequality’, The Economic Journal, 108(446), pp. 26-43. 
LILLARD, L. A. (1977) ‘Inequality: Earnings vs. Human Wealth’, The American Economic Review, 67(2), 
pp. 42-53. 
LITCHFIELD, J. A. (1999) ‘Inequality: Methods and Tools’ Text for World Bank’s Web Site on 
Inequality, Poverty, and Socio-economic Performance. 
LOURY, G. C. (1981) ‘Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings’, Econometrica, 49(4), 
pp. 843-67. 
MADDISON, A. (1982) Phases of Capitalist Development (Oxford University Press, New York). 
MENCHIK, P., and JIANAKOPLOS, N. (1997) ‘Black-White Wealth Inequality: Is Inheritance the 
Reason?’, Economic Inquiry, 35(2), pp. 428-42. 
MILANOVIC, B. (1996) ‘Income, Inequality and Poverty During the Transition’, Research Paper No. 11 
(The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
— (1998) ‘Income, Inequality, and Poverty during Transition from Planned to Market Economy’, Report 
No. 17419 (The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
 285
— (2002) ‘True world income distribution, 1988 and 1993: First calculation based on household surveys 
alone’, The Economic Journal, 112(476), pp. 51-92. 
MODIGLIANI, F. (1986) ‘Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nations’, The American 
Economic Review, 76(3), pp. 297-313. 
MOOKHERJEE, D., and SHORROCKS, A. (1982) ‘A Decomposition Analysis of the Trend in UK 
Income Inequality’, The Economic Journal, 92(368), pp. 886-902. 
MURFIN, A. J. (1980) ‘Saving Propensities from Wage and Non-Wage Income’, Warwick Economic 
research Papers, No. 174 (Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Conventry). 
NRB (1994) Agriculture Credit Review Survey (Nepal Rastra Bank, Kathmandu). 
NATH, K. H., and AL MAMUN, K. A. (2004) ‘Trade Liberalization, Growth and Inequality in 
Bangladesh: An Empirical Analysis’, Working Paper (Sam Houston State University, Houston) 
NEPAL MINISTRY OF FINANCE (2004) Nepal: Economic Survey Report. 
OKUN A. M. (1975) Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade-Off (Brookings Institution Press, Washington 
DC). 
NLSS (1996) Nepal Living Standard Survey, Volume I: Main Findings (Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Nepal). 
— (1996) Nepal Living Standard Survey, Volume II: Main Findings (Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal). 
O’NEILL, D. (1995) ‘Education and Income Growth: Implications for Cross-Country Inequality’, The 
Journal of Political Economy, 102(6), pp. 1289-1301. 
OAXACA, R. L., and RANSOM, M. R. (1994) ‘On Discrimination and the Decomposition of Wage 
Differentials’, Journal of Econometrics, 61(1), pp. 5-21. 
OHTAKE, F., and SAITO, M. (1998) ‘Population Aging and Consumption Inequality in Japan’, The 
Review of Income and Wealth, 44(3), pp. 361-81. 
OLIVER, M. L., and THOMAS, S. (1995) Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial 
Inequality (Routledge, New York). 
PAKISTAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE (2003) ‘Accelerating Economic Growth and Reducing Poverty: 
The Road Ahead’, Poverty Reduction Strategy Working Paper. 
PANIKAR, P. G. K. (1961) ‘Rural Saving in India’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 10(1), 
pp. 64-85. 
 286
PAPANEK, G. F. (1975) ‘Distribution of Income, Wealth and Power’, in Y. Ramati (ed.), Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries (Praeger, New York). 
— (1978) ‘Economic Growth, Income Distribution and the Political Process in Less Developed Countries’, 
in Z. Griliches, W. Krelle, H.-J. Krupp, and O. Kyn (eds), Income Distribution and Economic Equality 
(Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/Main and Wiley & Sons, New York). 
— (1979a) ‘Real Wages Growth, Inflation, Income Distribution and Politics in Pakistan, India, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia’, Discussion Paper No.29 (Department of Economics, Boston University, 
Boston). 
— (1979b) ‘Methodological and Statistical Appendix’, Discussion Paper No.30 (Department of 
Economics, Boston University, Boston). 
— (1980) The Indonesian Economy (Praeger, New York). 
— and OLDRICH K. (1986) ‘The Effect on Income Distribution of Development, the Growth Rate and 
Economic Strategy’, Journal of Development Economics, 23(1), pp. 55-65. 
PASINETTI, L. L. (1959) ‘On Concepts and Measures of Changes in Productivity’, The Review of 
Economic and Statistics, 41(3), pp. 270-86. 
— (1960a) ‘A Mathematical Formulation of the Ricardian System’, The Review of Economic Studies, 
27(2), pp. 78-98. 
— (1960b) ‘Cyclical Fluctuations and Economic Growtht’, Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 12(2), 
pp. 215-41. 
— (1962) ‘Rate of Profit and Income Distribution in Relation to the Rate of Economic Growth’, The 
Review of Economic Studies, 29(4), pp. 267-79. 
— (1966) ‘Changes in the Rate of Profit and Switches of Techniques’, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 80(4), pp. 503-17. 
— (1969) ‘Switches of Technique and “the Rate of Return” in Capital Theory’, The Economic Journal, 
79(315), pp.508-31. 
— (1973) A Multisector Model of Economic Growth (King’s College, Cambridge). 
— (1974) Growth and Income Distribution (Cambridge University Press, London). 
— (1977) Lectures on the Theory of Production (Colombia University Press, New York, and The 
Macmillan Press, London). 
— (1981) ‘On the Ricardian Theory of Value: A Note’, The review of Economic Studies, 48(4), pp. 673-5. 
— (1983) ‘The Accumulation of Capital’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 7(3-4), pp. 405-11. 
 287
— (1986) ‘Theory of Value – A Source of Alternative Paradigms in Economic Analysis’, in M. Baranzini 
and R. Scazzieri (eds), Foundations of Economics – Structure of Inquiry and Economic Theory: (Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford), pp. 409-31. 
— (1993) Structural Economic Dynamics – A Theory of the Economic Consequences of Human Learning 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). 
— (1999) ‘Economic Theory and Technical Progress’, Economic Issues, 4(2), pp. 1-18. 
— (2000) ‘Critique of the Neoclassical Theory of Growth and Distribution’, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Quarterly Review, 53(215), pp. 383-431. 
PAUKERT, F. (1973) ‘Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development: A Survey of Evidence’, 
International Labour Review, 108(2-3), pp. 97-125. 
PEN, J. (1974) Income Distribution (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 2nd edition). 
PENDAKUR, K. (1998) ‘Changes in Canadian Family Income and Family Consumption Inequality 
between 1978 and 1992’, The Review of Income and Wealth, 44(2), pp. 259-83. 
PEROTTI, R. (1992) ‘Political-Economic Equilibrium: Income Distribution, Politics and Growth’, The 
American Economic Review, 82(2), pp. 311-6.  
— (1993) ‘Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution and Growth’, The Review of Economic Studies, 
60(4), pp. 755-76. 
— (1996a) ‘Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say’, Journal of Economic 
Growth, 1(2), pp. 149-87. 
PERSSON, T., and TABELLINI, G. (1994) ‘Is Inequality harmful for Growth?’, The American Economic 
Review, 84(3), pp. 600-21. 
PIGOU, A. F. (1912) Wealth and Welfare (Macmillan, London). 
PIKETTY, T. (2001) ‘Income Inequality in France, 1901-1998’, Discussion Paper No. 2876 (Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, London). 
—, and SAEZ, E. (2001) ‘Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998’, NBER Working Paper No. 
8467 (National Bureau of Economic Research, New York). 
PLOTNICK, R. (1981) ‘A Measure of Horizontal Inequity’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
63(2), pp. 283-88. 
PODDER, N. (1993) ‘The Disaggregation of the Gini Coefficient by Factor Components and Its 
Applications to Australia’, The Review of Income and Wealth, 39(1), pp. 51-61. 
 288
PYATT, G. (1976) ‘On the Interpretation and Disaggregation of Gini Coefficients’, The economic Journal, 
86(342), pp. 243-55. 
QUADRINI, V., and RÍOS-RULL, J. V. (1997) ‘Understanding the U.S. Distribution of Wealth’, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 21(2), pp. 22-36. 
RAJAPAKSE, P., and ARUNATILAKE, N. (1997) ‘Would a Reduction in Trade Barriers Promote Intra-
SAARC Trade?: A Sri Lankan Perspective’, Journal of Asian Economics, 8(1), pp. 95-115. 
RAM, R. (1988) ‘Economic Development and Income Inequality: Further Evidence on the U-Curve 
Hypothesis’, World Development, 16(11), pp. 1371-6. 
— (1995) ‘Economic Development and Income Inequality: An Overlooked Regression Constraint’, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 43(2), pp. 425-34. 
— (1997) ‘Level of Economic Development and Income Inequality: Evidence from the Postwar Developed 
World’, Southern Economic Journal, 64(2), pp. 576-83. 
— (1999) ‘Financial development and economic growth: Additional evidence’, The Journal of 
Development Studies, 35(4), pp. 164-74. 
RAMSEY, F. P. (1928) ‘A Mathematical Theory of Saving’, Economic Journal, 38(152), pp. 543-59. 
RANDOLPH, S. M., and LOTT, W. F. (1993) ‘Can the Kuznets Effect Be Relied on to Induce Equalizing 
Growth?’, World Development, 21(5), pp. 829-40. 
RAO, C. R. (1969) ‘Two Decompositions of Concentration Ratio’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. 
Series A (General), 132(3), pp. 418-25. 
RAVALLION, M. (2001) ‘Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages’, Working Paper 
(Development Research Group, The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
— and CHEN, S. (1997) ‘What Can New Survey Data Tell Us about Recent Changes in Distribution and 
Poverty?’ World Bank Economic Review, 11(2). 
— and WODON, Q. T. (1997) ‘Poor Areas or Only Poor People’, Working Paper No. 1798 (Policy 
Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
REBELO, S. (1991) ‘Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth’, The Journal of Political 
Economy, 99(3), pp. 500-21. 
REHME, G. (2000) ‘Education, Economic Growth and Personal Inequality across Countries’, Working 
Paper No 99/42 (EUI Working Papers in Economics, European Institute). 
RILLAERS, A. (2001) ‘Education and Income Inequality: The Role of a Social Protection System’, 
Journal of Population Economics, 14(3), pp. 425-43. 
 289
ROBINSON, S. (1976) ‘A Note on the U Hypothesis Relating Income Inequality and Economic 
Development’, The American Economic Review, 66(3), pp. 437-40. 
ROMER, P. M. (1986) ‘Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth’, The Journal of Political Economy, 
94(5), pp. 1002-37. 
— (1987) ‘Growth Based on Increasing Returns Due to Specialization’, The American Economic Review, 
77(2), pp. 56-62. 
— (1989) ‘Capital Accumulation in the Theory of Long Run Growth’, in R. J. Barro (ed.), Modern 
Business Cycle Theory (Harvard University Press, Cambridge), pp. 51-127. 
SACHS, J. D., BAJPAI, N., and RAMIAH, A. (2002) ‘Understanding Regional Economic Growth in 
India’, CID Working Paper No. 88 (Harvard University, Cambridge). 
SAMUELSON, P., and MODIGLIANI, F. (1966) ‘Marginal Productivity and the Macro-Economic 
Theories of Distribution: Reply to Pasinetti and Robinson’, The Review of Economic Studies, 33(4), 
pp. 321-30. 
SAPOSNIK, R. (1981) ‘Rank-Dominance in Income Distribution’, Public Choice, 36(1), pp. 147-51. 
— (1983) ‘On Evaluating Income Distributions: Rank Dominance, the Suppes-Sen Grading Principle of 
Justice, and Pareto Optimality’, Public Choice, 40(3), pp. 329-36. 
SAUNDERS, P., STOTT, H., and HOBBES, G. (1991) ‘Income Inequality in Australia and New Zealand: 
International Comparisons and Recent Trends’, The Review of Income and Wealth, 37(1), pp. 63-79. 
SAWYER, M. (1976) ‘Income Distribution in OECD Countries’, OECD Economic Outlook (OECD, 
Paris). 
SEN, A. K. (1973a) On Economic Inequality (Clarendon Press, Oxford). 
— (1973b) ‘On Ignorance and Equal Distribution’, The American Economic Review, 63(5), pp. 1022-4. 
— (1995) ‘Rationality and Social Choice’, The American Economic Review, 85(1), pp. 1-24. 
— (1976) ‘Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement’, Econometrica, 44(2), pp. 219-31. 
— (1979) ‘Equality of What?’, The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, Delivered at Stanford University. 
— (1989) ‘Cooperation, Inequality, and the Family’, Population and Development Review, 15 
(Supplement: Rural Development and Population: Institutions and Policy), pp. 61-76. 
— (1997) ‘From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality’, Southern Economic Journal, 64(2), pp. 383-
401. 
SHEEHAN, J. (1980) ‘Market-Oriented Economic Policies and Political Repression in Latin America’, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 28(2), pp. 267-91. 
 290
SHERYL, B., and FELTENSTEIN, A. (1998) ‘Basic Macroeconomic Options for Bangladesh: A 
Numerical Analysis’, Journal of Asian Economics, 9(2), pp 281-305. 
SHORROCKS, A. F. (1980) ‘The Class of Additively Decomposable Inequality Measures’, Econometrica, 
48(3), pp. 613-26. 
— (1982a) ‘Inequality Decomposition by Factor Components’, Econometrica, 50(1), pp. 193-212. 
— (1982b) ‘The Impact of Income Components on the Distribution of Family Incomes’, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 98(2), pp. 311-26. 
— (1983) ‘Ranking Income Distributions’, Economica, 50(197), pp. 3-17. 
— (1984) ‘Inequality Decomposition by Population Subgroups’, Econometrica, 52(6), pp. 1369-85. 
SILBER, J. (1989) ‘Factor Components, Population Subgroups and the Computation of the Gini Index of 
Inequality’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 71(1), pp 107-15. 
— (1993) ‘Inequality Decomposition by Income Source: A Note’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
75(3), pp. 545-7. 
SINGH, N., BHANDARI, L., CHEN, A., and KHARE, A. (2002) ‘Regional Inequality in India: A Fresh 
Look’, Unpublished. 
SMITH, J. D., and FRANKLIN, S. D. (1974) ‘The Concentration of Personal Wealth, 1922-69’, The 
American Economic Review, 64(2), pp. 162-7. 
SMITH, J. P. (1995) ‘Racial and Ethnic Differences in Wealth in the Health and Retirement Study’ The 
Journal of Human Resources, 30 (Special Issue), pp. S159-S183. 
SPILERMAN, S. (2000) ‘Wealth and Stratification Processes’, Annual Review of Sociology, 26, pp. 497-
524. 
SUMMERS, R., and HESTON, A. (1991) ‘The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of 
International Comparisons, 1950-1988’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), pp. 327-368. 
TAM M. S., and PERSKY, J. (1982) ‘Regional Convergence and National Inequality’, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 64(1), pp. 161-5. 
THEIL, H. (1967) Economics and Information Theory (North Holland, Amsterdam). 
— (1979) ‘The Measurement of Inequality by Components of Income’, Economics Letters, 2(2), pp. 197-9.  
TODARO, M. P. (1997) Economic Development (Longman, London). 
TSUI, K. Y. (1996) ‘Economic Reform and Interprovincial Inequalities in China’, Journal of Development 
Economics, 50(2), pp. 353-68. 
UNDP (1998) Nepal Human Development Report 1998 (Nepal South Asia Centre, Kathmandu). 
 291
— (2001) Nepal Human Development Report 2001: Poverty Reduction and Governance (United Nations 
Development Programme, Kathmandu). 
VAUGHAN, R. N. (1971) ‘The Pasinetti Paradox in Neoclassical and More General Models: A 
Correction’, The Review of Economic Studies, 38(2), p. 271. 
WEEDE, E. (1997) ‘Income Inequality, Democracy and Growth Reconsidered’, European Journal of 
Political Economy, 13(4) pp. 751-64. 
WODON, Q. T. (2000) ‘Micro Determinants of Consumption, Poverty, and Inequality in Bangladesh’, 
Working Paper No 2076 (World Bank Working Paper Series, The World Bank Group, Washington 
DC). 
WOLFF, E. N. (1987) ‘Estimates of Household Wealth Inequality in the U.S., 1962-1983’, The Review of 
Income and Wealth, 33(3), pp. 231-56. 
— (1998) ‘Recent Trends in the Size Distribution of Household Wealth’, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 12(3), pp. 131-50. 
— (2002) Top Heavy: The Increasing Inequality of Wealth in America and What Can Be Done About It 
(The New Press, New York). 
WORLD BANK (1998) World Development Report 1998 (The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
— (2000) ‘Sri Lanka: Recapturing Missed Opportunities’, Report No. 20430-CE (Policy Research Working 
Paper Series, The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
— (2002) ‘Bangladesh Procurement Assessment Report’, Report No. 24144-BD (Policy Research Working 
Paper Series, The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
— (2002) ‘Pakistan Development Policy Review: A New Down’, Report No. 23916-PAK (Policy Research 
Working Paper Series, The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
— (2002) ‘Poverty in Pakistan: Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps and Rural Dynamics’, Poverty Assessment 
Report No. 24296-PAK (Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank Group, Washington 
DC). 
— (2003) ‘Bangladesh: Impressive Government but Continuing Challenges’, Report No. 26154-BD (Policy 
Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
— (2003) ‘Sri Lanka: Promoting Agriculture and Rural Non-farm Sector Growth’, Report No. 25387-CE, 
Volume I: Main Report (Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank Group, Washington 
DC). 
 292
— (2004) ‘Pakistan: CAS Progress Report’, Report No. 28262-PAK (Policy Research Working Paper 
Series, The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
— (2004) ‘Pakistan: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’, Report No. 27625-
PAK (Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank Group, Washington DC). 
YAO, S. (1999) ‘On the Decomposition of the Gini Coefficient by Population Class and Income Source: a 
Spreadsheet Approach’, Applied Economics, 31(10), 1249-64. 
YITZHAKI, S. (1983) ‘On an Extension of the Gini Inequality Index’, International Economic Review, 
24(3), pp. 617-28. 
— (1983) ‘On an Extension of the Gini Inequality Index’, International Economic Review, 24(3), pp. 617-
28. 
— and LERMAN, R. I. (1991) ‘Income Stratification and Income Inequality’, The Review of Income and 
Wealth, 37(3), pp. 313-29. 
